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The protection and conservation of the environment is essential for the continued 
existence of humankind, particularly in light of the challenges of climate change and 
environmental degradation. Along with these environmental concerns, South Africa 
faces challenges of poverty and inequality which can exacerbate environmental 
degradation. It is also often the poor who bear the brunt of the impacts of pollution 
and environmental degradation. Any effective approach to environmental protection 
must be mindful of the need for poverty alleviation, while any socio-economic 
development must bear in mind the absolute necessity of the environment for the 
existence of humankind. Section 24(a) of the Constitution provides for the right to an 
environment not harmful to health or well-being, while environmental protection is 
included in section 24(b). A handful of cases have dealt with this right, but its 
meaning has not been developed or sufficiently defined. This thesis looks at the 
interpretation of the key concepts of “environment”, “health or well-being”, and 
“sustainable development” in section 24. This is done through a teleological 
interpretation of the right which is mindful of the role of the interdependence of rights, 
and the context of the Bill of Rights and the Constitution as a whole. In light of the 
transformative goals of the Constitution it is important that section 24 is construed 
with due regard to the influences and challenges of socio-economic concerns such 
as poverty, unemployment and inequality. This thesis argues that the environmental 
right in section 24 can and should be interpreted to advance the needs of the poor 















Die beskerming en bewaring van die omgewing is essensieël vir die voortbestaan 
van die mensdom, veral as dit beskou word in die lig van die uitdagings van 
klimaatsverandering en die agteruitgang van die omgewing. Saam met hierdie 
bekommernisse oor die omgewing, het Suid Afrika ook uitdagings van armoede en 
ongelykheid wat die agteruitgang van die omgewing kan vererger. Dit is ook 
gewoonlik die armes wat die skok van die impak van die besoedeling en 
omgewingsagteruitgang moet dra. ‘n Effektiewe benadering tot omgewingsbewaring 
moet die behoefte aan armoedeverligting in ag neem, terwyl enige sosio-
ekonomiese ontwikkeling weer die absolute noodsaaklikheid van die omgewing vir 
die menslike voortbestaan in gedagte moet hou. Artikel 24(a) van die Grondwet 
voorsien vir die reg tot ‘n omgewing wat nie skadelik is vir die gesondheid of 
welstand van mense nie en artikel 24(b) maak weer voorsiening vir die beskerming 
van die omgewing. ‘n Handjievol sake het die reg behandel, maar die betekenis 
daarvan is nog nie ontwikkel of voldoende gedefinieer nie. Die tesis kyk na die 
interpretasie van die kernbeginsels “omgewing”, “gesondheid of welstand” en 
“volhoubare ontwikkeling” in artikel 24. Dit word gedoen deur ‘n teleologiese 
interpretasie van die reg, wat die interafhanklikheid van regte en die konteks van die 
Handves van Menseregte in die Grondwet as geheel, in gedagte hou. In die lig van 
die transformatiewe doelwitte van die Grondwet, is dit belangrik dat artikel 24 
gekonstrueer word met inagneming van die invloede en uitdagings van sosio-
ekonomiese kwelpunte soos armoede, werkloosheid en ongelykheid. Hierdie tesis 
argumenteer dat die omgewingsreg in artikel 24 tot voordeel van die behoeftes van 
die armes en tot die verbetering van hulle lewenskwaliteit, saam met die beskerming 
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1 1 Introduction to research problem 
Section 24 of the Constitution of South Africa (entitled “Environment”) reads as 
follows: 
Everyone has the right– 
(a) to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being; and 
(b) to have the environment protected, for the benefit of present and future 
generations, through reasonable legislative and other measures that– 
(i) prevent pollution and ecological degradation 
(ii) promote conservation; and 
(iii) secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources 
while promoting justifiable economic and social development.1 
As Anél Du Plessis has noted, this broadly phrased right is “loaded with potential 
meaning”.2 While a handful of cases have dealt with this right, the potential meaning 
of the environmental right has not been developed or sufficiently defined. The 
“paucity of jurisprudence” dealing with section 24 offers little to guide our 
understanding of this right.3  
This thesis will consider the interpretation of key concepts in section 24 with the 
goal of clarifying its content and scope. The environmental right must be interpreted 
and understood in order for it to be effectively realised, as “we can only meaningfully 
realise laws which we fully comprehend”.4 While the scope of this thesis will not 
allow for an exhaustive study of the meaning of section 24, it intends to make some 
contribution to the project by examining certain key concepts in this constitutional 
provision so as to promote the use (and usefulness) of the right.  
                                            
1
 Section 24, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
2
 Du Plessis A “South Africa's Constitutional environmental right (generously) interpreted: What is in it 
for poverty?” (2011) 27 SAJHR 279 303. 
3
 Feris L “Constitutional environmental rights: An under-utilised resource” (2008) 24 SAJHR 29 30. 
4
 Du Plessis A “Adding flames to the fuel: Why further constitutional adjudication is required for South 
Africa’s constitutional right to catch alight” (2008) 15 SAJELP 57 84. Du Plessis argues that judicial 
interpretation of section 24 is necessary in order to interpret environmental legislation in accordance 
with the Constitution. 




The motivation of this research lies in the untapped potential of section 24 for an 
interpretation that could serve the needs of the poor and promote social justice.5 
There is a great discrepancy between the quality of the environments to which 
various sectors of South African society are exposed. This is due, among other 
factors, to the displacement of communities under the apartheid government and 
current levels of poverty.6 The extent of poverty and inequality in South Africa is 
evident from a recent household survey.7 The 2013 survey revealed that 28 percent 
of South Africans do not have access to tap water either in their home or on site.8 In 
addition to this, 38 percent of the population do not have access to a flush toilet. Of 
that 38 percent, almost four percent have no access to any form of toilet, and 
another one percent use bucket toilets.9 The survey also found that almost 29 
percent of South Africans use their own refuse dump, while three percent simply 
dump anywhere.10 All of these factors have a negative impact on the health and well-
being of the poor, while also contributing to environmental degradation. Any relevant 
and effective interpretation of the environmental right must take the socio-economic 
and environmental circumstances of the poor into consideration.   
Under a Constitution that emphasises human dignity and equality and entrenches 
the socio-economic rights of all people, the environmental right cannot be restricted 
to the protection of wildlife and the natural, non-human environment. Kidd, for 
example, argues that such a narrow understanding of the term environment “tends to 
reinforce perceptions that environmental concerns are concerns of middle-class 
(largely white) people, which are not relevant to the majority of the population”.11 
These perceptions are, of course, not an absolute reflection of the reality. Many 
indigenous communities, for example, have a profound connection to the natural 
environment and are deeply concerned about its preservation. However, the 
historical approach to environmental conservation in South Africa was to cherish the 
                                            
5
 Anél du Plessis proposes that “a striking interface exists between the spirit and meaning of the 
substantive constitutional environmental right, poverty, and people’s health and well-being” in Du 
Plessis (2011) 27 SAJHR 283. Much of this research is inspired by this article and will be a 
development and expansion of propositions made there. 
6
 For an overview of some relevant statistics see Kidd M Environmental Law 2 ed (2011) 298-301. 
7
 Statistics South Africa “General household survey 2013” (18-06-2014) <http://beta2.statssa.gov.za/? 
page_id=1854&PPN=P0318&SCH=6005> (accessed 16-08-2014). 
8
 Statistics South Africa “General household survey 2013” 133. 
9
 Statistics South Africa “General household survey 2013” 150. 
10
 Statistics South Africa “General household survey 2013” 155. 
11
 Kidd Environmental Law (2011) 4. 




natural environment while showing little concern for the impact on individuals. This is 
illustrated in the case of many national parks which were established following forced 
removals of the communities that occupied the now protected areas.12 The 
preservation of the natural environment remains essential for the continued 
existence of humankind, but this cannot be achieved without being mindful of the 
poor and their relationship to the environment. Poverty contributes to environmental 
degradation and any real attempt to preserve and sustain the natural environment 
must recognise the importance of poverty alleviation. This suggests that there is a 
need to develop the interpretation of the constitutional environmental right in a way 
which recognises this relationship between poverty and the environment, and which 
is responsive to the needs of the poor. 
Du Plessis suggests that the interpretation of section 24 should focus on “the 
interconnectedness of socio-economic rights [and] the continued existence of 
poverty among the people of South Africa”.13 Feris similarly identifies the need “for 
jurisprudence that defines section 24 in the context of the specific economic and 
social conditions prevalent in South Africa”.14 Glazewski calls for a recognition of the 
relationship between socio-economic conditions and environmental concerns as 
follows: 
In facing [the challenges of environmental degradation], both international and 
domestic law have to confront the growing divide between rich and poor nations as 
well as the increasing income disparities within countries, including South Africa, 
where the alleviation of poverty and the creation of employment are inherently linked 
with the challenges around the environment.15 
In light of the transformative goals of the Constitution it is important that section 24 is 
construed with due regard to influences and challenges of socio-economic concerns 
such as poverty, unemployment and inequality in relation to the environment.16 As 
Kidd points out: 
                                            
12
 Kidd Environmental Law (2011) 300. 
13
 Du Plessis (2011) SAJHR 307. 
14
 Feris L “The socio-economic nature of section 24(b) of the Constitution - some thoughts on HTF 
Developers (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (HTF)” (2008) 23 SAPL 
194 206. 
15
 Glazewski J “The nature and scope of environmental law” in J Glazewski & L Du Toit (eds) 
Environmental Law in South Africa (OS 2013) 1-2. 
16
 The preamble of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 states that the Constitution 
is adopted with the aim to “[i]mprove the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each 
person”. See Klare K “Legal culture and transformative constitutionalism” (1998) 14 SAJHR 146-188. 




The litany of environmental ills suffered by many South Africans is inextricably tied up 
with their socio-economic status. Any attempts to redress the situation, therefore, 
cannot be divorced from the quest for social justice in South Africa.17 
The position of socio-economic interests in the interpretation of section 24 was noted 
in BP Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Agriculture, Conservation, Environment 
and Land Affairs: 
By elevating the environment to a fundamental justiciable human right, South Africa 
has irreversibly embarked on a road, which will lead to the goal of attaining a protected 
environment by an integrated approach which takes into consideration, inter alia, 
socio-economic concerns and principles.18 
The constitutional context of section 24 establishes the ideal setting for an 
interpretation of the environmental right which is mindful of the need for social justice 
as well as the role of the environment in achieving it.  
In order for the right in section 24 to be useful and effective in protecting and 
promoting the rights of all in South Africa, it is necessary to understand the 
entitlements of its beneficiaries. Understanding the content of the right is equally 
important for those officials tasked with the realisation of the right.19 As Du Plessis 
has argued: 
[A] deep, substantive basis must be laid down for understanding the normative 
meaning of a particular right for that right to be optimally useful for everyone living 
under the protection of South Africa’s transformative Constitution.20 
1 2 Research aims and methodology 
The aim of this thesis is to contribute to our understanding of this largely unexplored 
right and to highlight its potential for protecting the poor from the environmental risks 
to which they are regularly exposed. I do not endeavour to present a comprehensive 
analysis of section 24 in its entirety as the scope of this research does not allow for 
this. Instead my aim is to make a contribution to the interpretation of a few key 
concepts in the environmental right. I have chosen to focus on three contentious and 
open-ended concepts which have the potential to enhance social justice if 
                                            
17
 Kidd Environmental Law (2011) 300. 
18
 BP Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Agriculture, Conservation, Environment and Land Affairs 
2004 5 SA 124 (W) para 144B-D. 
19
 Du Plessis (2011) SAJHR 303. 
20
 Du Plessis (2011) SAJHR 303. 




interpreted teleologically: “environment”, “health or well-being” and “sustainable 
development”. 
The primary method used will be teleological constitutional interpretation. 
Teleological (or purposive) interpretation in this context involves examining a 
particular right in light of the text as a whole (the Bill of Rights and, more broadly, the 
Constitution) and examining the purpose for which it was created.21 Teleological 
interpretation has been described as an approach which “aspires in the interpretation 
of individual constitutional (and statutory) provisions, to realise the ‘scheme of 
values’ on which the constitutional order is premised”.22 The directions given under 
the interpretation clause in section 39 play an important role in determining the 
scheme of values which should inform the interpretation of fundamental rights.23 
Teleological interpretation requires the Bill of Rights to be treated as a whole 
rather than a list of independent and unrelated rights. Under this approach the 
fundamental rights included in the Bill of Rights are indicative of the values that 
should inform a purposive interpretation section 24. The interconnectedness and 
interrelationship of the rights in the Bill of Rights will be important in the interpretation 
of the environmental right. As the goals of the Constitution have a central function in 
teleological interpretation, the preamble serves as a valuable guide to constitutional 
interpretation. An interpretation of section 24 which incorporates the constitutional 
goals will be preferred to one which does not. This thesis ultimately aims to 
determine how the advancement of social justice can be facilitated through a 
teleological interpretation of key concepts in the environmental right in section 24. 
The interpretation of the three key concepts will be approached by examining the 
meaning given to them in the following contexts: the ordinary linguistic meaning of 
the concept; the meaning within the context of section 24 as a whole; the definitions 
in relevant environmental legislation; the interpretations found in South African 
                                            
21
 Du Plessis L “Interpretation” in S Woolman & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 
ed (OS 2008) 32-35. 
22
 Du Plessis “Interpretation” in CLOSA 32-55. 
23
 Section 39, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Section 39(1) states: 
When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum– 
(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom; 
(b) must consider international law; and 
(c) may consider foreign law. 




jurisprudence; the interpretation of the concept in the international law context; and 
finally, the interpretation of the concept in academic literature. The interdependence 
of rights and the influence of constitutional goals and values will be considered 
throughout. 
1 3 Overview of chapters 
In chapter 2 the interpretive approach to section 24 will be discussed. This chapter 
argues for the teleological approach to the interpretation of the environmental right 
that will be employed in the subsequent chapters. The significance of the 
interdependence of rights as well as the constitutional values and goals that should 
inform the interpretation of rights will be explored. This chapter also includes an 
interdependent interpretation of section 24 in relation to a selection of relevant rights 
in order to draw attention to the purposes of the right. The rights to equality, human 
dignity, life, freedom and security of the person, housing, health care services and 
water are discussed, in order to investigate their relevance for the interpretation of 
the environmental right. The rights, values and purposes underscored by this 
interdependent interpretation will be important for the interpretation of the key 
concepts of section 24. 
Chapter 3 examines the first of the key concepts: “environment”. In order to 
understand the scope of the environmental right’s application, it is necessary to 
define what is meant by the central concept of “environment”. Van der Linde and 
Basson note that “[n]either international law, nor academic writing, nor legislation 
provides a uniform answer to this question”.24 There is, however, consensus on the 
fact that, at a minimum, “environment” does include the natural, non-human 
environment. The possible definitions provided by the Environmental Conservation 
Act 73 of 1989 and the National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 will be 
examined along with case law, international law and academic opinions on the 
matter. It will be suggested that an interpretation of environment must be broader 
than the natural environment and include aspects of the anthropogenic environment 
                                            
24
 Van der Linde M & Basson E “Environment” in S Woolman & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of 
South Africa 2 ed (RS 2 2010) 50-12. 




if it is to be effective in advancing social justice and promoting human dignity and 
equality. 
The concepts of “health” and “well-being” are addressed in chapter 4. The two 
terms appear alongside one another in section 24, and harm to either health or well-
being constitutes a violation of the right. As there is a great deal of overlap between 
the two, the broader notion of well-being will receive more attention in this chapter. 
The interpretation of harm will briefly be addressed as it has a significant influence 
on whether the environmental right is infringed. The concept of well-being is a 
nebulous and “potentially limitless”25 one. Most commentators agree that well-being 
refers to something wider than physical and mental health,26 but beyond that it 
remains unclear how it should be understood in the context of section 24. I aim to 
show that an interpretation of well-being should be mindful of the influence of socio-
economic rights and conditions, and the relationship between poverty and well-
being. The context of the Bill of Rights as a whole and the constitutional vision of 
“free[ing] the potential of each person” will be important in the interpretation of the 
term.27 The Bill of Rights offers constitutional protection to certain essential aspects 
of the human experience in the form of rights, and I intend to show that these rights 
should be considered essential components of an interpretation of well-being in 
section 24.  
Chapter 5 deals with the notion of “sustainable development”. The concept 
originates in the international arena, so international law has an important role in the 
interpretation of sustainable development. It is, however, necessary to interpret the 
term in its immediate context of section 24 and the Bill of Rights as well as the 
broader South African context. Sustainable development is widely understood as a 
balancing of the three “pillars”, namely environmental, social and economic interests. 
While there is some case law shedding light on sustainable development under 
section 24, exactly how the balancing of these interests should take place remains 
uncertain. How social and economic interests relate to inequality, poverty and 
unemployment will be important in achieving sustainable development that promotes 
                                            
25
 Glazewski J “The Bill of Rights and environmental law” in J Glazewski & L Du Toit (eds) 
Environmental Law in South Africa (OS 2013) 5-16. 
26
 Van der Linde & Basson “Environment” in CLOSA 50-16; Feris & Tladi “Environmental rights” in 
Socio-Economic Rights (2005) 260; Glazewski “The Bill of Rights and environmental law” in 
Environmental Law 5-16. 
27
 Preamble of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 




constitutional goals and values. In determining how these three pillars should be 
balanced I will consider the influence of the Bill of Rights, particularly the socio-
economic rights conferred on everyone in South Africa. I will investigate the role of 
other fundamental rights at stake in the balancing of social, economic and 
environmental concerns.28 Ultimately I aim to show that the interpretation of 
sustainable development should be informed by the rights, values and purposes of 
the Bill of Rights as well as the interdependence of rights. 
The environmental right in section 24 can and should be interpreted to advance 
the needs of the poor and improve their quality of life alongside the protection of the 
natural environment. Precisely how the concepts of environment, health or well-
being, and sustainable development should be interpreted will be examined in the 
chapters that follow.  
                                            
28
 Glazewski “The Bill of Rights and environmental law” in Environmental Law 5-20–5-21; Feris & 
Tladi “Environmental rights” in Socio-Economic Rights (2005) 262; Fuel Retailers v Director-General: 
Environmental Management 2007 6 SA 4 (CC) para 45. 




2 Constitutional interpretation and section 24 
2 1 Introduction 
In order to accord meaning to the environmental right, it is necessary to have an 
understanding of the principles of constitutional interpretation. The first part of this 
chapter examines various approaches to constitutional interpretation and rights 
interpretation. Ultimately, I argue for an integrated, teleological method of 
constitutional interpretation. This approach seeks to give effect to the purposes of 
the text. These purposes should be established through the application of 
grammatical, systematic, historical and comparative interpretation. The role of the 
theory of transformative constitutionalism and the interdependence of rights will also 
be emphasised. 
In the second part of this chapter I will examine the environmental right in section 
24 and reveal some of the purposes underlying the right as required by a teleological 
approach. These purposes will be identified through a discussion of the relationship 
between the constitutional goals and values, and the environmental right. An 
interdependent interpretation of the right in relation to a selection of other rights will 
also assist in uncovering purposes of the right that should guide its interpretation. It 
will be argued that the purposes distilled from the Constitution and the right itself 
indicate that the environmental right in section 24 should be understood as 
protecting human needs and interests as they relate to the environment and not 
merely as conserving the natural environment for its own sake. The proposed 
approach to the interpretation of section 24 could shape this right into an important 
tool for advancing social justice and addressing the needs of the poor. 




2 2 Constitutional interpretation 
2 2 1 Introduction 
Constitutional interpretation involves the task of ascribing meaning to a written text. 
There are multiple meanings which can be given to any text and there are also 
various possible approaches to this task, as Lourens Du Plessis notes: 
The text of the Constitution-in-writing is open-ended and generates more and more – 
instead of being limited to only certain – meanings. Methodological pluralism 
manifesting as multiple strategy interpretation is preferable to methodological monism 
seeking to establish a one and only correct manner in which to arrive at ‘the best’ or 
the ‘most correct’ interpretation of the Constitution.1 
Using the work of Du Plessis on interpretation as a point of departure, various 
methods of interpretation and interpretive guides will be discussed. As noted above, 
a single interpretive approach is not advisable, as no method is complete or 
absolutely conclusive when it comes to the nature of language and interpretation. 
The methods of interpretation that will be discussed are grammatical 
interpretation, historical interpretation, systematic interpretation, purposive or 
teleological interpretation and, finally, international and comparative interpretation. 
The role of various interpretive guides in delineating the meaning of a provision will 
also be addressed. The interdependence of rights will be emphasised here as it is an 
important guide which is consistent with systematic interpretation and can contribute 
to a teleological interpretation of the Constitution. 
2 2 2 Methods of interpretation 
2 2 2 1 Grammatical interpretation 
Constitutional interpretation requires the interpretation of written text and the point of 
departure is therefore the text itself. Grammatical interpretation has been described 
as interpretation which “concentrates on ways in which the conventions of natural 
language can assist the interpretation of enacted law and can help to limit the many 
                                            
1
 Du Plessis L “Interpretation” in S Woolman & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed 
(OS 2008) 32-191. 




possible meanings of a provision”.2 An interpreter must be mindful of the particular 
words, phrasing, grammar and syntax used in a provision as these are all indicators 
and regulators of meaning. 
The language of a provision can limit the many possible meanings of the text, but 
it rarely, if ever, contains a single objective meaning. Du Plessis notes that “[n]atural 
language is always open-ended and makes for a proliferation of meanings”.3 This is 
especially true of the text of the Constitution as it is  
meant to be a long-lasting text and its expansively formulated provisions must have 
the quality of being able to cater for an inestimable number of unpredictable situations. 
The Final Constitution by its very nature thus unsettles the assumption of clear and 
unambiguous language.4 
While the open-ended text of the Constitution allows for a range of possible 
meanings, the language used must be respected as it delineates the boundaries of 
those meanings. As Kentridge AJ states in S v Zuma:5 
I am well aware of the fallacy of supposing that general language must have a single 
"objective" meaning. Nor is it easy to avoid the influence of one's personal intellectual 
and moral preconceptions. But it cannot be too strongly stressed that the Constitution 
does not mean whatever we might wish it to mean.6 
This judgment of Kentridge AJ points out that the interpreter’s “personal intellectual 
and moral preconceptions” can shape their interpretation of the Constitution. These 
preconceptions must be restrained by the meaning of the words used in the 
Constitution. Kentridge AJ warns that the expansive wording of the Constitution is 
not a licence to ascribe any desired meaning to the text, but rather an invitation to 
find the best interpretation for the current circumstances within the boundaries 
provided by the text. 
As language alone cannot provide a clear, unambiguous meaning (and can even 
serve to conceal the interpreter’s own influential preconceptions), constitutional 
interpretation cannot be limited to grammatical interpretation alone. Further 
interpretive strategies are required to demarcate the broad and variable terrain 
generated by the language of the Constitution. 
                                            
2
 Du Plessis “Interpretation” in CLOSA 32-159. 
3
 Du Plessis “Interpretation” in CLOSA 32-32. 
4
 Du Plessis “Interpretation” in CLOSA 32-161. 
5
 1995 2 SA 642 (CC). 
6
 Para 17. 




2 2 2 2 Historical interpretation 
Historical interpretation “situates a provision in the tradition from which it emerged” 
by allowing information concerning the historical period in which the text was created 
to guide the interpreter.7 Relevant sources of historical information include the 
broader historical events around the time of the conception of the text, as well as 
details regarding the drafting of text itself. 
In the South African context this mode of interpretation is particularly significant as 
the shift from parliamentary sovereignty and apartheid rule to constitutional 
democracy is a dramatic (and relatively recent) one. The enactment of the 
Constitution is “a historical event at a particular point in time” and interpreters must 
be mindful of this.8 The Constitution and the rights therein need to be interpreted in 
light of the era of racism and apartheid rule they are reacting to and denouncing. The 
Constitution should be understood as “the remedy to a fundamental tripartite 
mischief in South Africa’s history, namely colonialism, racism and apartheid”.9 Of 
particular importance in the field of socio-economic rights are the patterns of 
disadvantage and discrimination that have historical roots and continue to exist 
under the constitutional democracy. The Constitution represents a break from 
apartheid rule, and should be interpreted as such.  
2 2 2 3 Systematic interpretation 
Systematic interpretation places a specific provision within its broader context or 
“textual setting”.10 Du Plessis explains: 
[I]ndividual provisions of an enacted instrument-in-writing […] are understood in 
relation to and in light of one another and of other components of the more 
encompassing instrument of which they form part, drawing on the ‘system’ or ‘logic’ or 
‘scheme’ of the written text as a whole.11 
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Systematic interpretation recognises that a provision does not exist in isolation, but 
forms part of a greater whole and should be interpreted in light of this.12 
Interpretation requires an awareness of all the parts of the text that make up the 
whole. It is this mode of interpretation that, for example, allows for sound reliance on 
the preamble in the interpretation of other portions of the Constitution.13 
Constitutional interpretation calls for an appreciation of the dynamic, interrelated 
nature of provisions and the role of constitutional values in the scheme of the text. 
The relevant constitutional values include those foundational values outlined in 
section 1 as well as human dignity, equality and freedom as referred to repeatedly in 
the Bill of Rights.14 These values form part of the fabric of the Constitution and must 
be recognised when interpreting any rights in the Bill of Rights.15 
This systematic form of constitutional interpretation has been endorsed by the 
Constitutional Court, most notably in Matatiele Municipality and Others v President of 
the Republic of South Africa and Others (No 2).16 In this case the court commented 
on the importance of contextual interpretation: 
Like the German Constitution, [the South African Constitution] “has an inner unity, and 
the meaning of any one part is linked to that of other provisions. Taken as a unit [our] 
Constitution reflects certain overarching principles and fundamental decisions to which 
individual provisions are subordinate.” Individual provisions of the Constitution cannot 
therefore be considered and construed in isolation. They must be construed in a 
manner that is compatible with those basic and fundamental principles of our 
democracy. Constitutional provisions must be construed purposively and in the light of 
the Constitution as a whole. 
The process of constitutional interpretation must therefore be context-sensitive. In 
construing the provisions of the Constitution it is not sufficient to focus only on the 
ordinary or textual meaning of the phrase. The proper approach to constitutional 
interpretation involves a combination of textual approach and structural approach. Any 
construction of a provision in a constitution must be consistent with the structure or 
                                            
12
 Scott C & Alston P “Adjudicating constitutional priorities in a transnational context: A comment on 
Soobramoney’s legacy and Grootboom’s promise” (2000) 16 SAJHR 206 218. 
13
 Du Plessis explains that “[i]ntra-textual, systematic interpretation […] lays the basis for relying on 
textual elements such as the preamble, schedules to and the long title of an enacted instrument in the 
interpretation of any of its specific provisions”. Du Plessis “Interpretation” in CLOSA 32-163. See also 
Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) 
para 1; Soobramoney v Minister of Health (Kwazulu-Natal) 1998 1 SA 765 (CC) para 9. 
14
 The foundational values are found in section 1, while human dignity, equality and freedom appear 
in sections 1, 7, 36 and 39. 
15
 See Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others ; Shalabi and Another v Minister of 
Home Affairs and Others ; Thomas and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others 2000 3 SA 936 
(CC) para 34-35. 
16
 2007 6 SA 477 (CC). 




scheme of the Constitution. This provides the context within which a provision in the 
Constitution must be construed.17 
In addition to the role of overarching principles and values, the interaction 
between various rights is also essential to consider in rights interpretation, and the 
concept of the interdependence of rights can be seen as stemming from a 
systematic interpretation of the Bill of Rights as a whole.18 There is a complex 
network of relationships between the rights in the Bill of Rights. This 
interdependence means that we cannot, for example, consider the right to housing 
without also reflecting on the impact of the right to human dignity.19 
This systematic method of interpretation has been described as an integration of 
the text.20 Tribe and Dorf21 identify two opposing approaches which should be 
guarded against in such an interpretive exercise. Du Plessis explains the two 
approaches: 
Dis-integration, on the one hand, turns a blind eye to the systematic 
interconnectedness of text components and then tries to understand them in splendid 
isolation from one another. Hyper-integration, on the other hand, links text-components 
which, according to the scheme of the text, are not inherently coherent.22 
An interpretation of the right to life which, for example, relies heavily on section 192 
which deals with the establishment of an independent broadcasting authority could 
be seen as inappropriate as there is no ‘inherent coherence’, but it would be equally 
inappropriate to consider the right to emergency health care without considering its 
interaction with the right to life.23 
Systematic interpretation ultimately demands that we pay attention to the unity of 
the Constitution as a whole and the interactions between its various parts, including 
those values or principles which are not explicitly mentioned but are evident in the 
overall scheme of the text. 
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2 2 2 4 Purposive interpretation 
The aim of purposive interpretation is to interpret a provision so as to give effect to 
its purpose. Purposive interpretation looks further than the literal meaning of the 
words of a provision and asks what goal lies behind the existence of the provision. 
This approach is based on the assumption that the provision is not arbitrary, and has 
been enacted for a purpose.24  
Du Plessis points out that the process of interpreting purposively does not involve 
merely giving effect to an accepted purpose, but that interpretation is required to 
ascertain the purpose itself: 
[T]he purpose of a provision can simply not be known prior to interpretation. ‘Purpose’ 
can be established only through interpretation. The interpretation of enacted law is by 
its very nature purpose-seeking.25 
Purposive interpretation is then interpretation that seeks to establish the purpose of a 
provision and to give effect to that purpose. 
There are dangers in using an exclusively purposive approach to constitutional 
interpretation. Du Plessis warns against treating it as the answer to all problems of 
interpretation as interpretive processes “are too complex to be captured in one 
essential(-ist) or predominant catchword”.26 Murphy notes that for some lawyers and 
judges purposive interpretation represents the “disregard of words” or “straining their 
ordinary grammatical meaning” which results in uncertainty.27 He also recognises the 
fear that judges who place too much emphasis on purposive interpretation “might 
resort willy-nilly to relying on context (including the shifting values of the Constitution) 
to interpret legislation to mean whatever they want it to mean”.28 Murphy responds to 
this fear by pointing out that purposive interpretation does not require “a total 
departure from, or ignoring of, the language used in the text”.29 However, an 
exclusively purposive approach remains a risky one. 
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In order to guard against an “ad hoc purposivism”, a more integrated approach is 
necessary.30 The links between systematic and purposive interpretation have been 
recognised, and Du Plessis argues that “[a] purposive or purposeful reading of the 
Final Constitution […] must be a holistic (and historically sensitive) reading”.31 The 
purpose of a provision must be sought not only within the provision itself, but in the 
context of the purposes of the Constitution as a whole. Currie and De Waal describe 
this approach as follows: 
Purposive interpretation is aimed at teasing out the core values that underpin the listed 
fundamental rights in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom and then to prefer the interpretation of a provision that best 
supports and protects those values.32 
This more integrated purposive approach can be described as teleological 
interpretation. Often used interchangeably with purposive interpretation, teleological 
interpretation is a deeper, fuller form of purposive interpretation which recognises the 
role of the “scheme of values” of the Constitution in ascertaining the purpose of a 
provision.33 Du Plessis describes it as 
an enriched version of purposive interpretation [that] moves from the effectual 
acknowledgement of the purpose of a particular provision to the realization and 
fulfilment of values and purposes key to the legal and constitutional order as a whole.34 
The Constitutional Court has shown support for a purposive approach to 
interpretation.35 S v Zuma has frequently been referred to with approval for its 
reliance on the Canadian approach set out in R v Big M Drug Mart:36 
The meaning of a right or freedom guaranteed by the Charter was to be ascertained by 
an analysis of the purpose of such a guarantee; it was to be understood, in other 
words, in the light of the interests it was meant to protect. In my view this analysis is to 
be undertaken, and the purpose of the right or freedom in question is to be sought by 
reference to the character and larger objects of the Charter itself, to the language 
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chosen to articulate the specific right or freedom, to the historical origins of the concept 
enshrined, and where applicable, to the meaning and purpose of other specific rights 
and freedoms with which it is associated within the text of the Charter. The 
interpretation should be … a generous rather than legalistic one aimed at fulfilling the 
purpose of a guarantee and the securing for individuals the full benefit of the Charter’s 
protection.37 
Cornell and Friedman maintain that the Constitutional Court “adopts a teleological 
approach to interpretation […] in which the constituent parts of the Constitution are 
interpreted so as to cohere with one another and to further the purposes of the 
Constitution as a whole”.38 This teleological interpretation creates room for 
interpretation that considers the text, textual context, historical context, scheme of 
the text and the values and principles underlying the text itself. The goals and 
purposes of the text can be established using these factors. The jurisprudence 
clearly establishes that a purposive or teleological approach to interpretation has met 
with approval from the Constitutional Court. 
2 2 2 5 International and comparative interpretation 
2 2 2 2 1 International law 
Section 39(1)(b) states that international law must be considered when interpreting 
the Bill of Rights. Liebenberg notes that it is important to distinguish this interpretive 
injunction from binding international law which is incorporated through sections 231 
and 232 of the Constitution.39 In the context of the interpretation of the rights in the 
Bill of Rights, the instruction to consider international law in section 39(1)(b) is 
signficant. 
While both binding and non-binding international law must be considered in 
constitutional interpretation, the status of the particular international law remains 
relevant. Where an international instrument is binding in South Africa, there is an 
obligation to apply it. This could demand a specific interpretation in line with 
international obligations rather than requiring a mere consideration of international 
law in the interpretation of a right.  
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Section 232 of the Constitution renders customary international law part of South 
African law where it is not “inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of 
Parliament”.40 Dugard explains how courts assess customary international law in 
practice: 
[C]ourts may take judicial notice of [international law] as if it were part of our own 
common law. In practice this means that courts turn to the judicial decisions of 
international tribunals and domestic courts, both South African and foreign, and to 
international law treatises for guidance as to whether or not a particular rule is 
accepted as a rule of customary international law on the ground that it meets the twin 
qualifications of usus [state practice] and opinion juris [accepted as law].41 
Where a rule or principle is considered part of international customary law it is then 
incorporated into our law and will be binding rather than merely influential in 
interpretation.  
The position of treaties in South African law is addressed in section 231 of the 
Constitution which requires explicit incorporation of treaties by national legislation 
(with the exception of self-executing treaties).42 In Glenister v President of the 
Republic of South Africa43 Ngcobo J commented on the status of treaties in South 
African law: 
An international agreement that has been ratified by Parliament under section 231(2) 
[...] does not become part of our law until and unless it is incorporated into our law by 
national legislation. An international agreement that has not been incorporated in our 
law cannot be a source of rights and obligations.44 
Where a treaty forms part of our law in accordance with the guidelines of section 
231, it becomes binding in South Africa and must apply. Non-binding international 
law, on the other hand, does not apply directly, but must still be considered in the 
interpretation of the Bill of Rights. 
Important for the purposes of interpretation is the inclusion of binding and non-
binding public international law in the scope of the interpretation clause. Referring to 
the interpretation clause of the Interim Constitution in S v Makwanyane and 
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Another,45 the Constitutional Court explained the position of binding and non-binding 
international law: 
In the context of s 35(1), public international law would include non-binding as well as 
binding law. They may both be used under the section as tools of interpretation. 
International agreements and customary international law accordingly provide a 
framework within which Chapter Three [the Bill of Rights] can be evaluated and 
understood, and for that purpose, decisions of tribunals dealing with comparable 
instruments, such as the United Nations Committee on Human Rights, the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
the European Commission on Human Rights, and the European Court of Human 
Rights and, in appropriate cases, reports of specialised agencies such as the 
International Labour Organisation, may provide guidance as to the correct 
interpretation of particular provisions of Chapter Three [the Bill of Rights].46   
This decision establishes that international law agreements which have not been 
ratified by South Africa should still have a bearing on the interpretation of the Bill of 
Rights.47 
Du Plessis points out that “[t]he South African Constitution, and its Bill of Rights in 
particular, reflects the influence of a wide range of international human-rights law 
instruments: international declarations, covenants and conventions”.48 Although 
there are overlaps and similarities between the Bill of Rights and international 
sources due to the latter’s influence on the drafting of the Constitution, the rights in 
the Bill of Rights must be interpreted as “domestic highest law” and it is possible for 
the same (or a similar) provision to have a different meaning in South African law 
than that which it is given in the international law context.49 This does not mean that 
international law is insignificant or unpersuasive. Liebenberg argues: 
[I]nternational instruments and their interpretation by treaty bodies remain an important 
guide in interpreting relevant socio-economic rights provisions, particularly where it can 
be shown that the particular international jurisprudence is consistent with, if not 
identical to, our constitutional provisions and is appropriate in the South African 
context.50 
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Scott and Alston argue that the similarities between the content and values of the Bill 
of Rights and the UN human rights treaties indicate “the justifiability of a presumption 
of protection at least as great as that under the treaties”.51 They suggest that this 
presumption should be rebutted when international law is in conflict with the values 
of the Bill of Rights.52 
Relevant international law is a valuable guide in interpreting the provisions of the 
Bill of Rights, particularly where there is a lack of domestic case law on the right in 
question. Section 39 does not demand the adoption of international law, but its 
consideration is essential for interpretation of the Bill of Rights. 
2 2 2 2 2 Foreign law 
As opposed to the mandated consideration of international law, the Constitution 
permits the use of foreign law in interpreting the Bill of Rights in section 39(1)(c). 
This consideration of foreign law must be approached with some caution as legal 
systems vary throughout the world.53 The uniqueness and distinctiveness of each 
jurisdiction indicates that we should be wary of uncritically adopting foreign 
understandings or legal principles.54 
The nature and characteristics of the foreign jurisdiction will impact the extent to 
which it could add value to our interpretation of the Constitution.  Du Plessis points 
out that certain foreign constitutional texts “have had a definite impact on the making 
[of] the South African Constitution”.55 This lends favour to the use of these foreign 
constitutions to illuminate our interpretations of the Constitution. The greater the 
similarities between the South African Constitution and the constitutional text of a 
foreign democracy, the more persuasive a comparative interpretation will be. In K v 
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Minister of Safety and Security56 the Constitutional Court cautions that “it is important 
to be astute not to equate legal institutions which are not, in truth, comparable”.57 
Liebenberg offers a similar warning: 
Apart from practical difficulties relating to language differences and the differing legal 
systems of various jurisdictions, constitutional provisions acquire a distinctive meaning 
through their operation in concrete political economic and social contexts. Thus it is 
very difficult, if not impossible, to understand the true import and implications of 
comparative constitutional law and jurisprudence without a deep understanding of the 
relevant contexts.58 
Despite these cautions, foreign law can still be valuable in the interpretation of the 
Constitution. In deciding on the constitutionality of the death penalty in Makwanyane 
the Constitutional Court maintained: 
The international and foreign authorities are of value because they analyse arguments 
for and against the death sentence and show how courts of other jurisdictions have 
dealt with this vexed issue. For that reason alone they require our attention.59 
Foster similarly discusses the increased probability of the use of foreign law by the 
Constitutional Court in circumstances where “the challenged practice is identical to a 
practice challenged in foreign jurisdictions”.60  
The use of foreign sources is also valuable when a matter has not yet been 
decided on under the South African Constitution, but has been addressed 
extensively abroad. In Sanderson v Attorney-General, Eastern Cape61 the 
Constitutional Court held that “[c]omparative research is generally valuable and is all 
the more so when dealing with problems new to our jurisprudence but well 
developed in mature constitutional democracies”.62  
In addition to exercising caution in deciding when to use foreign sources, it is also 
necessary to pay attention to how these sources are used in interpretation. An 
understanding of the context of the legal system and its history is necessary if we are 
to avoid a superficial (and inappropriate) transfer of legal principles into our law. This 
may require knowledge of a foreign language and a broader study of the relevant 
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legal system. We must rely on foreign law that is correctly understood.63 Foster 
argues that “the use of foreign law is most persuasive when both the existence of 
relevant foreign decisions and the reasoning behind these decisions is fully 
considered”.64  
Finally, it is important to bear in mind that while foreign law can be valuable and 
illuminating, it is not binding. The Constitutional Court reiterates this in Makwanyane. 
In reference to the interpretation clause under the interim Constitution, the court held 
that the section dealing with foreign law “in permissive terms allows the Courts to 
‘have regard to’ such law. There is no injunction to do more than this”.65 While 
foreign law is not constraining, section 39(1)(c) does mean that courts are free to 
consider foreign law where it is appropriate and could possibly assist in the 
interpretation of the Constitution. 
Although foreign law has an important influence on the interpretation of rights in 
the Bill of Rights, I will not be addressing this influence in the subsequent chapters of 
this thesis. The scope of this research does not allow for the necessary contextual 
study of various foreign jurisdictions which is demanded by comparative 
interpretation. The treatment and interpretation of environmental rights in foreign law 
does, however, remain an important area of study worth consideration. 
2 2 3 Interpretive guides 
2 2 3 1 Introduction 
In addition to the methods of interpretation discussed above, there are other 
principles, theories and indicators that serve to guide constitutional interpretation. 
While these are not conclusive determinants of meaning, they assist in delineating 
the meaning of a constitutional provision. Those dealt with below are the generous 
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interpretation of rights, the goals and values set out in the Constitution itself, the 
principle of interdependence, and the theory of transformative constitutionalism.66 
2 2 3 2 Generous interpretation of rights 
The Constitutional Court favours a generous interpretation of rights, which “entails 
drawing the boundaries of rights as widely as the language in which they have been 
drafted and the context in which they are used makes possible”.67 A broad and 
generous interpretation should be preferred to a narrow, restrictive one. Klug 
suggests that this approach is “part of the response to the previous denial of rights 
that characterised South African legal history”.68 Currie and De Waal argue that the 
most “plausible” reason for this approach is the limitations clause in section 36 which 
allows a “broad construction of the right in the first (interpretative) stage of the 
enquiry” and only then requires justification for the infringement of the right.69 This 
approach favours the individual claiming the infringement as it makes a violation 
more likely and places the emphasis on the justification.70 
A generous interpretation does not, however, always correspond with a purposive 
interpretation of a right. A purposive interpretation could indicate that a right should 
be restrictively interpreted. Where there is such a contradiction between a generous 
interpretation and a restrictive, purposive interpretation, it seems courts will prefer 
the purposive approach above a generous construction of the right.71 This is 
because a generous interpretation is not necessarily in line with the goals and values 
of the provision and of the Constitution whereas a purposive interpretation is 
necessarily aligned with those purposes. As a result of this it could be argued that 
“the notion of generous interpretation does not contribute much to constitutional 
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interpretation”.72 Despite the questionable practical use of this approach, it is a useful 
point of departure and serves as a reminder that the Bill of Rights should break away 
from the “denial of rights that characterised South African legal history”.73 
2 2 3 3 Constitutional goals 
As discussed above, a teleological approach to interpretation involves giving effect to 
the values and purposes of the Constitution as a whole. In order to realise the 
purposes of the Constitution we must establish what those purposes are. The 
clearest statement of purposes is found in the preamble of the Constitution which 
states that the Constitution is adopted in order to break from the past and establish 
an open, democratic society which promotes social justice and human rights, where 
individuals are afforded equal protection under the law and their quality of life is 
improved.74 Reliance on the preamble is supported by a systematic approach to 
interpretation as the preamble “informs the matrix of interpretative legitimacy”.75 Du 
Plessis also points out that the Constitutional Court has displayed  
a readiness to rely on constitutional preambles for interpretive purposes without 
imposing the qualification that such reliance is warranted only where the language of 
the Constitution is ambiguous and/or unclear.76 
As a clear statement of constitutional goals, the preamble can serve as a valuable 
interpretive tool. 
The two most important of these goals for the purposes of this thesis are the goal 
of a society based on “social justice and fundamental human rights” and the aim to 
“[i]mprove the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person”.77 
The content and implications of these will be analysed in further detail below.78 The 
constitutional goals in the preamble serve as an important interpretive guide when 
the purposes of a specific provision are being determined. The purpose of a specific 
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provision must complement and further the goals outlined in the preamble (or at least 
not contradict them) if it is to be deemed a legitimate purpose. 
2 2 3 4 Constitutional values 
It has been argued that “legal interpretation, especially in the human rights arena, is 
a value-laden activity that should not be cloaked by the pretence of value 
neutrality”.79 The South African Constitution openly recognises the important role of 
values in interpretation. The values which should be relied on have been made 
explicit in the Constitution. It is not coincidental that the Constitution begins with a 
statement of values upon which the Republic of South Africa is founded. These 
values include human dignity, equality (with specific reference to sexism and 
racialism), the promotion of human rights and freedoms, the rule of law, and the 
accountability, responsiveness and openness of the government.80 
The values of human dignity, equality and freedom in Section 1(a) are repeated 
throughout the Bill of Rights. Section 7 affirms these values at the beginning of the 
Bill of Rights, section 36 requires that they are considered in assessing a justifiable 
limitation of a right and, most relevant here, section 39(1)(a) requires that they are 
promoted in the interpretation of rights.81 
The Constitutional Court has recognised that the Constitution “embodies […] an 
objective, normative value system”.82 The Bill of Rights directly refers to the role of 
the values and, as Liebenberg points out, “[s]ection 39 mandates an explicit value-
orientated approach in the interpretation of the various rights in the Bill of Rights”83 
and “[s]ection 39(1)(a) also requires the court to actively promote these values”.84 
Scott and Alston note that the verb “promote” indicates “an assertive role for the 
courts” granting them an important “value-forging role”.85 In addition to the direct 
instructions to consider these values when interpreting the Bill of Rights, a 
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systematic and teleological approach to interpretation calls for them to be taken into 
account in the interpretation of any provision of the Constitution. 
The Constitution gives interpreters the values of human dignity, equality and 
freedom to direct and inform the interpretation of the Constitution and to encourage 
interpretations that will further these values. With regard to the value statements in 
section 7, Du Plessis points out that these are “essentially presumptions that indicate 
that some understandings of the Bill of Rights are to be preferred to others”.86 In this 
way the values assist in demarcating the boundaries of the potential meanings of 
constitutional provisions and, more specifically, fundamental rights. 
2 2 3 5 Interdependence of rights 
As noted above, interdependence is closely related to systematic interpretation. The 
distinction between the two is that systematic interpretation of the Constitution 
involves the interrelation and connectedness of all provisions of the Constitution 
whereas the concept of interdependence is used almost exclusively in the field of 
human rights.   
The interdependence of rights is accepted as a key principle of international law.87 
It has been recognised that “[a]ll human rights are universal, indivisible and 
interdependent and interrelated”.88 Scott describes interdependence as “the idea that 
values seen as directly related to the full development of personhood cannot be 
protected or nurtured in isolation”.89 Interdependence appreciates that rights do not 
stand alone, but form a network of overlapping properties which together form “a full 
conception of personhood”.90 Scott suggests that, rather than emphasising the rights 
themselves, interdependence should be concerned with “nurturing the capacity to be 
human”.91 In the South African context Liebenberg argues for an approach to the 
interpretation of rights which acknowledges this interdependence and “does justice 
to the holistic concept of human well-being endorsed by our Bill of Rights”.92 Such an 
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approach which sees human well-being holistically would recognise the full spectrum 
of human need and ultimately “free the potential of each person” as aspired to in the 
preamble of the Constitution. 
Scott distinguishes between two types of interdependence: organic 
interdependence and related interdependence.93 This distinction can assist in 
determining how certain rights relate to each other and how they should be 
interpreted. In the case of organic interdependence, “one right forms a part of 
another right and may therefore be incorporated into that latter right”.94 In a sense, 
the second right owes its existence to the first. Scott uses the example of the right to 
freedom of association and trade union rights.95 Scott explains that “one right (the 
core right) justifies the other (the derivative right)”.96 Another example of this would 
be the relationship between the right to health care and the right to life. In the given 
example, the right to life would be the core right which encompasses the right to 
health care as the derivative right.97  
Scott describes related interdependence as the situation where “the rights in 
question are mutually reinforcing or mutually dependent, but distinct”.98 Here neither 
right is derived from the other, but they exist alongside one another and “are treated 
as equally important and complementary, yet separate”.99 An illustration of this would 
be the relationship between the environmental right in section 24 and the right to 
administrative justice in section 33. Administrative justice cases do not always 
implicate environmental concerns. However, the right to the environment is 
advanced when administrative justice serves as an effective tool to question 
decisions that concern the environment. In this way sustainable development, 
conservation or a healthy environment can be supported by the promotion of 
effective avenues to address environmental concerns through the right to just 
administrative action. The right in section 33 is thus complementary to section 24, 
but remains separate. 
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The principle of interdependence has been recognised as part of the South 
African Constitution.100 Liebenberg and Goldblatt assert that “[t]he inclusion of civil 
and political as well as economic, social and cultural rights [in the Constitution] 
reflects a commitment to the principle of the interdependency of all human rights”.101 
Liebenberg similarly argues that “[o]ne of the distinguishing features of the final 
South African Constitution is its far-reaching commitment to the principle of the 
interdependency of all human rights”.102 The interpretation of constitutional rights 
cannot ignore the influence of interdependence. 
The interdependence of rights has also been recognised by the Constitutional 
Court. In Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and 
Others103 the Constitutional Court affirmed the interrelationship of socio-economic 
rights:  
The right of access to adequate housing cannot be seen in isolation. There is a close 
relationship between it and the other socio-economic rights. Socio-economic rights 
must all be read together in the setting of the Constitution as a whole. […] Their 
interconnectedness needs to be taken into account in interpreting the socio-economic 
rights, and, in particular, in determining whether the state has met its obligations in 
terms of them.104 
It is clear that the court is in support of an interpretation of rights that pays due 
attention to the role of the interdependence and interconnectedness between rights.  
The role of interdependence in the interpretation of rights is one of enhancing the 
protection which rights offer by highlighting intersecting forms of discrimination and 
disadvantage. The intersection of multiple forms of disadvantage is perhaps clearest 
in cases of poverty. Scott notes that “from the social reality of the poor and 
oppressed emerge dimensions of human need and personhood that other sectors of 
society ignore or deny”.105 An interdependent approach to rights interpretation 
assists in drawing attention to those dimensions which are often overlooked or 
ignored. 
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Interdependence encourages a holistic approach to the protection of human 
welfare106 and “promotes the transformative ethos of the Constitution”.107 Liebenberg 
and Goldblatt propose an approach which they refer to as “interpretative 
interdependence” arguing that “[i]t encourages courts to consider how the values and 
purposes underpinning one right […] may be relevant and useful to the development 
of the jurisprudence under another right”.108 In the context of socio-economic rights 
Liebenberg contends that interpretation must be “sensitive to multiple, overlapping 
forms of deprivation and socio-economic marginalisation”.109 The advantages of this 
approach to rights interpretation are clear when we consider specific examples. 
Liebenberg and Goldblatt discuss the interdependence of socio-economic rights 
and the right to equality affirming an interpretation which is mindful of the 
“interrelationship” between the rights: 
[An interdependent interpretation] is also more likely to be responsive to the reality that 
the most severe forms of disadvantage are usually experienced as a result of an 
intersection between group-based forms of discrimination and socio-economic 
marginalisation.110  
They conclude that such an approach “would allow for the development of the 
equality right as requiring measures to address poverty”.111 This interdependent 
interpretation creates room to address “the complex causes and manifestations of 
poverty and inequality in South Africa”.112 Where people or communities experience 
a collective deprivation of, for example, equality, dignity, health services and water, 
an approach which considers each deprivation in isolation will fail to consider the 
links between various aspects of the rights and the cumulative effect of such 
disadvantages. Liebenberg and Goldblatt maintain that “[t]he striving to understand 
and respond to systemic disadvantage and injustice lies at the heart of 
transformative adjudication under our Constitution”.113 They contend that this 
objective can be achieved through “interpretative interdependence”.114 
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Similarly, Pieterse argues for an interdependent interpretation of the rights to 
health and freedom (or autonomy). He highlights the “interconnectedness of health 
status, individual control and socio-economic vulnerability”115 indicating that health is 
necessary for the exercise of autonomy and that autonomy is equally necessary “to 
pursue optimal health through exercising informed choices”.116 The “indivisibility of 
rights to autonomy and to health [and] their co-implication in health-related 
constitutional matters” again emphasises the necessity of an interdependent 
interpretation of rights to adequately address cases of overlapping disadvantages.117 
The relationship between the right to life and the right of access to health care 
services was briefly addressed in the case of Soobramoney v Minister of Health 
(Kwazulu-Natal).118 It was held that the right to life could not be relied on in a case 
concerning health care services as the latter is specifically dealt with in section 27.119 
Klug explains that the more expansive interpretation of the right to life was rejected 
in Soobramoney: 
[T]he state’s positive obligations to provide access to health care are contained in 
section 27 and therefore the Court could not interpret the right to life to impose 
additional obligations [on the state] that were inconsistent with section 27.120 
The case has been criticised for not recognising the clear interrelationship between 
the right to health care services and the right to life.121 Liebenberg argues that these 
rights should not be “interpreted to protect mutually discrete interests and to 
suppress the significant interconnection between these two rights”.122 Scott and 
Alston are also critical of the court’s approach in this case: 
[The court] seems to engage in a form of ‘negative textual inferentialism’ that is out of 
place in human rights jurisprudence. [...] [A]t face value, it would seem that both the 
right to life and the right to health must be read down in light of each other rather than 
drawing normative energy from each other.123 
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While the existence of a right to health suggests it was not necessary to extend the 
right to life to cover emergency medical care, this should not render the right to life 
irrelevant to the interpretation of section 27(3). If the right to health is to be 
interpreted contextually and teleologically, a consideration of the interpretive 
influence of the right to life cannot be ignored.124 
An appreciation of the interdependence of rights is crucial for a systematic 
interpretation of the Constitution that recognises that rights violations do not manifest 
themselves in isolation, but as a complex web of relationships and experiences that 
impact on a range of rights. For a comprehensive understanding of any right, 
including the environmental right in section 24, the intersection and relationship with 
other rights in the Bill of Rights must be considered. 
2 2 3 6 Transformative constitutionalism 
Transformative constitutionalism sees the Constitution as a mechanism for moving 
away from the divided and unjust apartheid system towards the society envisioned 
by the Constitution itself – “a society based on democratic values, social justice and 
fundamental human rights”.125 As a theory of constitutional interpretation, 
transformative constitutionalism requires that this far-reaching transformation be 
encouraged and promoted whenever the provisions of the Constitution are 
construed. In this context it serves as an important interpretive guide to the Bill of 
Rights. 
Klare defines transformative constitutionalism as  
a long-term project of constitutional enactment, interpretation, and enforcement 
committed […] to transforming a country's political and social institutions and power 
relationships in a democratic, participatory, and egalitarian direction.126 
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This project of transformation is not an external initiative imposed on the 
Constitution, but one that is implicit (and at times explicit) in the Constitution itself. 
Du Plessis describes the Constitution as “thoroughly transformative in character” and 
argues that “it invites (and arguably compels) optimum realization of the rights 
entrenched in the Bill of Rights”.127 A transformative interpretation in line with the 
goals of the Constitution must be one which achieves this “optimum realization” of 
rights. 
Socio-economic rights and the goal of social justice are central to this 
transformation.128 Liebenberg explains: 
Transformative constitutionalism is committed to positive measures to redress both the 
legacy of the past as well as new and emerging forms of subordination that deny 
human dignity, equality and freedom to certain groups in our society.129 
The legacy of the past cannot be redressed without the realisation of socio-economic 
rights and the promotion of social justice. Where individuals in South Africa 
experience severe material deprivation, transformation of our society has not been 
achieved. As the court held in Grootboom: 
There can be no doubt that human dignity, freedom and equality, the foundational 
values of our society, are denied those who have no food, clothing or shelter.130 
For the purposes of interpretation, transformative constitutionalism means that an 
interpretation that promotes social justice and the transformation of “political and 
social institutions and power relationships in a democratic, participatory, and 
egalitarian direction” should be favoured above one that does not. 
2 2 4 Conclusion 
There are various approaches to constitutional interpretation and the danger of 
giving absolute preference to a single method has been noted. It is nevertheless 
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clear that the Constitutional Court has shown favour for the purposive approach to 
interpretation. This method should not, however, be used exclusively as the answer 
to all problems of interpretation.  
It is therefore suggested that a teleological approach to interpretation should be 
used in conjunction with the other methods and guides discussed above. The 
purposes and aims of a provision should be ascertained through grammatical, 
historical and systematic interpretation while also using foreign and international 
sources where necessary. The interpretive guides discussed above also play an 
important role in delineating the meaning of a provision and can also shed light on 
possible underlying purposes. 
An interpretation of a provision of the Constitution should be consistent with the 
language used in the text, the context of the provision, the other provisions of the 
Constitution and should promote the values and purposes underlying the specific 
provision and the Constitution as a whole.131 
The remainder of this chapter will focus on the teleological interpretation of section 
24. The values and purposes underlying the environmental right will be uncovered by 
applying the principles of interpretation discussed above. These purposes will inform 
the interpretation of the specific aspects of section 24 discussed in subsequent 
chapters. 
2 3 Interpretation of section 24  
2 3 1 Introduction 
The interpretive methods and guides discussed in 2 2 above will be used throughout 
this thesis to determine how certain aspects of section 24 should be interpreted. The 
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focus will be on the concepts of “environment”, “health or well-being”, and 
“sustainable development”. Before examining these specific aspects of section 24, 
the remainder of this chapter will deal with the role of constitutional goals and values 
as well as the interdependence of rights in interpreting the right as a whole. This is 
done with the intention of ascertaining the purposes of section 24 so as to apply the 
teleological approach argued for above. These purposes will inform the interpretation 
of the specific concepts dealt with in the later chapters. 
2 3 2 Approaches to environmental rights 
There are various approaches to environmental rights and, before addressing the 
specifics of section 24, it is important to establish which approach is consistent with 
the South African Constitution. The two central approaches which will be discussed 
here are anthropocentrism and ecocentrism. 
The ecocentric or biocentric approach to environmental rights is rooted in a belief 
that the environment has value outside of its usefulness to mankind. Human beings 
form part of the environment along with all other creatures and organisms, and are 
not considered to be more superior or more significant.132 Ecocentrism sees the 
environment as possessing “intrinsic value which entitles it to an existence 
regardless of the interest of human beings”.133 This approach approves of the use of 
natural resources only to the extent that such resources are necessary to satisfy 
basic human needs.134  
Anthropocentrism, as the term suggests, views the environment from the 
perspective of mankind. Pure anthropocentrism sees the environment “in terms of 
immediate human utility” and not as having purpose or value outside of this human 
utility.135 The environment is not conserved for its own sake, but only where it is 
necessary to meet human needs. This approach has also been described as “ego-
centric”.136 Aside from this strict human-centred approach, there are other 
manifestations of anthropocentrism which demonstrate an appreciation for the 
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environment outside of its ability to meet human need. Redgewell refers to a “dilute 
anthropocentrism which recognizes the interrelatedness and interdependence of the 
natural world of which human beings form a part”.137 Feris similarly refers to “weak 
anthropocentrism” as a position which  
does recognise the central locale that humans adopt in nature and the ways in which 
humans find value in the utility of the earth, but also recognises the value of the 
environment independent of its usefulness for human purposes.138 
 This “weak anthropocentrism” or “indirect instrumentalism” does not see the 
environment “solely as a means to a human ends”.139 Here the objective worth of the 
natural environment is recognised in tandem with the way in which the environment 
can meet human needs. 
 The anthropocentric approach to environmental rights has been criticised for its 
focus on human need and its failure to value the environment outside of its benefit to 
people. However, the protection of the environment and its usefulness to humankind 
need not be seen as mutually exclusive. Redgewell points out that the goal of 
protecting the environment could be “more effectively achieved” by “linking such 
protection to human preference”.140 She recognises that humans and the 
environment cannot be detached from one another: 
To the extent that a clean, healthy or decent environment is also a clean, healthy or 
decent non-human environment, there is a fortuitous spill-over effect to non-humans in 
the recognition of such a human right.141 
The environmental right in the Interim Constitution142 received some criticism for 
its anthropocentric formulation.143 The right in section 29 read as follows: “Every 
person shall have the right to an environment which is not detrimental to his or her 
health or well-being”. While section 24(b) in the Final Constitution includes direct 
references to areas of environmental concern such as pollution, ecological 
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degradation and conservation, the environmental right remains primarily 
anthropocentric in its formulation.144 
The anthropocentric character of section 24(a) is relatively clear.145 While there 
has been some debate around the meaning of “everyone” and the position of 
animals in this regard, it is now accepted that section 24(a) is directed at humans 
and the fulfilment of their needs.146 Section 24(b) includes more explicit references to 
the value of the environment when it calls for measures that “prevent pollution and 
ecological degradation”, “promote conservation” and “secure ecologically sustainable 
development”. Despite these explicit references to environmental protection and 
conservation, section 24(b) is also centred on human need. According to the 
formulation of the subsection, the rights in section 24(b) protect the environment for 
“the benefit of present and future generations” and not for the sake of the 
environment itself.147  
Whether or not one agrees with the underlying philosophies of the anthropocentric 
approach, it must be accepted that when dealing with the environmental right in 
section 24, environmental goals need to be defined in terms of human benefit and 
need.148 Theron points out that the designation of an environmental right as a human 
right “is essentially anthropocentric”.149 It would be senseless to have a human right 
that did not ultimately serve human needs. 
The environmental right must then be understood to promote human rights and 
needs. The purposes of the right are to conserve and protect the environment for the 
benefit of human beings, and the interpretation of section 24 should reflect this. 
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2 3 3 Constitutional goals and values as related to section 24 
2 3 3 1 Constitutional goals 
The focus in this section will be on two important constitutional goals for the 
purposes of section 24, namely the goal of a society based on social justice and that 
of “the improvement of the quality of life of all citizens”. These goals are articulated in 
the preamble of the Constitution and, as noted in 2 2 3 3 above, they are relevant to 
the interpretation of the Bill of Rights and therefore the environmental right. 
Liebenberg discusses the role of constitutional goal of social justice in 
interpretation and argues: 
The commitment to social justice in the preamble of the Constitution can provide an 
important interpretive guide for the entire Bill of Rights. It can support interpretations of 
rights that challenge systemic patterns of subordination in social relationships.150  
In the context of section 24, we cannot discuss social justice without also considering 
the concept of environmental justice which encompasses many of the environment-
related facets of social injustice.151 The great socio-economic disparities prevalent in 
South Africa are central to these concerns. Interpreters of section 24 must be mindful 
of the “deep levels of poverty and socio-economic inequality [which] represent stark 
manifestations of social injustice in South Africa”.152 The commitment to social justice 
demands that the environmental right be interpreted in a way that best deals with 
material disadvantage and the disproportionate burden of environmental risk borne 
by the poor. A good illustration of this disproportionate burden is that of the south 
Durban industrial basin which had a number of polluting refineries and factories built 
next to poor black and coloured communities as a result of decisions made by the 
white-run council under apartheid. The community now deals with the brunt of the 
pollution from these industries including air pollution and contamination of soil and 
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ground water. The consequences for the people living in this area are higher risks of 
respiratory disease, cancers and leukaemia.153 
Kidd argues that “all the rights must be seen in the context of the preambular 
exhortation that the Constitution is aimed at improving the quality of life of all citizens 
and freeing the potential of each person”.154 This was argued in relation to 
understanding the concept of well-being in section 24, but it holds true for the rest of 
the right as well. One of the underlying purposes of section 24 must be to “improve 
the quality of life of all citizens”. A conservation measure, for example, that results in 
a diminished quality of life for affected citizens could be seen as falling short of the 
purposes of section 24. Throughout the interpretation and application of the 
environmental right, the improvement of citizens’ quality of life should be a central 
aim. 
The eradication of material deprivation and socio-economic inequality are central 
to the purposes of the Constitution and should therefore be central to its 
interpretation. The transformed society envisaged by these goals must be promoted 
in the interpretation of the environmental right. 
2 3 3 2 Constitutional values 
The role of the constitutional values in interpretation has been noted in 2 2 3 4 
above. The values of human dignity, equality and freedom are fundamental in the 
interpretation of any rights in the Bill of Rights as section 39 makes clear. The link 
between these abstract values and the pragmatic socio-economic rights is apparent 
in Grootboom where the Constitutional Court held that “human dignity, freedom and 
equality, the foundational values of our society, are denied those who have no food, 
clothing or shelter”.155 For citizens to enjoy human dignity, freedom and equality they 
must have their basic needs met. 
Human dignity, equality and freedom appear both as values and as rights in the 
Bill of Rights. The relationship between section 24 and each of these rights will be 
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discussed in further detail at 2 3 4 below. The existence of the values of human 
dignity, equality and freedom together with their corresponding rights underscores 
the importance of these values in the transformed society envisaged by the 
Constitution. Even where the specific rights to human dignity, equality and freedom 
are not directly implicated in a case, the values must be promoted in the 
interpretation of the relevant rights. With reference to interpretation and section 39(1) 
Liebenberg argues that the goal of social justice declared in the preamble has a role 
to play in fleshing out the values of human dignity, equality and freedom.156 
In the context of the environmental right, the value of human dignity stresses the 
centrality of human need and suggests that the right should be interpreted to 
enhance human dignity as it relates to the environment, and not merely to protect the 
natural environment for its own sake. The value of equality emphasises the 
importance of environmental justice and the redress of harm caused by 
discriminatory environmental policies or practices in the past. Finally, freedom as a 
value suggests that environmental conditions should not be such that individual 
freedoms are restricted, and it also indicates the importance of individual autonomy. 
In this regard the participation of individuals in environmental decision-making which 
affects them and their communities should be valued and promoted. 
As clearly indicated in section 39, the values of human dignity, equality and 
freedom must be promoted in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights. The 
interpretation of the environmental right in section 24 must therefore promote and 
advance these values. 
2 3 4 Interdependent interpretation of section 24 and other rights 
2 3 4 1 Introduction 
This section will examine the interdependence of section 24 and a selection of 
relevant rights in the Bill of Rights with the goal of illuminating some of the underlying 
purposes of the environmental right. As discussed in 2 2 2 3, a right must be 
interpreted in light of its context, that is, in light of its interdependent relationship to 
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the other rights in the Bill of Rights.157 As the Bill of Rights functions as a whole, the 
purposes of a right may be gleaned from other related rights. Taking into account the 
scope of this work a handful of rights have been selected for this discussion of 
interdependence. The rights dealt with below are certainly not the only rights relevant 
to the environmental right, but they are those which perhaps offer the most insight 
into the meaning of section 24.158 
2 3 4 2 Equality 
The right to equality is found in section 9 of the Constitution and, read purposively, 
supports substantive equality as opposed to mere formal equality.159 Substantive 
equality places the emphasis on “the results or effects of a particular rule” and the 
material socio-economic circumstances of an individual as opposed to the superficial 
approach of formal equality which applies the same rule or standard to all but fails to 
consider the different consequences it could have.160 Albertyn and Goldblatt maintain 
that the achievement of substantive equality requires  
the dismantling of systemic inequalities, the eradication of poverty and disadvantage 
(economic equality) and the affirmation of diverse human identities and capabilities 
(social equality).161 
It is clear that equality under the Constitution involves far more than neutral laws and 
the absence of discrimination. In the environmental justice context, Feris notes that 
an important aspect of substantive equality is that “it is geared at protecting not only 
individuals, but also groups”.162 This is significant because environmental harm 
typically affects groups of people (as opposed to isolated individuals) who are, for 
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example, living in the same polluted area or being exposed to the same toxic 
substances in their work environment. 
The right to equality has an important contribution to make to the interpretation of 
the environmental right. The intersection of the environment and equality is captured 
by the concept of environmental justice which advocates that “nature’s 
environmental bounty should be equitably distributed and that certain sectors of 
society should not bear an unequal brunt of negative environmental impacts”.163 The 
environmental right should be understood in a way which promotes substantive 
equality in the distribution of resources, services and negative environmental 
impacts. Substantive equality demands that the current socio-economic and 
environmental conditions of individuals be taken into consideration before simply 
applying the same policies across the country to achieve equality. Historical 
disadvantage could play an important role here. Kidd notes, for example, that the 
effect of the Group Areas Act 41 of 1950 under the apartheid government was the 
location of black areas “in proximity to polluting industries” which led to these 
neighbourhoods being exposed to greater degrees of pollution than their white 
counterparts.164 While the Group Areas Act has been done away with, its legacy 
lives on in many previously ‘black’ neighbourhoods that remain situated in these 
polluted areas. Section 24 cannot promote substantive equality without a 
consideration of these socio-economic, environmental and historical circumstances. 
The right to an environment which is not detrimental to health or well-being must 
be interpreted to include the necessary advancement of the needs of the poor where 
they bear the burden of society’s impact on the environment. It is often the case that 
the poor experience a disproportionate exposure to pollution, dumping and waste. 
More affluent communities contribute to the production of this pollution and waste yet 
remain separated from any consequences of their own environmental impacts.165 
Discrepancies in the quality of services relating to sanitation and clean water in 
different neighbourhoods are also indicative of inequality. Such situations fall within 
the scope of section 24 read with section 9 as well as the constitutional value of 
equality. 
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Equality must also be promoted in the interpretation of subsection (b) of the 
section 24. The right to have the environment protected through measures that 
prevent pollution and ecological degradation must be understood to imply that 
pollution and ecological degradation should be prevented in a way that does not 
unfairly benefit certain people while ignoring the needs of others. Similarly, 
sustainable development and the distribution and use of natural resources must 
promote substantive equality by considering the material circumstances of 
individuals who bear the brunt of relevant developmental decisions. 
In addition to the promotion of equality, sections 9 (3) and (4) also prohibit unfair 
discrimination.166 Glazewski recognises the intersection of human dignity and 
equality when he suggests: 
[I]n an environmental racism scenario, a court could adopt a view that discrimination 
[is] unfair on the ground that, for example, bearing the brunt of other people’s waste is 
an impairment of the right to fundamental dignity.167  
Discrimination could also be present where natural resources are distributed in a 
way that affords undue benefit to one group while unjustifiably excluding another. In 
Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social 
Rights v Nigeria,168 for example, it was held by the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights that the right of the Ogoni people in Nigeria to “freely dispose of 
their wealth and natural resources” under section 21 of the African Charter of Human 
and Peoples’ Rights169 was violated. This was due to the fact that “the oil exploitation 
in Ogoniland was pursued in a destructive and selfish fashion without any material 
benefit to the local population”.170 This could be characterised as the inequitable 
distribution of the benefits of natural resource exploitation. 
The purposes of section 24 with regard to the right to equality are the promotion of 
substantive equality through equitable distribution of environmental impacts, pollution 
and waste, and of natural resources as well as the prevention of discrimination 
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against certain individuals through unjustifiable exposure to detrimental 
environmental factors. 
2 3 4 3 Human dignity 
Along with its place as a foundational value, human dignity appears in the 
Constitution as a fundamental right. The existence of both the right and the value of 
human dignity underline the essential role that human dignity plays in constitutional 
interpretation. In Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs171 O’Regan J 
affirmed this role: 
Human dignity […] informs constitutional adjudication and interpretation at a range of 
levels. It is a value that informs the interpretation of many, possibly all, other rights.172 
Similarly, in Makwanyane the right to dignity is described as “an acknowledgement of 
the intrinsic worth of human beings” that serves as “the foundation of many of the 
other rights that are specifically entrenched in [the Bill of Rights]”.173 The central and 
vital place of human dignity in South Africa’s constitutional democracy cannot be 
doubted. 
It is therefore clear that human dignity has an important role to play in the 
interpretation of section 24. Glazewski notes that the right to human dignity “goes to 
the heart of environmental justice, as the imposition of environmental injustices 
ultimately strikes at human dignity”.174 Where individuals live in intolerable conditions 
due to, for example, exposure to unreasonable degrees of pollution and toxic waste 
or a lack of access to adequate sanitation, their ability to live dignified lives is clearly 
undermined. Linking human dignity to equality, Feris has argued that “when a 
specific group of people are disproportionately exposed to environmental 
degradation, such exposure not only amounts to unfair discrimination, but it also 
fundamentally impairs the dignity of each member of the group”.175 It could be 
argued that an environment which is harmful to one’s health or well-being would also 
be damaging to human dignity. Living with illness or disease as a result of an 
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unhealthy environment could, for example, result in an inability to earn a living or 
compel an individual to rely on the care of others to survive. This would constitute an 
infringement of human dignity.176 The interaction between human dignity and section 
24(a) could also shed light on how the concept of well-being should be 
understood.177  
One of the purposes of the environmental right is to promote human dignity. This 
means that the interpretation of harm to health or well-being should be influenced by 
the right to human dignity. The needs of future generations could also be read as a 
recognition that they are “worthy of respect and concern”.178 The concept of 
sustainable development should also be read as promoting the possibility of people 
to lead dignified lives by paying attention to the social and economic needs of human 
beings when addressing environmental issues. 
2 3 4 4 The right to life 
Section 11 of the Constitution states that “[e]veryone has the right to life”. Currie and 
De Waal note that this right is “textually unqualified” and can only be limited by the 
limitations clause in section 36.179 This right is fundamental given that without life an 
individual cannot enjoy any other rights. The right to life could be understood as 
including a right not to be killed, a duty on the state to protect the lives of those within 
the country’s borders and, most importantly for the purposes of section 24, a right to 
a life worth living.180 
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The right to life emphasises the necessity of the protection of the environment, as 
the environment supports and sustains all life. As noted by the court in Fuel Retailers 
v Director-General: Environmental Management:181 
The importance of the protection of the environment cannot be gainsaid. Its protection 
is vital to the enjoyment of the other rights contained in the Bill of Rights; indeed it is 
vital to life itself.182  
The right to life cannot be realised without the continued protection of the 
environment which is a prerequisite for life itself. Theron similarly points out that 
“[t]he right to a clean, balanced and protected environment is a fundamental one […] 
because it is vital for the exercise of other individual rights and duties, including the 
right to life”.183 
Read with the right to life, the right to an environment not harmful to health or well-
being must, at a minimum, be understood as a right to an environment which is not 
life-threatening.184 In a situation where harmful toxins or pollutants cause life-
threatening illness or death, it is suggested that both section 11 and section 24 
would be infringed. Section 24, however, goes beyond the protection of life with the 
inclusion of “health” and “well-being”. The coexistence of these rights indicates that 
the Bill of Rights goes beyond the mere preservation of life and also protects aspects 
of the quality of life. O’Regan J points out in Makwanyane: 
[T]he rights to human dignity and life are entwined. The right to life is more than 
existence, it is a right to be treated as a human being with dignity: without dignity, 
human life is substantially diminished. Without life, there cannot be dignity.185  
This reading of life and dignity supports the idea of what Currie and De Waal term 
“the right to a life that is worth living”.186 Section 24 should be understood as 
furthering the right to life by providing certain conditions necessary for such a life 
worth living. According to Pieterse: 
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This implies that it would constitute a violation of the right to life if living conditions only 
permit mere physical existence without what is needed to make such existence 
humane and dignified.187 
The guarantee of an environment not harmful to health or well-being is important in 
securing these conditions necessary for a humane and dignified life. 
In light of the above reading of the right to life, it has been argued that socio-
economic rights “appear to codify the state’s positive constitutional obligation to 
make life liveable”.188 In this sense socio-economic rights make provision for specific 
aspects of the right to life. The rights to housing, water, health care and an adequate 
environment constitute elements of the right to life, not only improving the quality of 
life (enhancing a life worth living), but in many cases preserving life itself.  
The rejection of the appeal to the right to life in Soobramoney could be understood 
as an indication that the role of the right to health care services is supplementary to 
the right to life.189 The reasoning is that the existence of the more specific right 
means that the right to life cannot be relied on in such cases where a specific socio-
economic right exists.190 The criticisms against this approach have been noted.191 
While reliance on the specific right relevant to the case at hand is necessary, this 
does not mean that other rights (the right to life in this case) have no interpretive role 
to play. A systematic, teleological interpretation of the right to life cannot ignore its 
interdependence with the other rights in the Bill of Rights.  
Due to the interdependence of rights, the right to life contributes to the 
interpretation of the environmental right even where it is not directly relied on. The 
right to life indicates that section 24 should aim to promote the creation of an 
environment which is safe and does not pose a threat to life, as well as promoting an 
environment which allows for the enjoyment of a life of dignity. 
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2 3 4 5 Freedom and security of the person 
The right to freedom and security of the person is found in section 12 of the 
Constitution. The first subsection deals with deprivation of freedom, detainment, 
violence, torture and punishment, and does not have any clear links to section 24. 
Section 12(2), however, has implications for the interpretation of the environmental 
right. Section 12(2)(b) is particularly important here. It states that “[e]veryone has the 
right to bodily and psychological integrity, which includes the right– […] (b) to 
security in and control over their body”. Section 12 has been described as “a right to 
be left alone” that “at least in relation to one’s body […] creates a sphere of individual 
inviolability”.192 
In the context of the environment, an infringement of section 12(2)(b) could occur 
where a person is exposed to harmful pollutants from the dumping of toxic waste 
without any means to avoid or control it. This could constitute a violation of bodily 
integrity where the pollutants have serious health consequences. Currie and De 
Waal note that “where the intrusion is more subtle there is a need to determine 
whether it is a serious enough invasion of bodily security to require protection by the 
s 12(2)(b) right”.193 This would require a clear link between the toxic waste and the 
health concerns of the applicant. 
For the purposes of section 24, the right to bodily integrity sheds some light on 
how section 24(1) could be interpreted. An interdependent interpretation of the two 
rights alerts us to the possibility of infringements of bodily integrity that are more 
subtle and further removed than direct physical assault. The right to freedom and 
security of the person is then reinforced by the right to an environment which is not 
detrimental to health or well-being. As a result, one of the purposes underlying 
section 24 should be to protect against environmental invasions of bodily integrity 
which affect an individual’s health. 
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2 3 4 6 Housing 
Section 26(1) of the Constitution states that “[e]veryone has the right to have access 
to adequate housing”. This is a qualified right and the state is required to take 
measures to “achieve the progressive realisation of this right”.194 
The right to housing is also found in article 11(1) of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights where it forms part of the right to an adequate 
standard of living.195 While the constitutional right differs from the right to housing in 
the ICESCR in that it provides a right of access to housing, the concept of ‘adequate 
housing’ is central to both rights. The meaning of adequate housing has been 
expanded on by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.196 What is 
relevant for the purposes of section 24 is the comment that “housing should not be 
built on polluted sites nor in immediate proximity to pollution sources that threaten 
the right to health of the inhabitants”.197 The location of housing plays a part in 
determining whether or not it can be deemed ‘adequate’. Housing that is located in 
an unsafe environment where, for example, polluted water poses a threat to the 
inhabitants’ health would encroach on the environmental right.  
In light of the right to housing, section 24(a) should be understood as ensuring 
that the environment in which housing is located is free of harm to health and well-
being. It is significant that section 24(a) is not subject to the progressive realisation 
found in section 26. This means that where individuals have housing located in an 
environment less than ‘adequate’ under section 26, they could potentially rely on 
section 24 for more direct relief if they experience harm to their health or well-being 
as a result. While adequate housing need not be provided immediately in terms of 
section 26, under the environmental right individuals could possibly argue for 
immediate relief on the basis that housing should, at a minimum, not be harmful to 
their health or well-being. 
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The right in section 26 is also important for the interpretation of section 24(b), 
particularly the concept of sustainable development. Feris and Tladi argue: 
For a truly integrated approach to sustainable development under the South African 
Constitution, the socio-economic rights protected, such as the housing rights, will have 
to be used to give content to the concept of sustainable development as found in 
section 24.198  
The balancing of factors in sustainable development must take into account the right 
of access to housing.199 Where a proposed low cost housing development is located 
in an ecologically sensitive area, it must be kept in mind that section 24 is an 
anthropocentric right and must be read in conjunction with the right to housing. If no 
other suitable location exists, this interdependent reading suggests that the needs of 
individuals who have yet to receive access to housing should be placed above the 
needs of the natural environment. A weighing of the two rights in such a situation 
would, of course, need to include a consideration of the urgency of the need for 
housing and the extent of the potential impact of the development on the 
environment.200 One could argue that where the damage to the environment is 
severe and irreversible, and there is little urgency or threat to human life should the 
housing not be provided immediately, the obligation to protect the natural 
environment should outweigh the right to housing.201 
An interdependent interpretation of section 26 and section 24 indicates that the 
environmental right should include a right to a safe environment where an 
individual’s home is located. The right to housing should also be promoted when 
“ecologically sustainable development” is balanced with “economic and social 
development” under section 24(b)(iii). While protection of the environment forms part 
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of section 24(b), it must be emphasised that it is an anthropocentric right which 
should be read with the right to housing to promote the needs of the poor.  
2 3 4 7 Health care services 
The Constitution does not include a right to a certain standard of health but rather a 
right to have access to health care services.202 As with the right to housing, section 
27 is a qualified right subject to progressive realisation.203 
The existence of the right to health care services has implications for how section 
24 is interpreted. The concept of health in the environmental right must mean more 
than access to health care services which is already covered under section 27.204 
Glazewski points out that a harmful environment could “avoid falling foul of the right 
concerning health provided for in section 27”, indicating that the two rights offer 
distinct guarantees.205 He goes on to observe: 
Given the serious health consequences of air and water pollution and the siting of 
waste disposal sites, “health” is unarguably a component of environmental concern 
and thus falls within the ambit of section 24. The environmental right accordingly goes 
beyond the right of access to health care established by section 27, which concerns 
the provision of health care sevices.206  
As a result of the limited scope of section 27(1)(a), the environmental right has an 
important role to play in advancing health in South Africa, particularly for the poor.207 
In an assessment of health ten years after the commencement of the Final 
Constitution, Ngwena argues: 
The eradication of poverty; the levelling of income disparities; provision of adequate 
housing, clean water and sanitation; and general economic growth hold the key to the 
enhancement of health much more than the mere provision of health care.208 
                                            
202
 Section 27(1)(a), Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Section 27(3) is also relevant 
to health as it states that “[n]o one may be refused emergency medical treatment”. 
203
 See section 27(2), Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
204
 The concept of health in section 24 is discussed further in chapter 4 below. 
205
 Glazewski “The Bill of Rights and environmental law” in Environmental Law 5-15. 
206
 Glazewski “The Bill of Rights and environmental law” in Environmental Law 5-15. 
207
 See WHO-UNEP Health and Environment Linkages Initiative (HELI) Health & environment: 
Managing the linkages for sustainable development: A toolkit for decision-makers: Synthesis report 
(2008) 23-24 where it is pointed out that “[e]nvironmentally-related diseases not only affect the poor 
and vulnerable the most but also contribute to keeping them poor”. 
208
 Ngwena C “Health” in South African Human Rights Commission Reflections on Democracy and 
Human Rights: A Decade of the South African Constitution (2006) 79 82. 




Section 24 arguably plays an important part in the “provision of adequate housing, 
clean water and sanitation”. Considering the impact that each of these could have on 
health, the environmental right is crucial to the promotion of health.209 In a report on 
the relationship between health and the environment, the World Health Organisation 
and United Nations Environmental Programme’s Health and Environment Linkages 
Initiative notes that around one quarter of the global burden of disease is attributable 
to environmental factors – and in sub-Saharan Africa the figure is more than a 
third.210 The impact of environmental factors on health is evident in SERAC where 
the exploitation of oil reserves and dumping of toxic waste in a region of Nigeria 
ultimately led to a range of severe health consequences for those living in the area 
including “skin infections, gastrointestinal and respiratory ailments, and increased 
risk of cancers, and neurological and reproductive problems”.211 The environmental 
right is undoubtedly linked to the promotion of health. It must also be noted that if the 
incidence of environmentally related diseases is reduced through the promotion of 
section 24, there will be greater resources available to contribute to the progressive 
realisation of access to health care services according to section 27. 
If section 24 is interpreted in light of the right to health care services, it is clear that 
the purpose of the environmental right is to guarantee a certain quality of 
environment that is, at a minimum, not harmful to an individual’s health. This 
promotion of health is not subject to progressive realisation as with the right in 
section 27, and the concept of health in the environmental right must go beyond the 
concept of health care services in section 27. 
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2 3 4 8 Water 
Along with the right to health care services and social security, section 27 contains a 
right of access to “sufficient food and water”.212 While the right to sufficient food is by 
no means insignificant, the right to water will be focused on here as it has a vital role 
to play in the interpretation of section 24. 
The relationship between the environmental right and the right to water is an 
important one. Kidd recognises this and explains: 
[T]he right of access to water is aimed at addressing people’s basic water needs – for 
drinking, food preparation, washing and sanitation. Access to water that is polluted 
would not be suitable for drinking and food preparation (at least), which reveals the 
clear connection between the environmental right in s 24 and the right of access to 
water in s 27.213  
Mosdell similarly explains that the right to water is “an indispensable element of other 
rights, particularly the rights to adequate food (nutrition), health [and] a clean and/or 
healthy environment”.214  
Section 24 emphasises that when interpreting the right to water, the quality of the 
water should be given due consideration. Regarding the quality of water under the 
right to water in the ICESCR, it has been held that “[t]he water required […] must be 
safe, therefore free from micro-organisms, chemical substances and radiological 
hazards that constitute a threat to a person’s health”.215 The UN Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights also stated that “[e]nvironmental hygiene […] 
encompasses taking steps on a non-discriminatory basis to prevent threats to health 
from unsafe and toxic water conditions”.216 
The right to water in section 27(1)(b), when read interdependently with section 24, 
indicates that an environment not harmful to health or well-being should be one 
where sufficient water is accessible, and the water supply is safe and healthy.217 The 
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provision of safe and sufficient water has a great impact on the environment in which 
individuals live. The question of access to sufficient water was addressed in 
Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg.218 Here the Constitutional Court held that the 
Constitution does not confer an immediate right to sufficient water, and that what 
constitutes sufficient water depends on various factors which the courts are not 
suited to decide on.219 It must be noted, however, that section 24 is not subject to 
progressive realisation and many water related needs could possibly be more 
effectively addressed under section 24, particularly where the lack of access to water 
impacts on health.220 Water contributes to hygiene, sanitation, food preparation and 
even food cultivation and it plays a vital role in general health and well-being of 
communities.221 The role of section 24 is particularly important where a community’s 
source of water is located in the natural environment. The pollution of a river from, 
for example, sewerage or toxic waste could mean a lack of access to a sufficient 
water supply under section 27(1)(b), but it could also be argued that this constitutes 
an infringement of section 24.  
In promoting an environment not harmful to health or well-being, the 
environmental right must serve to protect water sources and ensure that the water is 
safe for domestic use where it is needed for this purpose. The protection of the 
environment should aim to promote the accessibility of safe and sufficient water to all 
in South Africa. 
2 4 Conclusion 
This chapter has argued for an integrated teleological interpretation of section 24. 
This interpretation should be compatible with the language and context of the right, 
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as well as other provisions of the Constitution. It should also promote the values and 
purposes implicit (or explicit) in section 24 itself and the Constitution as a whole. The 
interdependence of rights is an important interpretive tool supporting the cohesion of 
the Bill of Rights. An interdependent interpretation allows other rights to inform the 
interpretation of section 24 while also allowing those rights to be promoted through 
the interpretation of the environmental right. 
It is clear from the language and context of section 24 that it is an anthropocentric 
right which aims to achieve more than the preservation of the natural environment. 
The constitutional goals of social justice and the improvement of the quality of life of 
all citizens call attention to the role that section 24 could play in their achievement. 
The values human dignity, equality and freedom also emphasise the anthropocentric 
nature of section 24. These values point to the meeting of the physical needs of 
individuals and the promotion of environmental justice through means that allow for 
the involvement and participation of those affected.  
The interdependent interpretation of equality and the environmental right 
reiterates the need for environmental justice which eases the burden of negative 
environmental impacts borne largely by the poor. The right to human dignity reveals 
the role that section 24 should play in promoting dignified lives where environmental 
needs related to health and well-being are met. The right to life highlights the 
importance of the protection environment as it is a foundational condition for life 
itself. The interaction between the environmental right and the right to freedom and 
security of the person draws attention to the potential of violations of bodily integrity 
from environmental impacts. 
Section 24 has a potentially beneficial role to play when understood in relation to 
other socio-economic rights. The lack of a “progressive realisation” limitation means 
that the environmental right could be a more effective tool for promoting the needs of 
the poor in certain cases. Section 24 understood alongside the right to adequate 
housing indicates that the adequacy of housing should take into account 
environmental aspects of the location, particularly those affecting health. Housing is 
also an important factor to be considered when clarifying the meaning of sustainable 
development. The right to health care services indicates that reference to health in 
section 24 should be understood as having a broader meaning than in section 27, 
and it also emphasises the many crucial links between health and the environment. 




Finally, the right to water can also be promoted through the interpretation of section 
24 as clean water is an essential component of a healthy environment. 
Prior to the new constitutional dispensation Albie Sachs commented on the 
potential of an environmental right in the future and argued: 
No serious environmental programme for South Africa can ignore the question of 
poverty, nor can any system of environmental rights fail to deal with the right to 
accessible and clean water, to electricity or gas, to sewage and rubbish disposal.222 
An interpretation of section 24 as argued for in this chapter could address the 
concerns identified by Sachs and could make a substantial contribution to the quality 
of life of those living in poverty. The environmental right is important for the 
protection and conservation of the natural environment, but to limit its sphere of 
influence to concerns such as wildlife and national parks would be to ignore the 
context and purposes of the right and its capacity to improve the lives of the poor. 
The following chapters will examine interpretation of specific aspects of section 
24. The first of these is the term “environment” which is a fundamental concept in the 
environmental right. In order to understand the scope and meaning of the right, it is 
essential to first determine what is meant by the “environment”. 
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3 1 Introduction 
Before the environmental right in section 24 can be understood, it is vital to 
understand what is meant by the most fundamental term: “environment”. It is crucial 
to understand this term as it determines the scope of the entire right. The meaning of 
environment will be explored firstly by examining the ordinary meaning of the term. It 
will then be contextualised by considering the immediate textual context of section 
24, followed by interpretations offered in case law and legislation. The international 
construction of the environment must also be taken into account as required by the 
Constitution. Lastly, academic opinion on the meaning of the term will be examined. 
A definition for the term will then be proposed and discussed. 
3 2 Ordinary meaning of environment 
In order to understand the meaning of the term “environment” as it is used in section 
24 it is necessary to begin with the ordinary meaning of the word. While it is by no 
means conclusive, the ordinary meaning of the word serves as a useful starting 
point. 
The Oxford Dictionary defines “environment” as “the surroundings or conditions in 
which a person, animal, or plant lives or operates”.1 The Collins dictionary describes 
the term in a similar manner: 
1. external conditions or surroundings, esp. those in which people live or work. 2. 
Ecology. the external surroundings in which a plant or animal lives, which tend to 
influence its development and behaviour. 3. the state of being environed; 
encirclement.2 
It is clear from these definitions that “environment” can be understood as anything 
that surrounds a person or thing (or plant or animal). The use of the term demands 
that there be a subject or central point which is surrounded by what is then called the 
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environment. Kidd points out that the environment is a relative concept “since it deals 
with the circumstances surrounding something or someone”.3 As the Collins 
definition above indicates, in some cases the term is associated specifically with 
ecology and what I will refer to as the natural environment,4 but it is not limited to 
this. As is discussed below, too narrow a definition of environment would be 
inappropriate for section 24, but it would be equally problematic to interpret 
environment in its broadest sense. Kidd explains why an overly broad interpretation 
would be problematic: 
The definition [of environment as surrounding; surrounding objects, region or 
conditions] is not too helpful […] since law is a component of humans’ surrounding 
circumstances and therefore all law is, according to this definition, environmental law.5 
There is boundless potential for the application of the term “environment” and the 
situations in which the word is used are diverse and plentiful. The environment can 
refer to the physical place where a person lives, that is, their home or their 
neighbourhood. More broadly, it could also refer to ecological entities and systems 
which may not be in the immediate surroundings. One could refer to the protection of 
the environment with reference to, for example, the endangered polar bear which 
exists far from one’s immediate surroundings. Used in a more abstract sense, the 
term could refer to a non-physical space such as an abusive or violent family 
environment. A workplace rife with sexual harassment could likewise be described 
as a hostile work environment. The term “environment” in these contexts refers to 
emotional and psychological surroundings as opposed to the physical. Similarly one 
could speak of a political environment which would go beyond the physical 
surrounding objects and refer, amongst other things, to the government, to 
ideologies and policies, and to public opinion. 
It is clear that the term environment has a wide range of possible applications and 
uses. The meaning of the term in the environmental right is, however, shaped by the 
context within which it is found. The whole of section 24 and the Bill of Rights as well 
as the legislation, case law and international sources dealing with the environment 
all play a part in contextualising and refining the term. What follows is an 
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examination of the each of these contextual aspects and their impact on the meaning 
of the term “environment”. 
3 3 Environment in section 24 
It is important to locate the meaning of environment within its immediate context, that 
is, the language and context of section 24.6 The language of the right provides an 
important indication of the meaning and helps refine the broad scope of the ordinary 
meaning discussed above. 
To begin with, when we construe the term environment it is important to establish 
whose environment is being identified. As seen above, the environment refers to the 
surroundings of a central subject. Environment could refer to the habitat surrounding 
a specific animal, for example. In the context of section 24, however, it is clear that 
the subject is “everyone”.7 It is accepted that the reference to “everyone” does not 
include animals or other living things, but rather signifies all people.8 The immediate 
surroundings of people are important for the right in section 24(a) which refers to an 
environment which is not harmful to “health or well-being”. The anthropocentric 
nature of the right affirms the centrality of human beings in the interpretation of the 
right. The environment spoken of is the environment of human beings.9 Du Plessis 
explains the impact of the anthropocentric approach on the term: 
The term ‘environment’ as it appears in s 24 can therefore not be limited to the non-
human natural environment, but must be understood broadly to include, for example, 
socio-economic and cultural dimensions of the inter-relationships between people and 
the natural environment.10 
The position of people as central to the right means that the definition of 
environment must include more than the natural environment. The environment in 
which people live includes, among other things, their homes, the roads they use, 
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their access to water and sanitation, the air quality and the public spaces they 
make use of such as town centres, parks and beaches. 
Another significant textual indication of the meaning of environment is the use of 
the term “ecological” in section 24(b). Section (b) of the right refers to “ecological 
degradation” and “ecologically sustainable development”. The fact that the right does 
not refer to environmental degradation or environmentally sustainable development 
seems to indicate that the concept of ecology is separate or distinct from the concept 
of environment. The phrasing of the right suggests that the environment is a broader 
term than “ecology”. Environment then includes ecology, but goes beyond it. 
The immediate textual context of “environment” in section 24 supports an 
interpretation of the term as anthropocentric. While the term includes the natural 
environment and ecology, these are viewed from a human perspective. This human 
perspective includes non-natural or man-made features of peoples’ surroundings into 
the term “environment” The definitions and use of the term in legislation are also 
useful indicators of its meaning which will now be discussed. 
3 4 Environment in legislation: NEMA and ECA 
In addition to the constitutional text itself, there are legislative definitions of 
“environment” which offer some insight into how the term should be understood. 
While the Constitution is the ultimate authority and is not subordinate to legislation, 
this does not mean that legislation cannot be consulted in interpreting a right. How 
the environment has been understood by legislators is an important factor in 
determining the meaning in section 24. 
Before examining the legislative definitions of the environment, it is necessary to 
say something about subsidiarity. The principle of subsidiarity demands that specific 
legislation on a certain matter be relied on in court before appealing to the 
Constitution.11 This means that before relying on section 24 an individual would first 
need to rely on the environmental legislation. Where the legislation does not make 
provision for a specific matter, it could be possible to rely on the Constitution. The 
Constitution must also be relied on where it is argued that the legislation is 
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unconstitutional.12 Van der Walt points out that this does leave the Constitution 
without influence: 
 [T]hat does not mean that the effect of the Constitution is limited or that constitutional 
provisions or principles are not considered, since the legislation that does apply must 
be interpreted in view of the constitutional provisions that it is supposed to give effect 
to, which in turn must be seen in the context of other constitutional provisions.13 
While most cases will necessarily involve a reliance on legislation because of the 
rules of subsidiarity, it is important to understand what is meant by section 24 in the 
Constitution in order to understand whether or not the legislation gives effect to the 
right adequately. The legislation can also assist in the interpretation of the 
Constitution as it provides insight into how the legislature has understood the 
provision.  
The Environment Conservation Act 73 of 1989 (ECA) has been repealed almost 
entirely by the National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 (NEMA). The 
definitions of the ECA, however, remain in force. The ECA provides the following 
definition of “environment”: 
'environment' means the aggregate of surrounding objects, conditions and influences 
that influence the life and habits of man or any other organism or collection of 
organisms.14 
As Kidd indicates, this definition remains as broad and vague as the dictionary 
definition discussed in 3 2 above.15 It would be difficult to find an aspect of human life 
which is excluded from the term. This definition in the ECA indicates a preference for 
a more generous rather than restricted interpretation of environment, but the right 
needs a narrower scope than this in order to find practical application. 
The enactment of NEMA was in partial fulfilment of the State’s obligation under 
section 24 to take legislative measures in realisation of the right.16 This link to section 
24 is also evident in the preamble of NEMA which refers to the environmental right.17 
NEMA serves as “environmental framework legislation” in South Africa and “provides 
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general basic norms that may be used to introduce new environmental legislation or 
to amend or maintain existing legislation”.18 NEMA provides important principles and 
guidelines to be applied to all environmental legislation and is therefore influential in 
the environmental sphere.19 The following definition of environment is found in 
NEMA: 
“environment” means the surroundings within which humans exist and that are made 
up of— 
(i) the land, water and atmosphere of the earth; 
(ii) micro-organisms, plant and animal life; 
(iii) any part or combination of (i) and (ii) and the interrelationships among and 
between them; and 
(iv) the physical, chemical, aesthetic and cultural properties and conditions of the 
foregoing that influence human health and well-being.20 
It has been noted that this statutory definition of environment is an anthropocentric 
one.21 It refers to the “surroundings within which humans exist” and subsection (iv) of 
the definition explicitly refers to aspects of these surroundings “that influence human 
health and well-being”. It is clear that human needs and concerns are fundamental. 
Kidd identifies some implications of this anthropocentric approach: 
Many people are adversely affected by environmental factors, such as pollution, and a 
definition such as that in NEMA would ensure that, for example, pollution that does not 
have a significant effect on the physical (non-human) environment, but does have an 
impact on human health, would be an environmental issue.22 
Despite the anthropocentric perspective of the NEMA definition, the environment 
remains limited to surroundings which are made up of land, water, atmosphere, 
micro-organisms and plant and animal life.23 This apparently excludes the man-made 
environment including, for example, buildings and roads. Du Plessis argues that the 
anthropocentric focus of NEMA indicates that the term is not limited to the natural 
environment, but should “embrace the socio-economic and cultural dimension of the 
                                            
18
 Nel J & Du Plessis W “An evaluation of NEMA based on a generic framework for environmental 
framework legislation” (2001) 8 SAJELP 1 1-2. See the full article for an extensive discussion of 
NEMA as environmental framework legislation in South Africa. 
19
 NEMA of course remains subject to the Constitution. 
20
 Section 1, National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998. 
21
 Du Plessis A “South Africa’s constitutional environmental right (generously) interpreted: What is in it 
for poverty?” (2011) 27 SAJHR 279 292; Kidd M “Environment” in Currie I & De Waal J (eds) The Bill 
of Rights Handbook 6 ed (2013) 516 518. 
22
 Kidd Environmental Law 4. 
23
 Subsections (i) and (ii) of the definition in NEMA. 




inter-relationships between, for example, people and the natural environment”.24 
While the socio-economic and cultural dimensions of the environment in NEMA are 
broader than the natural environment on its own, the scope of the environment 
remains linked to the natural environment, thereby excluding human surroundings 
which are man-made. 
Should the narrower definition of environment in NEMA be applied to section 24, it 
would prevent reliance on the right in cases involving built, man-made or urban 
environments. Harmful substances found in building materials used to build a home 
would be excluded from the ambit of the right to an environment not harmful to 
health or well-being. Kidd argues for a broader concept of the environment than that 
which is found in NEMA, one that “would include the place of humans in the urban 
environment, which would include the built environment and the work 
environment”.25 Elsewhere he states that the application of the NEMA definition of 
“environment” to section 24 would result in the right being “unacceptably limited”.26 
Van der Linde and Basson similarly argue that the “needs, interests and values” of 
traditional and urbanised sectors of society need to be considered when defining the 
scope of environment in section 24.27 In a diverse country such as South Africa, a 
human-centred approach to the term “environment” needs to remain attentive to the 
unique positions that various people find themselves in. The environmental right 
should offer protection to all people in South Africa, whether they live in a city, on a 
farm or in a rural village.  
The statutory definition of environment found in NEMA is a useful starting point for 
understanding environment under section 24. The meaning of the term in section 24 
should, at a minimum, include the definition in NEMA. It is clear, however, that in the 
constitutional environmental right the concept should be extended beyond this 
definition to include the built environment. The section that follows will take a closer 
look at how the courts have understood the concept of “environment” in South 
African jurisprudence on the environmental right. 
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3 5 Environment in case law 
Although case law on the environmental right remains scarce, there are a few cases 
where the right has been mentioned. These cases show where the right has found 
application and this gives an indication of the scope of the term “environment”. 
The most extensive discussion of the meaning of environment is found in the case 
of BP Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Agriculture, Conservation, Environment 
and Land Affairs.28 The High Court looked at the definition of environment found in 
the ECA and held that the “broad and inclusive definition” is in agreement with 
international law:29 
In line with international law, the environment is a composite right, which includes 
social, economic and cultural considerations in order to ultimately result in a balanced 
environment.30 
The court also points out that the wide definition of environment found in the ECA 
pre-dates the Constitution, presumably indicating that this understanding of 
environment would have influenced the intended meaning of environment when 
section 24 was drafted.31 The court describes the narrow definition of environment 
which is limited to the natural environment, to the exclusion of “the entire 
anthropogenic environment”.32 This is compared to the more extensive definition 
found in the ECA: 
In promulgating the ECA, South Africa chose to embark upon the extensive approach 
to environment by giving it a comprehensive definition, which is as all-embracing as 
may be imagined. The broad definition of ‘environment’, in my view, would include all 
conditions and influences affecting the life and habits of man. This surely would 
include socio-economic conditions and influences.33 
The inclusion of social, economic and cultural factors in the sphere of environment is 
an important consideration in this case, and the court goes on to examine the 
definition of environment in NEMA as well as the principles set out in section 2 of the 
Act. While the court does not offer any commentary on the NEMA definition of 
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environment itself, the importance of social, economic and cultural considerations 
throughout NEMA is emphasised in the judgment.34 Ultimately it was held that the 
Minister’s mandate to consider environmental factors when making a decision 
included the consideration of socio-economic factors.35 BP clearly indicates the 
court’s favour for an interpretation of environment that is broader than “God’s created 
physical environment”, one that is inclusive of social, economic and cultural 
conditions.36 
While few cases discuss the meaning of environment as expressly as BP, the 
scope of the concept can be inferred from the matters which are covered by the right 
in case law dealing with section 24. Fuel Retailers v Director-General: Environmental 
Management37 contains similar facts to BP and the court demonstrates its support 
for an integrated approach to the environment which deems the environment and 
socio-economic factors inseparable.38 In MEC: Department of Agriculture, 
Conservation and Environment v HTF Developers (Pty) Limited39 the court similarly 
emphasises the relationship between the environment and socio-economic growth.40 
The jurisprudence strongly suggests that the courts interpret the term environment to 
encompass social, economic and cultural factors or, at the very least, they 
acknowledge that the concept of environment should be intimately related to these 
factors. 
In addition to the cases which address the relationship between the environment 
and socio-economic factors, jurisprudence on the environmental right also confirms 
more traditional views of the environment. In Minister of Health and Welfare v 
Woodcarb (Pty) Ltd,41 decided under the Interim Constitution, the quality of the air is 
(unsurprisingly) included within the concept of environment. This case dealt 
specifically with polluting smoke generated from a sawmill which infringed on the 
environmental right. The influence of the needs of future generations is also a factor 
in determining the scope of the term “environment”. The ability of future generations 
to meet their needs is mentioned in Director Mineral Development, Gauteng Region 
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v Save the Vaal Environment.42 The role of future concerns indicates that the 
environment covered by section 24 includes not only the environment as it is 
currently, but also the state of the environment in the long term. This suggests that 
the environment as it will be experienced by the next generation should also not be 
harmful to health or well-being. A practice that causes no harm at the moment, but 
will result in inevitable degradation of the environment in future, could be covered by 
the environmental right. Heard in the Land Claims Court, In re Kraanspoort 
Community43 confirms that the future of the environment is an important aspect 
included in the scope of the environment. Here the sustainable use of renewable 
resources was crucial and the court held that the land claim was subject to it. 
In conclusion, the case law clearly indicates that the socio-economic and cultural 
aspects of the environment are included in the definition of “environment”. The 
quality of the environment as it will be enjoyed by future generations is also an 
important facet of the concept. In addition to our national sources of environmental 
law, the international law position must be considered in the interpretation of section 
24. The international law understanding of environment will now be examined. 
3 6 Environment in international law 
As discussed in chapter 2,44 the Constitution requires the consideration of 
international law when interpreting the Bill of Rights.45 The meaning of environment 
must therefore be understood with consideration of the international law context. 
While there is a vast number of international sources dealing with the environment, 
the scope of this research only allows for a discussion of the most relevant of 
these.46  
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The earliest of these sources is the Declaration of the United Nations Conference 
on the Human Environment or the Stockholm Declaration.47 The conference, held in 
Stockholm in 1972, was attended by 114 states along with various international 
institutions and non-governmental organisations.48 It is not insignificant that the 
conference tackles the human environment. This suggests that the Stockholm 
Declaration, like section 24, is rooted in an anthropocentric view of the environment. 
The Declaration proclaims: 
Both aspects of man's environment, the natural and the man-made, are essential to his 
well-being and to the enjoyment of basic human rights – even the right to life itself.49 
It is clear that here the environment means more than the natural environment. The 
principles set out in the declaration confirm this wide interpretation of the 
environment. They cover natural resources and ecosystems,50 nature 
conservation,51 pollution,52 economic and social development, and living and working 
environments.53 Each of these aspects forms part of the Stockholm Declaration’s 
understanding of the environment which clearly encompasses both the natural and 
anthropogenic environment. 
The next important source to consider is the Report of the World Commission on 
Environment and Development: Our Common Future or the Brundtland Report54 
which was drafted by the World Commission on Environment and Development 
(WCED) as established by the United Nations General Assembly.55 The report 
reiterates the important link between the environment and development, indicating 
the complex relationship between the natural environment and socio-economic 
development.56 In a foreword to the Brundtland Report the chair of the WCED 
succinctly clarifies the meaning of environment and development: 
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[T]he "environment" is where we all live; and "development" is what we all do in 
attempting to improve our lot within that abode. The two are inseparable.57 
If it is to be understood as “where we all live”, the environment encompasses more 
than the natural environment, but rather extends to every part of the physical space 
that we as human beings find ourselves in. This broad understanding of the 
environment echoes what is found in the Stockholm Declaration. 
The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development58 is the result of the United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) held in 1992. 
Principle 1 of the Declaration establishes that “[h]uman beings are at the centre of 
concerns for sustainable development”, taking an anthropocentric view of 
sustainable development and the environment. The crucial link between environment 
and development is emphasised throughout the Rio Declaration.59 Unlike the 
Brundtland Report, no definition of the environment is presented in the case of 
UNCED. The documents it produced do, however, correspond with the broad view of 
the environment found in the earlier Stockholm Declaration and Brundtland Report.60 
Post 1992 and the Rio Declaration the international development of environmental 
issues has centred around sustainable development and climate change.61 While 
these are important to international environmental law, the terminology used means 
that these sources are less useful in identifying the scope of the term “environment”. 
Sustainable development has become central and unavoidable in international 
environmental law, and will be discussed in detail in chapter 5. 
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In the regional context, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights62 
includes an environmental right in article 24: 
All peoples shall have the right to a general satisfactory environment favourable to 
their development.63 
Not unlike section 24 of the South African Constitution, the right in the African 
Charter has been described as “vague and ambiguous”.64 What is revealing about 
the wording of the right, however, is that the environment is clearly linked to 
development, and this suggests that the African Charter intended a general 
satisfactory environment to cover more than the natural environment.65 The mention 
of development indicates a recognition of the role of social and economic 
infrastructure in the environment in line with the broader international position.  
The most detailed discussion of the right by the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (the Commission) is found in the communication of The Social 
and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social Rights 
v Nigeria.66 Here the Commission confirms that the environment encompasses 
concerns regarding pollution, ecological degradation, conservation, sustainable 
development and natural resources.67 The environment is understood not only as the 
natural environment, but inclusive of aspects of the man-made environment as they 
relate to sustainable development. Van der Linde and Louw note that this decision 
reveals the “great scope of protection” offered by this right “for human beings, the 
environment and the relationship shared between them”.68 The Commission views 
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the environment as inclusive of the natural environment and socio-economic 
development. 
The International Court of Justice addressed the meaning of environment in 
Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion)69 and held that “the 
environment is not an abstraction but represents the living space, the quality of life 
and the very health of human beings, including generations unborn”.70 This Advisory 
Opinion emphasises the important role of “living space” in the meaning of 
environment. Housing, public spaces and the neighbourhoods where people live are 
clearly within the scope of this definition and this has important implications for 
quality or life and health in the areas where people reside. 
Under international law the environment is undoubtedly bound to development. 
This necessitates the inclusion of social, economic and cultural dimensions of the 
environment as well as aspects of the man-made environment. This position is 
echoed in the African regional context. The International Court of Justice has also 
indicated that the term must also be understood as including the areas where people 
live. These interpretations of the term must be considered in determining what 
environment means in the South African context. Following the discussion of the 
primary sources above, the academic opinion on the meaning of environment will be 
examined before a definition is proposed. 
3 7 Academic opinion 
Having studied the language of section 24, the relevant legislation, case law, and 
international law, academic interpretations of the term environment will now be 
explored. An appropriate definition for “environment” will then be proposed, followed 
by a discussion of its possible implications. 
Glazewski has suggested that environment be understood broadly “to include not 
only our relationship with natural resources but also our cultural heritage as well as 
the urban environment”.71 Feris and Tladi similarly argue for a wide interpretation of 
the term which would include “the interrelationships between humans and the natural 
                                            
69
 Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) ICGJ 205 (ICJ 1996).  
70
 Para 29. 
71
 Glazewski “The Bill of Rights and environmental law” in Environmental Law 5-15. 




environment”.72 They go on to emphasise the importance of including those aspects 
of the environment that are significant for indigenous cultures and communities.73 
Writing elsewhere Feris extends this definition by referring to the “inter-relationships 
between humans and between humans and the natural environment”.74 She argues 
that this definition “would incorporate both socio-economic and cultural dimensions 
of the inter-relationships”.75 This definition, taken at face value, is significantly 
broader than the one put forward earlier by Feris and Tladi. The inclusion of human 
interrelationships suggests the addition of a wide range of interpersonal concerns to 
the scope of environment. Kidd seems to approve of this wide definition and 
explains: 
Feris argues that a broader approach would include the socio-economic and cultural 
dimensions of the inter-relationships not only between humans and the natural 
environment, but also between humans and other humans, in other words, the social 
environment.76 
Feris and Kidd thus support a very broad definition of environment. It is not clear 
what could be excluded from such an all-encompassing definition. Kidd argues that 
environment should be understood, as with the traditional dictionary definition as 
“humans’ surroundings”.77 Such a limitless concept of the environment could be 
problematic as the environmental right would be too broad to be of any practical use. 
Kidd also suggests that a wider interpretation of environment should incorporate the 
urban environment which in turn should include the built environment and the work 
environment.78 He notes that the term must be broader than the natural environment 
if it is not to “reinforce perceptions that environmental concerns are concerns of 
middle-class (largely white) people, which are not relevant to the majority of the 
population”.79 
Not unlike the definitions above, Du Plessis suggests a definition beyond the 
natural environment and inclusive of “socio-economic and cultural dimensions of the 
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inter-relationships between people and the natural environment”.80 This definition is 
narrower than that suggested by Kidd and Feris as it remains linked only to the 
natural environment and seems to exclude interrelationships between people. The 
cultural and socio-economic dimensions are included to the extent that they relate to 
the natural environment and not as components of the environment in and of 
themselves. Du Plessis explains the interrelationship between people and the natural 
environment: 
[It] encompasses all of the interests that people hold in the natural environment, 
whether they be of a cultural nature or whether they reflect the need for the provision 
of the services that the natural environment provides, such as water to drink, air to 
breathe, and food to eat.81 
An important distinction between this conception of the environment and that of Kidd 
and Glazewski is that it is seemingly limited to the natural environment and would 
therefore exclude the anthropogenic environment. This is problematic where, for 
example, the work environment is concerned. Limiting the definition to relationships 
with the natural environment would exclude environments which South Africans are 
exposed to daily, such as potentially harmful work environments or living 
environments in informal settlements. 
It is evident from these definitions that there are three possible components of the 
environment. These are the natural environment, the anthropogenic environment 
(which would include the built environment and aspects of the urban environment) 
and the social environment (which consists of the interrelationships between 
humans). Each of the authors suggests that environment should encompass some 
combination of these components. A definition of environment will now be proposed 
– one which includes the first two components (the natural and the anthropogenic 
environment) but excludes the social environment. 
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3 8 Proposed interpretation 
The proposed interpretation of the term “environment” in the context of the 
environmental right in the Constitution is the physical82 surroundings within which 
humans live and the interrelationship between humans and these surroundings. This 
definition encompasses all physical aspects of the environment whether natural or 
man-made, but excludes non-physical environments such as an emotional or 
political environment. The implications of such a definition will now be discussed. 
Firstly, the exclusion of non-physical environments is important. As noted above, it 
is necessary to limit the potential scope of the term to avoid the absurd inclusion of 
every aspect of human life. The incorporation of interrelationships between humans 
within the environmental right would mean that interpersonal relationships between 
individuals would be covered by section 24. An emotionally harmful home 
environment resulting from a messy divorce could then potentially violate a child’s 
right to an environment not harmful to her health and well-being. A manipulative or 
disrespectful colleague at work could be seen as creating a psychologically harmful 
work environment which could potentially fall within the scope of section 24. These 
examples are far removed from the purposes of the environmental right examined in 
chapter 2.83 
The absence of human interrelationships in the definition of environment is not 
without challenges. Cramped living conditions due to overcrowding can have a 
significant impact on quality of life and can affect an individual’s health by 
contributing to the spread of disease.84 This would be a situation involving human 
interrelationships which impacts on environmental health. Such a situation could be 
understood as a symptom of the physical environment of the built environment and 
housing infrastructure. It is the inadequate conditions of the physical environment 
which result in this kind of overcrowding. It is important to note that in such 
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circumstances the actual relationships between the individuals are irrelevant to their 
environmental health or well-being under section 24. 
It should also be noted that the exclusion of the social environment from the 
definition of environment does not exclude social aspects of the environment. It is 
suggested that such aspects of the environment remain under the purview of section 
24 to the extent that they are linked to the physical environment. By way of example, 
Feris argues: 
 An expanded definition of “environment” could be invoked to prevent the displacement 
and relocation of indigenous groups on the basis that the loss of culturally or 
historically significant sites violates section 24.85 
For such circumstances to be covered by the environmental right, social aspects of 
the right must be taken into account. This does not, however, mean that the right 
should protect the social environment of the indigenous groups. While there are 
social concerns relevant to the violation of the environmental right, in this case the 
violation is linked to the physical sites which are of cultural or historical importance. 
The relationship (which in this case is a social and cultural one) between the 
indigenous group and the physical environment remains part of the proposed 
definition of environment. Social aspects of the environment are not excluded from 
the right as long as they are linked to a physical component of the environment.86 
The inclusion of the man-made environment in the interpretation of environment is 
important as people who live in cities, for example, arguably come into contact with 
more of the anthropogenic environment than the natural environment on a daily 
basis. The proposed interpretation allows for the inclusion of public spaces such as 
town centres, public parks, libraries and shopping malls. These facilities are used by 
countless people and should also be free from harm to health and well-being. 
Included in this understanding of environment would be transport infrastructure 
including roads, railways and airports. It could be argued that many of these features 
of the environment are necessary for the well-being of an individual as they allow for 
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access to facilities important for social, cultural and economic development. This 
would support the international law connection between environment and 
development. It could also be argued that a lack of transport infrastructure resulting 
in a child being unable to access a school near his home infringes on the right to an 
environment that is not harmful to health or well-being.87 Similarly, the environmental 
right could be violated where harm to well-being is experienced by a disabled person 
bound to a wheelchair who cannot access a necessary socio-economic resource (for 
example, a home affairs office) due to the lack of a suitable ramp to enter the 
building. In these examples it is the individual’s interrelationship with the physical 
environment that causes the harm. The man-made environment could also be 
harmful to health or well-being where it is simply unsafe. Roads that are poorly 
maintained or buildings constructed with harmful substances could infringe on the 
environmental right. Given that two-thirds of the South African population live in 
urban areas, the scope of section 24 must include the anthropogenic environment if 
it is to have any meaning for this sector of society.88 
Another vital component of the proposed definition is the inclusion of the work 
environment. A definition limited to the natural environment would rule out harmful 
work environments where many spend the majority of their time. The environmental 
right could, for example, be infringed in a factory where workers are exposed to 
harmful chemicals without any protective gear provided by the employer. An 
overcrowded, badly ventilated and poorly lit office space would also be covered by 
section 24 if harm to health or well-being could be shown. 
One of the most important aspects related to the environment which must be 
included in any interpretation of the term is that of access to water and sanitation. 
They are vital to health and well-being and relate to both the natural and the 
anthropogenic environment. Clean rivers and unpolluted rain water are valuable 
sources of water for washing, drinking and preparing food in the same way that 
access to clean tap water is. Whether the source of clean water is natural or man-
made, it is absolutely essential for health and well-being.89 Access to sanitation 
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requires suitable access to hygienic toilets. The environmental right covers access to 
natural sources of sanitation as well as the man-made infrastructure of taps and 
toilets. A lack of access to sufficient clean water (that is, the water necessary for 
health and well-being) would infringe on the environmental right, as would a lack of 
access to toilets. The importance of sanitation and hygiene for an environment not 
harmful to health or well-being applies equally to the work environment. It is 
suggested that a school or workplace that does not provide necessary access to 
clean toilets and clean water would be covered by section 24. Where an individual is 
required to use harmful substances in the course of their work, but not given access 
to sufficient clean water to wash these substances off, the right to an environment 
not harmful to well-being could be violated.90 
Given that the proposed definition is wide enough to include numerous aspects of 
the environment it is not feasible to address each possibility here. Some of the most 
important features of the environment which are covered by the definition have been 
highlighted above. A definition of the environment which covers a person’s physical 
surroundings and their relationship to it would include social and cultural aspects of 
the physical environment, the man-made or built environment (including the urban 
environment), the work environment and access to water and sanitation. 
3 9 Conclusion 
The term “environment” can be understood as a broad and all-inclusive term. It is 
important to refine it according to the context of section 24, in order to allow the right 
to find effective application. The term has been examined in the context of 
environmental right itself; in light of South African legislation and case law; and in 
consideration of international law and academic opinion. 
It is clear that the environment must be understood as referring to something 
broader than the natural environment, and that the social, economic and cultural 
dimensions of the environment cannot be ignored. The vital link between 
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environment and development must also remain central to the interpretation of the 
term. 
Three potential components of the environment have been identified: the natural, 
anthropogenic and social environments. For the reasons discussed above, I have 
argued that the scope of the right would be too broad if the social environment were 
to be included in the meaning of environment. In light of this, I have proposed a 
definition which encompasses the two remaining components. It is therefore 
proposed that the most appropriate interpretation of the term “environment” in the 
context of section 24 of the Constitution encompasses the physical surroundings 
within which humans live, and the interrelationship between humans and these 
surroundings. Having developed an appropriate definition for environment, the 
following chapter will discuss the meaning of the next key terms of the right: “health” 
and “well-being”. 




4 Health and well-being 
4 1 Introduction 
Section 24 contains a right to an environment not harmful to health or well-being. 
The meanings of “health” and “well-being” overlap to a certain extent and appear as 
a unit in the environmental right. The two should be considered together and 
therefore the interpretation of both terms will be addressed as far as possible. 
However, the scope of this chapter does not allow for an in-depth analysis of both 
terms and, as well-being is the more enigmatic of the two, a greater amount of time 
will be spent on investigating its meaning. I will begin by investigating the ordinary 
meanings of health and well-being. The terms will then be considered in light of the 
whole of section 24 where they appear. The interpretation of health and well-being 
by the legislature and the courts will then be examined. International law 
perspectives on health and well-being will be studied as they must be considered in 
the interpretation of the Bill of Rights. Following this, the opinion of commentators on 
section 24 and academics from legal and social studies disciplines will be discussed. 
I will conclude by proposing an interpretation of the term in line with a holistic and 
interdependent interpretation of the Bill of Rights. 
4 2 Ordinary meaning of health and well-being 
As established in chapter 2, the ordinary meaning of language is an important 
starting point in interpreting the law.1 While the use of “health or well-being” in 
section 24 of the Constitution has a specific legal meaning due to its context, the 
ordinary meaning ascribed to the two terms is the point of departure for 
interpretation. 
Health is described by the Oxford Dictionary as “the state of being free from 
illness or injury – a person’s mental or physical condition”.2 The Collins Dictionary 
similarly defines health as “the state of being bodily or mentally vigorous and free 
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from disease” or “the general condition of body and mind”.3 It is clear that health is 
seen to cover both the physical and mental condition of an individual. The inclusion 
of mental state under the concept of health is important to note as not all 
environmental impacts have visible physical consequences. These definitions of 
health, applied to section 24, would include the physical consequences of the 
environment on an individual’s health such as a child developing asthma due to 
pollution of the air in their neighbourhood. 
Well-being is a much broader concept than health. The Oxford Dictionary defines 
well-being as “the state of being comfortable, healthy or happy”.4 The definition given 
in the Collins Dictionary is equally all-embracing: “the condition of being contented, 
healthy, or successful; welfare”.5 These definitions include in the ambit of well-being 
the concepts of comfort, happiness, contentment and success all of which have clear 
subjective dimensions and are difficult to delimit. 
Well-being, as defined above, is broad enough to include an almost absurd range 
of harm from the sense of dis-ease somebody may feel because they do not like the 
red walls of their workplace, an individual’s discontentment because his garden is 
not as big as he wants it to be, to the unhappiness of a resident who dislikes the type 
of tree her municipality has planted in her street. While it is necessary for well-being 
to encompass certain subjective feelings and experiences, it must have boundaries 
to prevent every subjective discomfort resulting in the infringement of section 24.6 
Liebenberg recognises that “something more is required than a sense of emotional 
insecurity or aesthetic discomfort before the section becomes applicable”.7 Precisely 
what that “something more” is, will be investigated in the remainder of this chapter. 
The potential scope of “health or well-being” is vast. Many of the possible 
meanings would be absurd or impractical. The next section will assist in refining the 
interpretation of the terms by considering the immediate context of the right itself. 
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4 3 “Health or well-being” in section 24 
In order to understand what is meant by health and well-being in the environmental 
right, it is essential to understand the terms in context. The importance of 
considering the grammatical context when determining the meaning of a word or 
phrase is outlined in chapter 2.8 In addition to this, chapter 2 explains that the 
context of the provision as a whole must be taken into account.9 This section will 
examine health and well-being in the grammatical context within which the terms are 
found as well as within the context of the environmental right as a whole. 
Before addressing the interpretation of health and well-being specifically, it is 
necessary to say something about harm. It is possible that an aspect of well-being 
could be impacted negatively without being considered harmful. The concepts of 
health and well-being in section 24(a) are qualified by the notion of harm. The 
environmental right is only infringed if the environment is harmful to health or well-
being. While it is not clear what precisely would constitute harm, the requirement of 
harm creates a certain threshold for damage or negative impacts to be considered a 
violation of section 24. Harm requires an objective standard to prevent every minor 
negative impact qualifying as an infringement of the right. Examples of objective 
indications of harm are found where harm is linked to pecuniary loss (bearing in mind 
that it must still be linked to health or well-being to violate section 24) or certifiable, 
recognised harm to a person’s health or well-being. The latter would require medical 
proof of the damage caused by the environment. Particularly where emotional and 
psychological harm is concerned, the environmental harm would need to result in 
identifiable consequences recognised by the medical profession.10 In the absence of 
such an objective standard it could be possible to argue that any small change in a 
person’s surrounding environment could lead to an infringement of the environmental 
right. 
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The notion of harm appears in the private law sphere in the law of delict. It could 
be argued that a fundamental right which the state must promote and fulfil should, at 
a minimum, offer the protection that a party would be able to claim from a private 
party. The law of delict would then offer an indication of the base level of harm which 
should be considered an infringement of section 24. There is of course scope to 
argue that the state should provide protection that extends beyond that which is 
available in delict. The types of harm which are provided for in the law of delict are: 
physical injury to a person, damage to property, pure economic loss, pain and 
suffering (including psychiatric injury) and infringement of personality rights 
(including bodily integrity, dignity and privacy).11 To reiterate, this harm would have 
to be linked to an individual’s (or a community’s) health or well-being in order to 
constitute a violation of the environmental right. This would be difficult to argue 
where the environmental harm consists of minor damage to property or minimal 
economic loss. It would also depend on the meaning given to well-being. The 
interpretations of health and well-being are of course essential in determining what is 
considered harmful under section 24. 
The concepts of health and well-being appear in the disjunctive form in section 24. 
The right protects individuals from harm to either health or well-being. The inclusion 
of both of these concepts indicates that they do not have the same meaning. While 
there may be an overlap in their meanings, the inclusion of both concepts cannot be 
understood as superfluous or accidental. It is an intentional inclusion with 
implications for the meaning of these terms. The most important implication for the 
use of “health or well-being” in the right is that the broader term, well-being, must be 
understood as referring to something more than health. If the two were intended to 
convey the same meaning, well-being would be redundant. Well-being could be seen 
as encompassing health, but it must mean some broader and more inclusive than 
health alone.12 
The environmental right in the Interim Constitution corresponds with section 24(a) 
of the Final Constitution (with the exception of the word “detrimental” in the Interim 
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Constitution in the place of “harmful”).13 There were no explicit references to 
conservation or sustainable development. Before the commencement of the Final 
Constitution it was argued that the term well-being was broad enough to include 
conservation related concerns, indicating that a lack of conservation could be 
considered detrimental to well-being.14 While the right in section 24 now includes 
conservation and the prevention of ecological degradation amongst other things, the 
recognition that the state of the natural environment affects human well-being 
remains important for interpretation of the term. This suggests that even where there 
are no direct physical consequences for an individual or community, the degradation 
of the natural environment is linked to their well-being. The destruction of a 
geographically remote natural landscape could impact on well-being even where it is 
not visible or even accessible by the individual.15 
It could also be argued that the ultimate inclusion of section 24(b) in the 1996 
Constitution is an indication that the integrity of the natural environment is regarded 
as an important concern worthy of constitutional protection and therefore important 
for well-being. The environment must be protected “for the benefit of present and 
future generations”,16 that is, for the sake of all humanity. This protection is 
necessary not only for the environment itself, but for the existence and well-being of 
the human species. Our ability to continue existing and to provide for our children’s 
survival forms an important part of human well-being.17  
The role of sustainable development is also recognised in section 24(b) and is a 
central principle of international environmental law.18 Read holistically, the 
environmental right recognises the necessity of human development which balances 
economic, social and environmental concerns. Each of these three aspects of 
sustainable development should also form part of our understanding of what well-
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being means. Well-being, as it appears in section 24, should encompass the 
individual’s economic reality, social experiences and environmental context. 
Health and well-being must be understood in the light of section 24 as a whole 
and the inclusion of section 24(b) is particularly important for this interpretation. 
Whether there has been an infringement of section 24(a) will also depend on how 
harm is interpreted. The use and interpretation of health and well-being in the 
framework environmental legislation will now be examined.  
4 4 Health and well-being in NEMA 
As noted in 3 4, the National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 (NEMA) 
has an important role to play in the interpretation of section 24. As it was enacted to 
give effect to the environmental right in section 24, NEMA provides an indication of 
how the legislature interprets section 24. 
Using the language of the Constitution, “health” and “well-being” appear alongside 
each other throughout NEMA and are often treated as a unit. The preamble asserts 
that “many inhabitants of South Africa live in an environment that is harmful to their 
health and well-being” and it reaffirms the right to an environment not harmful to 
health or well-being.19 Health and well-being also form part of the definition of 
“environment”: 
“environment” means the surroundings within which humans exist and that are made 
up of— 
(v) the land, water and atmosphere of the earth; 
(vi) micro-organisms, plant and animal life; 
(vii) any part or combination of (i) and (ii) and the interrelationships among and 
between them; and 
(viii) the physical, chemical, aesthetic and cultural properties and conditions of the 
foregoing that influence human health and well-being.20 
This definition indicates that the drafters of NEMA understood that human health and 
well-being can be influenced by certain aspects of the objects in (i) and (ii) of the 
definition. The physical, chemical, aesthetic and cultural dimensions of the 
environment can have an impact on health and well-being. According to NEMA, 
therefore, the aesthetic dimension of a particular environment has an effect on 
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human health and well-being. The definition of “pollution” in NEMA includes 
reference to a change in the environment which “has an adverse effect on human 
health or well-being”. This definition recognises not only the expected potential 
health impacts of pollution, but it also recognises that experiencing pollution could 
have an adverse effect on well-being. Pollution that does not have a direct effect on 
health could nevertheless be seen as harmful to an individual’s well-being and 
therefore in violation of the environmental right.21 
Section 2 of NEMA sets out certain principles which must govern environmental 
management. Section 2(2) states:  
Environmental management must place people and their needs at the forefront of its 
concern, and serve their physical, psychological, developmental, cultural and social 
interests equitably.22 
These interests provide an indication of the aspects of the human experience with 
which environmental management should be concerned. Environmental 
management which seeks to realise the right to an environment not harmful to health 
or well-being is required by NEMA to serve the individual’s physical, psychological, 
developmental, cultural and social interests. With reference to the environmental 
right, Du Plessis argues that “[t]his principle [in section 2(2) of NEMA] and the cluster 
of interests included therein, arguably lays down a firm guideline for the courts as to 
the basic constituents of the notion ‘well-being’”.23 NEMA clearly sees these interests 
as worthy of concern and central to environmental management and they provide a 
valuable guideline for the meaning of “health or well-being” in section 24. 
NEMA indicates that health and well-being have aesthetic and cultural 
dimensions. It also recognises the importance of psychological, developmental, 
social and cultural interests thereby contributing to the interpretation of section 24. 
Many of these interests are recognised as part of well-being in case law, 
international law and by commentators on section 24 as will be seen below. The 
following section examines how health and well-being have been interpreted in 
South African case law. 
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4 5 Health and well-being in case law 
While the phrase “health or well-being” in section 24 has not received much 
attention, there are some cases which shed light on how it should be interpreted. 
The mention of well-being in these cases (if it is indeed mentioned at all) is often 
brief and lacking in content. There is, however, some information and direction to be 
gleaned from these cases which can assist in the interpretation of health and well-
being. 
The first important case is that of Minister of Health and Welfare v Woodcarb (Pty) 
Ltd24 which was decided under the Interim Constitution. The case concerned air 
pollution caused by the respondent’s sawmill operations. A ‘Rheese burner’, which 
burnt excess sawdust and other materials, generated a great deal of smoke 
containing noxious gases. The court held that such generation of smoke constituted 
an “infringement of the rights of the respondents' neighbours to ‘an environment 
which is not detrimental to their health and well-being’”.25 It is not clear if there were 
direct health risks due to this smoke or if it was the general well-being of the 
applicants that resulted in the infringement. Van der Linde and Basson note: 
Although the Woodcarb court found a violation of the right to an environment that is not 
detrimental to health or well-being, it did not offer a meaningful interpretation of these 
concepts [in section 29].26 
Woodcarb may not have clarified the meaning of health or well-being very 
thoroughly, but the case does confirm that air pollution caused by such an industrial 
plant can lead to an infringement of the health or well-being of others. 
The case of Hichange Investments (Pty) Ltd v Cape Produce Co (Pty) Ltd t/a Pelts 
Products27 similarly dealt with the emission of noxious gases from the tanning 
process used at the respondent’s tannery. In this case the hydrogen sulphide 
emanating from the tannery exceeded “both nuisance and public health guidelines” 
and also caused “considerable corrosion on the applicant’s premises”.28 The court 
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points out that the definition of pollution in NEMA includes a change in the 
environment caused by “odours” that have “an adverse effect on the human health or 
well-being”.29 This indicates that even outside of a clear threat to health, the 
presence of the odour in this case could be sufficient to result in harm to well-being. 
Leach J argues that “[o]ne should not be obliged to work in an environment of stench 
and [...] to be in an environment contaminated by H2S is adverse to one’s ‘well-
being’”.30 The unpleasant experience of exposure to the odour of the gas is deemed 
harmful to the well-being of those subjected to it. 
In the High Court (Transvaal Provincial Division), the meaning of the 
environmental right is discussed in the case of HTF Developers (Pty) Ltd v Minister 
of Environmental Affairs and Tourism.31 Murphy J states that the environmental right 
“does not confine itself to protection against conduct harmful to health but seeks also 
by, inter alia, the promotion of conservation and ecologically sustainable 
development, to ensure an environment beneficial to our ‘well-being’”.32 This 
confirms that the notion of well-being in section 24(a) includes conservation and 
ecologically sustainable development. These concepts, which are commonly seen as 
existing for the benefit of the natural environment and not human beings, are 
deemed important and are seen by the court as integral to human well-being.33 
Murphy J continues by pointing out that while “[t]he term ‘well-being’ is open-ended 
and manifestly [...] incapable of precise definition”, it remains important to attempt to 
define it in order for environmental authorities to understand the constitutional 
objectives they must reach.34 Glazewski is quoted with approval, having described 
well-being as “a sense of environmental integrity; a sense that we ought to utilize the 
environment in a morally responsible and ethical manner”.35 Environmental integrity 
suggests that we should minimise our interference with the natural environment and 
its ecological equilibrium. The court’s appeal to this concept reinforces the idea that 
well-being is linked to the healthy existence of an environment which maintains a 
degree of independence and “integrity”. 
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The role of economic and social development in achieving well-being is 
recognised in Fuel Retailers v Director-General: Environmental Management.36 The 
court points out the reference to economic and social development in section 
24(b)(iii) and states that it is “essential to the well-being of human beings”.37 In a 
footnote Ngcobo J points out the link between well-being and development as 
recognised in the Declaration on the Right to Development.38 An important 
component of well-being is thus the capacity for economic and social development. 
Du Plessis argues that this “rather embryonic observation” about well-being in Fuel 
Retailers has caused confusion and points out that the primary focus of the court’s 
discussion was sustainable development and the role that economic and social 
development play in sustainable development.39 She also notes that in Fuel Retailers 
“no attempt has been made to unpack the notion of ‘well-being’ as such”.40 While the 
court could have provided more clarity on the meaning of well-being, this does not 
discount its recognition of the role of social and economic development in human 
well-being. 
In Paola v Jeeva NO41 the derogation in value of property due to the loss of a view 
was addressed. This case does not deal directly with section 24 or environmental 
law, but it has been used in support of the contention that enjoyment of a view could 
be linked to well-being. Van der Linde and Basson argue:  
The reduction in the value of the property that would result from the applicant’s inability 
to enjoy the magnificent views from his property forms part of the field of protection of 
the applicant’s right to an environment that is not detrimental to his well-being. The 
Court’s reasoning clearly recognizes that the aesthetic value (of a magnificent view or 
some other feature of the environment) falls within the protective ambit of FC s 24(a).42 
The ratio of the court’s decision was, however, not due to the owner’s loss of 
enjoyment of the view. Kidd points out that “the crux of the decision is the market 
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value of the property and not the view”.43 The derogation of the market value as a 
result of the view is not the same as the view itself. I would argue that this case 
cannot be read as support for the contention that the enjoyment of a view is linked to 
well-being.44 To argue that the view in this case is linked to well-being under section 
24 is to suggest that well-being is somehow linked to the market value of an 
individual’s assets. This would, in my opinion, be incorrect. The well-being derived 
from the aesthetics of the environment is not due to the economic value of property, 
but rather the subjective experience an individual has when appreciating the view, 
and the feelings of well-being that accompany that experience.45  
Lastly, the case of Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town46 illustrates 
some of the important elements of well-being and how they could find practical 
application. Although the court refers briefly to section 24, it neither elaborates on the 
right as a whole, nor the concept of well-being specifically. The case concerned a 
piece of land along the coast and on the western slopes of Table Mountain that 
Oudekraal Estates wanted to develop. The land has a cultural and religious 
significance for the Muslim community of Cape Town due to its historical importance 
and the location of treasured kramats and graves on the land,47 and the court also 
pointed out the environmental importance of the flora on the undeveloped land.48 In 
addition to this it was noted that the aesthetic beauty of the land contributed to its 
tourism value.49 The facts of the case illustrate how cultural or religious well-being 
could be adversely affected by changes in the environment and the destruction of 
important sites. The land in question contributed to the spiritual, cultural and social 
well-being of the Muslim community and its destruction would have resulted in 
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significant harm to well-being. The tourism value of the land also serves as an 
example of how the destruction of a specific landscape can affect the economic 
interests of a community. The destruction of the landscape diminishes tourism 
revenue, which in turn influences employment, the economy and the economic well-
being of the population.50 
The case law discussed above confirms that health and well-being in section 24 
includes protection from pollution, concerns related to conservation, and socio-
economic concerns related to development. The case of Oudekraal illustrates how 
environmental harm can impact on cultural and religious interests and suggests that 
these should be included in well-being. Ultimately well-being is an open-ended term 
which will need to continue evolving and adapting as the courts are faced with 
changing environmental circumstances and needs. The international law 
understandings of health and well-being can assist in guiding the courts as they give 
meaning to section 24. These are discussed in the following section. 
4 6 Health and well-being in international law 
As noted in chapter 2, international law is an important source to consult when 
interpreting rights in the Bill of Rights.51 There is a wide range of international law 
dealing with health and well-being, and the scope of this chapter unfortunately does 
not allow for a detailed discussion of all these. The most relevant of the available 
international sources will be discussed in this section, particularly those related to the 
environment. 
The Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 
(the Stockholm Declaration)52 was one of the very first international documents that 
included a right to the environment. Principle 1 of the Stockholm Declaration reads 
as follows: 
Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in 
an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being, and he bears a 
solemn responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present and future 
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generations. In this respect, policies promoting or perpetuating apartheid, racial 
segregation, discrimination, colonial and other forms of oppression and foreign 
domination stand condemned and must be eliminated.53 
This first principle links the concept of well-being to dignity, while also implying that 
the prerequisites for a life of dignity and well-being are freedom, equality and 
adequate conditions of life. It is important to note that the protection and 
improvement of an environment that permits dignity and well-being is explicitly linked 
to the elimination of oppression, discrimination and segregation. This suggests that 
social and political aspects of the environment are considered to be essential 
features of well-being. It is particularly interesting to note the presence of the values 
which are foundational to constitutional interpretation in South Africa.54 Freedom, 
equality and dignity each play a role in this right, and should, as is demonstrated by 
the Stockholm Declaration, play a central role in the achievement of human well-
being. Well-being in section 24 should be understood to include these values and an 
environment which harms an individual or community’s freedom, equality or dignity 
would be in violation of the environmental right. 
The Stockholm Declaration also asserts that “[b]oth aspects of man's 
environment, the natural and the man-made, are essential to his well-being”.55 This 
recognition of the role of the natural and man-made environments in well-being 
shows that well-being should include concerns relating to both. Well-being in the 
natural environment would be linked to concerns such as conservation and the 
protection of biodiversity, or the pollution of the environment, whereas the state of 
the built environment would impact upon well-being where, for example, damaged 
roads prevent access to basic services. 
While the Stockholm Declaration does mention health, it is not in relation to the 
general right to the environment, but with reference to the impact of pollution in 
specific instances.56 It is not unreasonable to suggest that the Stockholm 
Declaration’s conception of well-being encompasses health and that it was therefore 
considered unnecessary to mention a right to an environment which permits a life of 
health and well-being. The right to health is, however, mentioned more frequently in 
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international law and therefore offers more direction for the interpretation of “health 
or well-being” in section 24. 
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights57 includes a 
right to health in article 12. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
elaborates on the right and notes that the right includes physical and mental health, 
and does not merely concern the right to health care.58 It further explains: 
[T]he right to health embraces a wide range of socio-economic factors that promote 
conditions in which people can lead a healthy life, and extends to the underlying 
determinants of health, such as food and nutrition, housing, access to safe and potable 
water and adequate sanitation, safe and healthy working conditions, and a healthy 
environment.59  
The underlying determinants of health identified here could also be seen as 
determinants of well-being for the purposes of section 24 where they impact on 
quality of life and wellness but fall short of impacting on physical or mental health. 
The Committee also notes that health in article 12 does not have the meaning given 
to health by the World Health Organisation (WHO).60 The definition of health used by 
the WHO describes health as “a state of complete physical, mental and social well-
being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity”.61 This definition affirms the 
role of physical, mental and social factors in human well-being. Despite the 
Committee adopting a narrower definition of health under the ICESCR, the WHO’s 
notion of health is still applicable for the interpretation of section 24. As noted in 3 3 
above, “health or well-being” form a logical disjunction in section 24 and the right 
protects individuals from harm to health or well-being, so which of the two is relied on 
is largely immaterial as either will fall within the ambit of section 24(a). The features 
of both definitions adopted by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights and the World Health Organisation should be covered by the scope of section 
24. 
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As indicated in 4 5 above, there are important links between development and 
well-being, and these are evident in international law. The preamble of the United 
Nations Declaration on the Right to Development describes development as follows: 
Development is a comprehensive economic, social, cultural and political process, 
which aims at the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population and 
of all individuals.62 
The right to development establishes a link between well-being and development. 
Development in this context is made up of economic, social, cultural and political 
aspects. As was noted above, Fuel Retailers makes reference to the right to 
development and the court’s discussion of well-being has been criticised for being 
“embryonic” and leading to confusion.63 However, in light of the clear link between 
environment and development in the international arena,64 the mention in Fuel 
Retailers of the role that development plays in achieving well-being under section 24 
seems appropriate. This means that the economic, social, cultural and political 
dimensions of development are all contributing factors to human well-being. It is also 
not insignificant that the environmental right in the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (African Charter)65 also emphasises development as it entitles 
people to “a general satisfactory environment favourable to development”.66  
The African Charter also includes a right to development, which is linked to well-
being in Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group 
International on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v Kenya.67 Although the African 
Commission on Human and People’s Rights does not explicitly endorse this 
interpretation, the complainants proposed interpretation of development is noted by 
the Commission: 
[T]he Complainants argue [that] it is clear that development should be understood as 
an increase in peoples’ well-being, as measured by capacities and choices available. 
The realisation of the right to development, they say, requires the improvement and 
increase in capacities and choices. They argue that the Endorois have suffered a loss 
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of well-being through the limitations on their choice and capacities, including effective 
and meaningful participation in projects that will affect them.68 
It could be argued then, that development which is carried out without the 
participation of those affected, and which does not allow for flexibility and choice, 
could be deemed harmful to well-being. In light of the important role of development 
in international law, and the references to development in section 24 of the 
Constitution itself, development should be considered a component of well-being. 
The position of indigenous communities, and the impact of development on their 
environment and well-being, has been recognised in the international context. The 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) produced 
Agenda 21 which acknowledges “the interrelationship between the natural 
environment and its sustainable development and the cultural, social, economic and 
physical well-being of indigenous people”.69 Agenda 21 suggests that sustainable 
development should consider of the impact of development on these communities 
and recognises that their environment plays a vital role in their cultural, social, 
economic and physical well-being.70 This link between indigenous or traditional 
communities and the environment is similarly illustrated in Endorois.71 Amongst other 
violations, the Endorois community’s restricted access to religiously significant 
ancestral land was held to be a violation of the right to freedom of religion72 as well 
as their cultural rights.73 The African Commission held that the protection of human 
rights “requires respect for, and the protection of their [minority groups] religious and 
cultural heritage essential to their group identity, including buildings and sites such 
as libraries, churches, mosques, temples and synagogues”.74 This confirms the 
importance of culturally or religiously significant features of the environment for the 
well-being of individuals or communities.  
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The case of Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) and the Center 
for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) v Nigeria75 demonstrates the extent of 
impact that environmental degradation can have on health and well-being. In this 
case the exploitation of oil reserves and dumping of toxic waste in a region of Nigeria 
ultimately led to a range of severe health consequences for those living in the area.76 
The African Commission noted that the rights to health and to a general satisfactory 
environment “recognise the importance of a clean and safe environment that is 
closely linked to economic and social rights in so far as the environment affects the 
quality of life and safety of the individual”.77 SERAC confirms the important link 
between the environment, economic and social rights, and quality of life or well-
being. 
In Maya Indigenous Community of the Toledo District v Belize the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights recognises the physical, cultural and spiritual facets 
of well-being and how they are impacted by environmental degradation.78 The case 
emphasises that these facets of well-being are particularly important for indigenous 
communities whose lifestyles are more intimately connected with the environment. 
The recognition of the way of life of indigenous communities in the interpretation of 
well-being reinforces the value of freedom in the Constitution as it emphasises the 
importance of allowing room for different lifestyles, cultures and religions. 
Environmental harm has also been linked to the right to privacy and family life in 
international law. Despite the absence of an environmental right in the Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European 
Convention),79 De Wet and Du Plessis point out that the European Court “frequently 
makes reference to the impact of the particular environmental situation on the health 
and well-being of the claimants”.80 The European Court is not clear on the meaning 
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of health and well-being in the environmental context, but De Wet and Du Plessis 
note that the Court has recognised a link between well-being and the enjoyment of 
home and family life.81 This is evident in López Ostra v Spain:82  
[S]evere environmental pollution may affect individuals’ well-being and prevent them 
from enjoying their homes in such a way as to affect their private and family life 
adversely, without, however, seriously endangering their health.83  
Similarly, in Fadeyeva v Russian Federation84 the applicant was successful in 
claiming a violation of Article 8 of the European Convention despite failing to prove 
harm to her health.85 In this case significant air pollution was cause by the operation 
of the Severstal steel plant in close proximity to the applicant’s home. Although the 
applicant could not show quantifiable harm to her health as a result of the steel plant, 
the quality of her home life was adversely affected and this was sufficient.86 
Exposure to pollution can therefore affect the quality of an individual’s life at home 
and could be an important indicator of environmental harm to well-being. Excessive 
pollution could, for example, impact on an individual’s ability to be at peace and 
enjoy their own home, which ultimately impacts on overall well-being. 
The international law discussed confirms that “health or well-being” is an 
extensive phrase which should include conservation, protection from pollution, 
cultural dimensions of the environment and, importantly, concerns related to 
development. Having considered some of the international law dealing with health 
and well-being, I will now turn to the views of various commentators and academics 
on the meaning of health and of well-being. 
4 7 Academic opinion 
Academic opinions on the notions of health and well-being are varied. A range of 
interests and concerns have been suggested as components of well-being, and 
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these will be discussed below. In addition to the views on the environmental right 
and section 24, there are also useful perspectives on well-being from other 
disciplines. These could inform the interpretation of the right and are also important 
to consider. I will begin by briefly examining interpretations of health while the 
remainder of this section will focus on the meaning of well-being. 
Before defining health in the context of the environmental right, it is important to 
distinguish it from the right to health care services.87 Glazewski points out that the 
right to a healthy environment is broader than access to health care in section 27.88 
He notes that “[a] particular environment may be damaging to a person’s health, yet 
avoid falling foul of the right concerning health provided for in section 27”.89 Health 
has been linked to a sense of mental and physical integrity,90 and can refer to 
individuals or to the greater public.91 Public health would be affected in situations 
where large scale pollution affects the health of entire communities. Du Plessis 
argues that health impacts on future generations should also be given consideration 
when interpreting health in section 24.92 She notes that “[p]henomena such as 
environmental change and, in particular, climate change, can [...] have severe 
impacts on the health conditions of future generations of people”.93 This is 
particularly important in light of the principle of intergenerational equity which is 
referred to in section 24(b).  
As noted in 4 3, the notion of well-being is broader than that of health.94 Health 
forms a part of well-being, but well-being extends beyond this. There is a range of 
possible factors that could be included within well-being and there are different 
opinions about what the term should include. Most commentators agree, however, 
that well-being in section 24 is broad enough to cover concerns related to the natural 
environment such as conservation, environmental integrity, the protection of 
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ecosystems, biodiversity and natural habitats.95 As seen in 4 3 above, the rest of the 
right supports such an interpretation. This confirms that a person’s sense of well-
being is linked to the well-being of the environment.96 
Feris argues that the inclusion of well-being in section 24 allows the right to 
encompass “important concerns of environmental law such as the conservation of 
fauna and flora or the maintenance of bio-diversity” which would not fall under the 
ambit of health.97 Du Plessis similarly distinguishes the ambit of well-being from that 
of health: 
Whereas the notion of ‘health’ covers issues of contamination, ‘well-being’ should be 
understood to afford protection against the destruction of natural habitats, which does 
not necessarily have direct health impacts.98  
Conservation and the protection of the natural environment are widely considered to 
be important aspects of the notion of well-being. Van der Linde and Basson suggest 
that “the desire to protect the ‘fynbos’ unique to the Western Cape from a hazardous 
building project might, for example, be captured under an expansive understanding 
of well-being”.99 Feris and Tladi also argue that well-being is dependent on 
“conservation and the maintenance of wilderness areas and biodiversity”.100 
Glazewski elaborates on the inclusion of conservation under well-being: 
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[T]he term “well-being” encompasses the essence of environmental concern, namely a 
sense of environmental integrity; a sense that we ought to utilise the environment in a 
morally responsible, considered and ethical manner.101 
This suggests that our well-being is dependent on that of the environment and that 
morally responsible behaviour can contribute to well-being. 
Another aspect of well-being which many academics agree on is that it includes 
the aesthetic value of features of the environment.102 While there is some consensus 
on the inclusion of aesthetic elements in well-being, few commentators elaborate on 
precisely what that might mean or where it would find application. De Wet and Du 
Plessis suggest that well-being could refer to interests people have in the 
environment and, by way of example, they refer to “the aesthetic value of a wetland 
that attracts different bird species”.103 Kotzé also refers to aesthetics as an example 
of an interest that people have in the environment and offers the example of an 
ocean view being included under well-being because of its aesthetic value.104 
This aesthetic value of a certain feature or portion of the environment has also 
been linked to the idea of a ‘sense of place’.105 This is arguably as vague and elusive 
a concept as that of well-being, but it is associated with the aesthetics and specific 
identity of a place. A certain place has value to people for some reason (spiritual, 
psychological or cultural, for example) and is therefore linked to their well-being. 
Glazewski argues that a ‘sense of place’ was one of the reasons for not mining in St 
Lucia in Kwa-Zulu-Natal in the 1990s,106 while Du Plessis links ‘sense of place’ to the 
built environment “when the identity or economic value of a particular setting or 
settlement has everything to do with the surrounding natural environment”.107 In 
these examples it is the attachment that people have to the aesthetic appeal of the 
place which links it to their well-being. To destroy or damage such an environment 
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would constitute harm to the individual who is no longer able to appreciate or enjoy 
that environment as it has lost its identity and that which made it appealing.  
While aesthetics may seem like a superficial or trivial aspect of the environment, a 
closer look at studies on the impact of landscape and the appearance of 
environments illuminates the link between well-being and this appearance. A study 
by Thompson and Kent found that “the perceived ability to escape to green spaces 
away from noise and overcrowding was significantly linked to mental well-being”.108 
This would be particularly important where high density city living is concerned.109 
Exposure to natural landscapes with an aesthetic appeal has also been found to 
contain numerous benefits for individuals such as “reduced stress, improved 
attention capacity, facilitating recovery from illness, ameliorating physical well-being 
in elderly people, and behavioural changes that improve mood and general well-
being”.110 Even the presence of “natural elements” in a home (gardens or indoor 
plants, for example) has a significant impact on cognitive functioning in children.111 
This handful of examples indicates that the aesthetic dimensions of the environment 
have far more to do with well-being than the brief pleasure of appreciation or a 
simple preference for a certain landscape. There are clear benefits to well-being 
which can be gained from the environment – particularly the natural environment – 
whether in the form of vegetation in a home, trees in an informal settlement or the 
preservation of a national park located hours from an individual’s home. These 
benefits range from highly subjective aspects of well-being such as feelings of 
happiness, to the more objective benefits of recovery from illnesses and cognitive 
functioning.  
                                            
108
 Thompson S & Kent J “Connecting and strengthening communities in places for health and well-
being” (2013) Australian Planner 1 4. It is interesting to note that a benefit to well-being is gained 
through the perceived ability to access these areas. Whether or not the people ever actually go there 
is another matter. This confirms the suggestion made by some commentators (discussed below) that 
harm to the environment anywhere could be seen as harm to well-being, regardless of whether 
people intend to visit the place in question. 
109
 The availability of such ‘green spaces’ involves the knowledge of freedom of access to these 
places (whether or not it is exercised). This is important in light of the infringement of freedom under 
the apartheid regime such as, for example, the limited and segregated access to beaches. The value 
of freedom in the Constitution, read with the environmental right, suggests that such spaces should be 
protected and maintained in order that all South Africans have the opportunity to benefit from the 
capacity of natural landscapes to promote well-being. 
110
 Velarde, Fry & Tveit (2007) Urban Forestry & Urban Greening 210. 
111
 Adams S & Savahl S “Children’s perceptions of the natural environment: A South African 
perspective” (2013) Children’s Geographies 1 4. 




Although it is clear that the physical appearance of the environment (and the 
human response to it) is a component of well-being, it is important to note that this 
will not mean that every diminishment of aesthetics will result in harm to well-being. 
Harm to well-being would likely be easier to substantiate where more objective 
facets of well-being have been negatively affected.112 As noted above, Liebenberg 
suggests that the right requires more than an “emotional insecurity or aesthetic 
discomfort”.113 The aesthetic qualities of a particular environment are often linked to 
other interests that could be affected if those qualities were lost. It has been noted 
that there could be cultural, spiritual or psychological interests that relate to the 
physical features of the environment.114 Aesthetic features of the environment could 
also have important links to tourism revenue.115 If it can be shown that the aesthetics 
of the environment have an impact on one of these interests it could be easier to 
argue that there has been harm to well-being. This link could avoid the unnecessary 
application of section 24 to instances of mere “aesthetic discomfort”.116 
The spiritual and cultural significance of certain elements of the environment has 
been recognised as forming part of the notion of well-being.117 The significance of 
the environment in these respects could be general or specific. Specific “rock 
formations, water courses or soil” could have cultural or religious value to certain 
groups.118 Examples of cultural and spiritual or religious significance linked to 
physical features of the environment are seen in the cases of Oudekraal and 
Endorois discussed above.119 
More broadly speaking, it has been proposed that “the notion of ‘well-being’ 
includes spiritual or psychological aspects such as the individual’s need to be able to 
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commune with nature”.120 Glazewski also notes the importance of access to 
wilderness and wild places for human well-being.121 Numerous studies indicate the 
value of access to the natural environment, even in small doses such as the 
presence trees in public spaces.122  
In addition to the above components of well-being proposed by commentators on 
section 24, the social and economic dimensions of well-being have also been 
acknowledged.123 Feris and Tladi note, for example, that indigenous groups often 
“depend on biodiversity as a source of nutrition and for its medicinal and cultural 
value” and the loss of this biodiversity could be considered harmful to their social 
well-being.124 It has also been argued that well-being should include “the enjoyment 
of a sustainable livelihood”.125 This suggests that where the environment impacts 
negatively on employment and businesses, it could result in harm to well-being.126  
The economic dimensions of well-being are particularly significant where poverty 
is concerned. The relationship between poverty and well-being is an important one 
as poverty impacts well-being in a variety of ways. Shelton examines the relationship 
between poverty, the environment and well-being and notes that “poverty is not 
merely about income or wealth, but encompasses the capability of an individual or 
group to access the various elements that contribute to well-being”.127 In other 
words, the poor lack access to that which can improve their well-being. Du Plessis 
also recognises this link between poverty and well-being: 
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[L]iving in poverty results in an inadequate experience of well-being and [...] this has a 
direct impact on people’s ability to be content with their environment, to enjoy a 
sustainable livelihood and to protect their inherent dignity. In fact, the notions of 
poverty and well-being appear to be mutually exclusive. The well-being of poor people 
is in most instances directly affected by factors related to poverty, their insecure, 
unhealthy and often intolerable work and living environments. But when poor people 
have to live off scarce natural resources and/or their living spaces are established in 
sensitive or protected ecosystems this could also impact on their well-being and that of 
future generations of other poor and non-poor people.128 
It is significant to note that the well-being of poor people, while having strong links to 
immediate material needs, is also bound up in the state of natural ecosystems and 
natural resources. The way the poor live today has an impact on the well-being of 
future generations. One could perhaps argue that there is a hierarchy of needs 
covered by the concept of well-being. The needs of the poor which relate to well-
being are more immediate than others and possibly even life-threatening. In the 
interests of substantive equality it may be necessary to prioritise objective material 
deprivation over more subjective threats to well-being. For example, where the well-
being of one community in relation to access to a public park comes into conflict with 
the urgent need of another community displaced by floods, the urgent material needs 
of the latter community should arguably come first.129 An awareness of how poverty 
interacts with well-being alerts us to the tensions between the different dimensions of 
well-being and how they impact people differently.  
The right and constitutional value of human dignity is also important for 
understanding how the environment affects well-being. Du Plessis emphasises this 
relationship between dignity and well-being: 
Further in-depth interpretation and analysis of the notion of ‘well-being’ is also likely to 
reveal scientifically valid links between well-being, dignity (a constitutional value), and 
the individual’s constitutional right to have his or her inherent human dignity 
protected.130 
Where an aspect of the physical environment impacts negatively on an individual’s 
human dignity it could then be argued that this constitutes harm to well-being under 
section 24. This interpretation would be particularly important for the experiences of 
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the poor in, for example, informal settlements where lack of access to clean toilets 
could constitute an infringement of human dignity and of well-being. 
Commentators have suggested well-being could be affected where the 
environmental harm takes place in a geographically remote location.131 Kidd 
maintains that well-being does not have to be connected to a person’s immediate 
environment. While discussing the aesthetics of the environment and a ‘sense of 
place’ he argues: 
 [A] person’s well-being may be detrimentally affected when there is a threat or 
damage to the environment in a place that is not only geographically distant from that 
person but also somewhere that person has never been nor intends to go in the future. 
For example, a person in Johannesburg may legitimately allege that her environmental 
well-being is detrimentally affected by a threat to the natural environment at St Lucia, 
one of South Africa’s World Heritage Sites. This raises the idea that knowledge or 
reasonable anticipation of a threat to the environment anywhere may have an impact 
on a person’s environmental well-being.132 
This idea has been reiterated by Kotzé and Du Plessis who include a threat to 
natural resources as a potential harm to well-being regardless of the location of the 
harm.133 
It is necessary to note here that the timing of harm should also be considered in 
the interpretation of well-being. As already noted with reference to health, the future 
impacts on well-being must be considered. Glazewski notes that an environment 
which does not harm well-being points to “a sense of stewardship, that people are 
the custodians of the environment for future generations”.134 This interpretation is 
supported by the reference to the needs of future generations in section 24(b), and is 
underscored by obligation to consider equality when interpreting the Bill of Rights.135 
Action taken today should therefore not be harmful to well-being immediately or in 
the future. 
In addition to the legal perspectives on the meaning of well-being that I have 
discussed, well-being can also be interpreted from a social sciences perspective. 
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Kidd examines some of these extra-legal sources in order to examine how they have 
interpreted well-being.136 McGregor’s definition of well-being includes being with 
others, having needs met, a meaningful pursuit of goals and a satisfactory quality of 
life.137 Doyal and Gough argue that health and autonomy are basic dimensions of 
human need.138 Health relates to the state of the body and the material needs that 
must be met in order to maintain physical health such as food, water and shelter.139 
Autonomy relates to the individual’s freedom to make decisions and achieve 
personal goals.140 While health is not a novel concept, this inclusion of autonomy as 
a component of well-being could be helpful in illustrating how the value of freedom 
could be incorporated into the interpretation of the environmental right.141 
Social sciences perspectives on well-being confirm the important links between 
poverty and well-being (or lack thereof) that have been recognised above. Kidd 
argues that “[p]overty involves, in short, the absence of well-being”142 but also notes 
that there is a move away from the emphasis on material deprivation in poverty 
studies. McGregor and Sumner refer to the idea of ‘3-D well-being’ which suggests 
that there are three dimensions of well-being: “the material, the relational and the 
subjective (also referred to as perceptual)”.143 It is argued that all three of these 
should be considered when determining well-being.144 This is important to note if we 
consider well-being as encompassing social and cultural elements as well. A poor 
rural community could be seen as lacking in well-being with regard to material 
needs, but it could be thriving where social and cultural needs are concerned. On the 
other hand, it is equally possible for a single wealthy city-dweller to experience 
extreme isolation and a lack of relational well-being despite all material needs being 
met. The poor are not bereft of all sense of well-being due to their economic status 
and neither are the wealthy guaranteed well-being because of theirs. The likelihood 
is of course that the poor experience more harm to well-being than the wealthy as a 
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result of the lack of autonomy that accompanies a lack of financial resources. The 
wealthy are often in a position to access what is necessary in order to fulfil their own 
needs if it is not provided for them, whereas the poor are forced to make do with 
what they have. In considering the effect of poverty on well-being, it is important not 
to forget that well-being consists not only of a material dimension but, following 
McGregor and Sumner’s approach, relational and subjective dimensions as well. 
Kidd’s discussion of these social sciences theories of well-being illustrates how 
useful these perspectives can be in understanding the possible application of well-
being in the context of the environmental right. He notes that many of these ideas 
overlap with existing rights in the Bill of Rights: 
What ideas such as those of McGregor, and Doyal and Gough, indicate is that well-
being incorporates several dimensions that would be addressed by other rights in the 
Bill of Rights, including slavery, servitude and forced labour; housing; health care; food 
and water; children’s rights; and education, not to mention equality and dignity. Their 
ideas emphasise human relationships and feelings, which ought, therefore, to be taken 
into account in how we delineate the concept of well-being in s 24.145 
This relationship between well-being and the rights in the Bill of Rights is important 
for an interdependent interpretation of section 24. The following section discusses 
the proposed interpretation of “health or well-being” which suggests that the other 
rights in the Bill of Rights should be incorporated into the concept of well-being in 
section 24. 
4 8 Proposed interpretation 
In light of the interdependence of rights and the importance of reading the 
Constitution holistically,146 it is essential to interpret well-being in the context of the 
Bill of Rights as a whole. If we consider the preamble’s commitment to improving the 
quality of life of each citizen,147 it could be argued that the Bill of Rights aims to 
improve the well-being of the beneficiaries of its rights. The Bill of Rights provides a 
clear indication of what interests are considered worthy of constitutional protection, 
and those interests should be understood as contributing to well-being. A teleological 
and interdependent interpretation of the Bill of Rights and constitutional values 
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suggests that well-being should be understood as encompassing that which is 
considered necessary for a life of dignity, equality and freedom. The fundamental 
rights in the Bill of Rights are an indication of what is considered necessary to 
improve the quality of life of South Africans and to promote dignity, equality and 
freedom. While well-being probably includes aspects of the human experience which 
may not be explicitly protected in the Bill of Rights, well-being should, at a minimum, 
be interpreted to include those interests which are protected by the Bill of Rights.148 
Writing on well-being and the environment from an economic studies perspective, 
Dasgupta refers to human rights as “constituents of well-being” and argues that “the 
centrality of human rights in collective living is a reason why measures of social well-
being must include them”.149 Shelton notes that a rights-based approach to 
environmental protection and poverty alleviation is valuable as it “emphasizes the 
right to a certain quality of environment because that quality is linked to, indeed a 
prerequisite for, the enjoyment of internationally and domestically guaranteed 
rights”.150 This affirms the link between human rights and well-being, and indicates 
that the state of an individual’s environment can impact their ability to access or 
enjoy other fundamental rights.151 I propose that where an aspect of the environment 
hinders the ability to exercise fundamental rights, it should be understood as harmful 
to well-being. 
I will now turn to some practical examples of an interpretation of well-being which 
includes the rights in the Bill of Rights as components of well-being. Where a child’s 
ability to receive an education as set out in section 29 is hindered by the physical 
environment, such as a lack of school buildings to shelter students in the rainy 
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season, there would be an infringement of the right to an environment not harmful to 
health or well-being. The protection of cultural, religious and linguistic communities in 
section 31 indicates that the interests of these communities must be protected, so 
the destruction of a significant religious landmark would constitute a violation of the 
environmental right.152 Labour rights reinforce the importance of a safe work 
environment and the rights of arrested, detained and accused persons suggests that 
prisons and holding cells should also be safe and healthy environments. 
In many of these cases the more specific right, and not section 24, would need to 
be relied on in practice.153 In such cases the environmental right serves as a 
reminder that its interaction with, for example, the right to education, reinforces the 
necessity of a conducive physical environment for the realisation of section 29 in the 
form of school classrooms, toilets and access roads. There are, however, situations 
where the environmental right could have a more prominent role to play. Consider an 
informal settlement placed on the other side of a river from the centre of town, where 
access to the town is gained by way of a bridge. If the bridge is washed away in a 
flood or collapses due to a lack of maintenance, it could be argued that a failure to 
replace the bridge or provide alternative transport to those in the informal settlement 
constitutes an infringement of section 24. The ability of those individuals to realise 
their rights of access to just administrative action, access to courts or even access to 
information could be inhibited due to their physical lack of access to government 
buildings in the town centre where they would be able to pursue these rights. The 
rights themselves would not provide a right to that bridge, but the environmental right 
arguably means that the well-being of that community is dependent on access to the 
town centre, and therefore dependent on that bridge (in light the Constitution’s 
conception of well-being in the Bill of Rights).  
Section 24 could also play an important role in relation to the right to freedom and 
security of the person in section 12 of the Constitution. Consider the following 
example. The right to an environment which is not harmful to health or well-being 
should include a right of access to clean toilets. This is particularly important for the 
health of communities in informal settlements. While clean toilets may be provided 
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for a certain area, the location of the toilets could be considered harmful to well-
being if they are far from homes or difficult to access. In some areas women and 
children fear going to such toilets at night due to safety concerns and the high crime 
rate. While the toilets provided may be healthy and clean, the layout of the facilities 
and homes in this case results in a threat to safety and security for the individual who 
needs to walk through a dangerous area to use the toilet at night. The threat to a 
constitutionally protected right, for example, the right to bodily and psychological 
integrity in section 12(2), serves as an indication that the individual’s well-being is 
detrimentally affected. This situation may not be covered by section 12 directly, but 
an interdependent interpretation of section 24 and the right to freedom and security 
of the person suggests that this should constitute harm to well-being under the 
environmental right. This approach to well-being is particularly important for the poor 
as they often experience multiple intersecting forms of disadvantage which may not 
be explicitly addressed in the Bill of Rights. 
I suggest that where an aspect of the human experience, as envisaged and 
protected within the Bill of Rights, is diminished or infringed then there is an adverse 
impact on the individual’s well-being. It must again be borne in mind that this does 
not mean that all such circumstances constitute an infringement of section 24. In 
order for a violation of section 24 to exist the environment must, in some way, cause 
harm to health or well-being. This requires a link to the physical environment as the 
cause of the harm, as well as damage which is significant enough to be considered 
harmful. 
The proposed approach to well-being does not cover every facet of well-being. 
There are recognised aspects of well-being, such as the aesthetic dimensions, which 
are not included in any specific rights in the Bill of Rights. I am not recommending 
that these be excluded from the definition of well-being in section 24. However, a 
teleological and interdependent interpretation of section 24 in the context of the Bill 
of Rights should provide baseline for our understanding of well-being. At the very 
least well-being should encompass those interests already recognised by the 
Constitution as worthy of protection and integral to a life of equality, dignity and 
freedom. 




4 9 Conclusion 
Section 24 provides protection from environmental harm to “health or well-being”. 
The two terms are disjunctive and harm to either one will result in an infringement of 
the environmental right. According to their ordinary meanings, both terms are very 
broad and cover a wide range of interests. In order to determine which of these 
interests should be protected under section 24 it is necessary to delineate these 
meanings within their particular context. It must be borne in mind that a violation of 
the environmental right requires a link between the harm and the physical 
environment, and is also dependent on the interpretation of harm. The components 
of health and well-being identified here will therefore not always result in an 
infringement of the right. This chapter has investigated the meaning of health and 
well-being in the context of section 24, under relevant of South African legislation 
and case law, and considered international law and academic opinion. 
Health has been interpreted to include physical and mental health. Some broader 
conceptions of health include, for example, social health. It is not necessary for the 
purposes of section 24 to differentiate between these definitions of health as both 
would overlap with well-being and therefore be included in the right. For this reason, 
the greater part of this chapter has focused on the meaning of well-being. 
Considering the dictionary definitions of well-being, it is possible to include an 
array of subjective feelings and experiences within the scope of the term. While 
subjective aspects of well-being should be included in its interpretation, the 
environmental right should not be stretched to the point where it offers protection 
from any minor subjective discomfort. Where it may become necessary, the open-
ended nature of the term allows the courts flexibility in adapting to changing needs 
as environmental issues develop. There are, however, certain aspects of well-being 
which are widely agreed upon. One of the most prominent of these is the protection 
of the natural environment.  
The context of section 24 as well as the accompanying legislation, case law and 
academic opinion clearly indicates that concerns such as conservation are linked to 
the well-being of both present and future generations. Well-being in this sense 
includes an absence of pollution and environmental degradation, whether or not it 
has an impact on an individual’s health. The aesthetic dimension of the environment 




also has clear links to well-being. Positive responses to the appearance of the 
surrounding environment can contribute to well-being in a variety of ways. The 
environment is also often connected to cultural and spiritual or religious interests of 
individuals and communities. The well-being of these individuals and communities is 
directly affected when such an environment is damaged or destroyed. The cultural 
and spiritual connection to the environment is particularly important in the case of 
indigenous communities.  
It is also evident that well-being is linked to socio-economic interests. Strong links 
exist between well-being, the environment and development, particularly in the 
international law context. This is an important recognition when one considers the 
relationship between well-being and poverty. Development, balanced with 
environmental protection, can contribute to well-being by contributing to economic 
stability and poverty alleviation. Some social science perspectives point out the role 
of health and autonomy in well-being as well as the importance of considering the 
relational and subjective aspects of well-being alongside the material aspects.  
I have proposed that the interpretation of well-being should be informed by a 
teleological and interdependent interpretation of the Constitution. The Constitution 
offers a broad outline of those elements of human life which are considered 
important and worthy of protection. These are contained in the Bill of Rights and 
should be understood as necessary components of well-being. Where the enjoyment 
of any of the rights in the Bill of Rights are negatively affected or violated by an 
aspect of the environment, there would be harm to well-being. The proposed 
interpretation of well-being is not an all-inclusive one. There are certainly recognised 
interests, such as the aesthetic dimension of the environment, which are not covered 
by another right in the Bill of Rights. However, the interdependent interpretation of 
well-being suggested should provide a foundation for what is considered necessary 
for a life of dignity, equality and freedom under the Constitution and, therefore, for 
what must be included in the interpretation of “health or well-being” in the 
environmental right. 




5 Sustainable development  
5 1 Introduction 
Section 24 includes explicit reference to the notion of sustainable development. 
Much has been written in the national and international sphere concerning the 
meaning of sustainable development and precisely what the content of the term is.1 
This chapter will examine these sources and attempt to ascertain what sustainable 
development should mean in the context of section 24 and the Constitution as a 
whole. I will begin by discussing the ordinary meaning of the term after which I will 
examine sustainable development in the context of the structure and content of the 
environmental right. The handful of South African cases which have dealt with 
sustainable development will then be considered. Thereafter, I will examine how 
sustainable development has been understood in the National Environmental 
Management Act 107 of 1998 (NEMA). The international law position on sustainable 
development is particularly important as the international sphere is where the notion 
originates. This will be considered as it informs the interpretation of sustainable 
development in the South African context. I will then analyse leading academic 
opinions on the meaning and content of sustainable development before concluding 
by proposing an interpretation and approach to the notion of sustainable 
development that recognises the central role of constitutional rights, values and 
purposes. 
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5 2 Ordinary meaning of sustainable development 
As established in chapter 2, the ordinary meaning of language is an important 
starting point in interpreting the Constitution.2 While “sustainable development” has a 
specific meaning in its constitutional context, the ordinary meaning ascribed to the 
term is the point of departure for interpretation. 
At the most superficial level, sustainable development refers to development 
which can be maintained over a (potentially unlimited) period of time. This is not very 
helpful as it does not tell us what is being developed, or indeed what is being 
sustained. It could refer to social development which must be financially sustainable, 
or economic development which must be environmentally sustainable. Sustainable 
development is used in many spheres and often means different things depending 
on the context. As Murombo argues: 
One could be forgiven for believing that to many industrialists, sustainable 
development means sustaining development and not the environment; hence the 
desire by many moderate environmentalists to use the term ‘sustainability’ and 
abandon ‘sustainable development’.3 
It is evident that for sustainable development to have any meaningful application, it 
must be more clearly defined. 
The Collins dictionary refers to sustainable development within its definition of 
“sustainable”:  
1. capable of being sustained 2. (of economic development, energy sources, etc.) 
capable of being maintained at a steady level without exhausting natural resources or 
causing severe ecological damage; sustainable development.4 
This definition in the Collins dictionary associates sustainable development with the 
preservation of natural resources and the prevention of ecological damage. At the 
same time it also indicates that sustainable development is often associated with 
economic development. The word “sustainable” suggests that sustainable 
development is not a quick fix but rather a long term project which requires steady 
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maintenance. It will presumably only become evident in the future whether or not 
sustainability has been achieved.  
While sustainability seems concerned with maintenance of the current state over 
the long term, development is explicitly concerned with change. The Collins 
dictionary defines development as “1. the act or process of growing, progressing, or 
developing 2. the product or result of developing”.5 Development requires growth 
and expansion for the advancement of humanity, while sustainability requires 
stability and preservation of the environment for the survival of future generations. 
Sustainable development therefore requires a management of the tension between 
maintaining the current status quo in certain areas, while promoting development 
and change in others. 
This ordinary meaning of sustainable development is very vague and general, and 
needs to be fleshed out in order to determine precisely what is meant by the term in 
the context of the Constitution. The following section will examine the influence of the 
context of section 24 on the meaning of sustainable development in the right. 
5 3 Sustainable development in section 24 
Before addressing the specific aspects of section 24 which impact on the 
interpretation of sustainable development, it is necessary to make a general 
observation on section 24(b). In the case of HTF Developers v Minister of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism6 it was held by Murphy J that section 24(b) is an 
aspirational directive principle rather than a justiciable socio-economic right.7 As 
numerous commentators have argued, this is an incorrect interpretation of section 
24.8 Section 38 of the Constitution provides for any of the listed persons or groups to 
approach the court for appropriate relief where a right in the Bill of Rights is 
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“infringed or threatened”.9 There is no reason why access to appropriate relief should 
be arbitrarily limited where section 24(b) is concerned. It is clear from the Bill of 
Rights that section 24(b) contains a fully justiciable right which the state must 
“respect, protect, promote and fulfil” and it is certainly more than a mere aspiration.10 
Feris asserts that the mandate in section 24(b) “reaches far beyond hopes and 
dreams and falls within the realm of real expectations”.11 
In considering “sustainable development” in section 24, it is important to construe 
the term within its immediate context of the environmental right. Section 24 states:  
Everyone has the right– [...] (b) to have the environment  protected, for the benefit of 
present and future generations, through reasonable legislative and other measures 
that– [...] (iii) secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural 
resources while promoting  justifiable economic and social development. 
Sustainable development appears in the context of section 24(b) which deals with 
the right to have the environment protected. It is essential to interpret section 
24(b)(iii) with this fundamental purpose of environmental protection in mind as it will 
certainly impact the interpretation of sustainable development. The environmental 
right also clearly indicates that the purpose of environmental protection is “the benefit 
of present and future generations” and not the maintenance of the environment for 
its own sake. The right emphasises the benefit of present generations, which implies 
the notion of intragenerational equity and environmental justice.12 Intergenerational 
equity has been recognised as a key component of sustainable development and will 
be discussed in more detail below.13 The reference to present and future generations 
in section 24 reaffirms the anthropocentric nature of the right discussed in chapter 
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2.14 For now, it is important to note that environmental protection is central to 
sustainable development and is explicitly included in the environmental right as the 
overarching purpose of section 24(b). Another important aspect of section 24(b) 
which affects how we understand and apply sustainable development, is the 
instruction to use “reasonable legislative or other measures”. Reasonableness is 
introduced as a requirement for the measures used in the implementation of section 
24(b), and therefore of sustainable development. The role of reasonableness in 
sustainable development decisions is discussed in further detail below.15    
Sustainable development is qualified in the environmental right and described as 
“ecologically” sustainable development. This indicates that it is not development itself 
which must be sustained, but rather the ecology or environment that must be 
sustained when development takes place. If sustainable development is seen as a 
balancing of economic, social and environmental interests,16 the conception of 
sustainable development under the environmental right seems to place a greater 
emphasis on the environment. With reference to the inclusion of the term 
“ecologically”, Van der Linde and Basson note the importance of this attention to the 
environment in the interpretation of sustainable development: 
The danger exists that without placing special emphasis on ecological interests, as the 
Final Constitution requires, a mere mechanical evaluation of environmental rights, 
economic rights and social developmental rights will result in environmental interests 
being ‘balanced away’.17 
Feris similarly recognises the role of the term in the interpretation of section 24(b)(iii). 
She suggests that it “qualifies the type of sustainable development that is envisioned 
by the Constitution” and that the notion of sustainable development in the 
environmental right “places the environmental value centre-stage”.18 The importance 
of the environment in the Constitution’s conception of sustainable development is 
reinforced by the underlying goal of environmental protection in section 24(b). 
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Section 24 also refers to the principle of sustainable use of natural resources which 
has been recognised as a principle of sustainable development in international law.19 
Despite this clear emphasis on the environment, section 24(b)(iii) also includes 
explicit reference to economic and social development. This is significant in light of 
the anthropocentric nature of section 24 as well as the central purpose of 
environmental protection being the benefit of present and future generations. The 
environmental right requires that the need for economic and social development is 
not only taken into consideration, but actively promoted when measures are taken to 
protect the environment. Such development must, however, be justifiable.20 This 
economic and social development is only justifiable under section 24 if it does not 
result in unsustainable use of the environment or of natural resources.21 Where 
economic or social development is considered unjustifiable due to the environmental 
harm caused, this should not be understood as a dismissal of human need. Section 
24 remains anthropocentric and ecologically sustainable development – which 
trumps unjustifiable social and economic development – ultimately aims to provide 
for both present and future generations.  
Sustainable development must also be construed in the context of section 24 as a 
whole. In light of section 24(a), sustainable development should, at a minimum, not 
be harmful human health and well-being. Section 24(a) underscores the social 
development portion of section 24(b)(iii). In order to further the realisation of the 
right, sustainable development should promote health and well-being wherever 
possible. This interaction between section 24(a) and (b) highlights the tension 
between meeting immediate human needs while promoting the environmental 
protection necessary for the existence of present and future generations. 
Sustainable development, as it appears in section 24, includes the balancing of 
environmental protection with social and economic development, as well as the 
principles of sustainable use and intergenerational and intragenerational equity.22 As 
will be seen below, these features of sustainable development are also recognised in 
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international law.23 In the specific context of section 24 it is important to emphasise 
the anthropocentrism of the right as well as the express qualification of ecologically 
sustainable development. The following section will examine the use and 
interpretation of sustainable development in the environmental framework legislation. 
5 4 Sustainable development in NEMA 
As noted in chapter 3,24 the National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 
(NEMA) has an important role to play in the interpretation of section 24. As it was 
enacted to give effect to section 24, NEMA provides an indication of how the 
legislature interprets the environmental right. 
NEMA defines sustainable development as:  
the integration of social, economic and environmental factors into planning, 
implementation and decision-making so as to ensure that development serves present 
and future generations.25 
The recognition of the role of economic and social factors corresponds with the 
reference to justifiable social and economic development in section 24. The court in 
Fuel Retailers v Director-General: Environmental Management (Fuel Retailers)26 
notes that this definition “incorporates two of the internationally recognized elements 
of the concept of sustainable development, namely, the principle of integration of 
environmental protection and socio-economic development, and the principle of 
inter-generational and intra-generational equity”.27 These internationally recognised 
principles will be discussed in more detail in 5 6 and 5 7 below.  
Aside from the definition in NEMA, sustainable development also appears 
elsewhere in the Act. The preamble makes reference to the three pillars of 
sustainable development when it states that “the State must respect, protect, 
promote and fulfil the social, economic and environmental rights of everyone”.28 This 
indicates that all three pillars of sustainable development implicate various rights in 
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the Constitution. Van der Linde notes that sustainable development is central to the 
principles of NEMA.29 Section 2(3) clearly echoes the principle of integration (of 
social, economic and environmental interests)30 and states that “[d]evelopment must 
be socially, environmentally and economically sustainable”.31 Section 2(4)(a) 
elaborates on some of the principles that should be included in sustainable 
development. While not identified as such, these principles are consonant with 
internationally recognised principles of sustainable development such as the 
precautionary principle,32 the preventive principle,33 the equitable use of natural 
resources,34 and the sustainable use of natural resources.35 Section 2(4)(i) reiterates 
the principle of integration when it states that decision-making should consider, 
assess and evaluate “[t]he social, economic and environmental impacts of 
activities”.36 
Sustainable development is clearly the motivation for many of the principles and 
goals of NEMA. The Act makes repeated reference is made to social and economic 
factors or concerns and the integration of social, economic and environmental 
interests is promoted. It is evident, however, that the Act is designed primarily for the 
management and protection of the environment. It could be argued that this 
conception of sustainable development is in keeping with the environmental right’s 
mandate to protect the environment and to promote ecologically sustainable 
development while also promoting social and economic development. I turn now to 
the interpretation of sustainable development found in case law. 
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5 5 Sustainable development in case law 
As with other areas of the environmental right, sustainable development has not 
received much attention in South African jurisprudence. There are, however, a few 
cases that offer some insight into how the judiciary has understood sustainable 
development. 
The most extensive discussion of sustainable development in South African 
jurisprudence is found in Fuel Retailers.37 The Fuel Retailers Association of South 
Africa argued before the Constitutional Court that the environmental authorities had 
not considered the socio-economic impact of a proposed filling station when 
authorising the development under section 22(1) of the Environment Conservation 
Act 73 of 1989.38 The court clarified the obligations of the environmental authorities 
and ultimately concluded that they failed to adequately consider the socio-economic 
impact of the proposed development.39 
What is important for the purposes of the interpretation of section 24 is the court’s 
elaboration on the meaning of sustainable development.40 In granting the appeal to 
the Constitutional Court, Ngcobo J affirms the need to take seriously concerns of 
development and environmental protection: 
The need to protect the environment cannot be gainsaid. So, too, is the need for social 
and economic development. How these two compelling needs interact, their impact on 
decisions affecting the environment and the obligations of environmental authorities in 
this regard, are important constitutional questions.41 
The interaction of these “two compelling needs”, both of which implicate 
constitutionally protected rights, lies at the heart of sustainable development. Ngcobo 
J describes the intimate relationship between the environment and development 
which necessitates sustainable development: 
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Economic and social development is essential to the well-being of human beings. [...] 
But development cannot subsist upon a deteriorating environmental base. Unlimited 
development is detrimental to the environment and the destruction of the environment 
is detrimental to development. Promotion of development requires the protection of the 
environment. Yet the environment cannot be protected if development does not pay 
attention to the costs of environmental destruction. The environment and development 
are thus inexorably linked.42 
The court clearly accepts that the environment and development are interests that 
must be promoted and protected. Sustainable development requires an approach 
which recognises the complex and integrated relationship between the environment 
and development. Ngcobo J confirms that this relationship is recognised within the 
Constitution: 
The Constitution recognises the interrelationship between the environment and 
development; indeed it recognises the need for the protection of the environment 
whilst at the same time it recognises the need for social and economic development. It 
contemplates the integration of environmental protection and socio-economic 
development. It envisages that environmental considerations will be balanced with 
socio-economic considerations through the ideal of sustainable development.43 
This integration of environmental protection and socio-economic development is 
widely recognised as a fundamental component of sustainable development. 
The decision of Fuel Retailers provides important direction on the interpretation of 
sustainable development in the South African context. Feris highlights the court’s 
recognition of the interrelationship between social, economic and environmental 
factors and the acknowledgement of the centrality of sustainable development in the 
environmental right.44 She suggests that this indicates that the principle of integration 
is therefore “a central tenet of a ‘South African jurisprudence’ on sustainable 
development”.45 
Despite the positive contribution the decision makes to our understanding of 
sustainable development, the Fuel Retailers judgment is not without criticism. Tladi 
points out that the court does not sufficiently distinguish between socio-economic 
rights, development and economic development.46 Throughout the judgement these 
terms are conflated and as a result “the Court never stops to ask whether the factors 
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that the Fuel Retailers Association requested that the environmental authorities 
consider are socio-economic or purely economic”.47 Tladi argues that this leads to 
the erroneous suggestion “that economic considerations are the same as social 
considerations”.48 He suggests that the court’s approach is indicative of a definition 
of sustainable development which treats development (both social and economic) as 
a single entity in opposition to environmental protection rather than recognising the 
need to balance economic, social and environmental concerns.49 Tladi explains the 
distinction:  
Factors relevant for the economic growth variation [of sustainable development] are, 
for example, trade related concerns. Access to clean drinking water and food reflect a 
human well-being [or social] variation of sustainable development. They are not the 
same. [...] By blurring the distinction between social and economic concerns, our 
jurisprudence flirts with the undesirable outcome of preserving the status quo: namely, 
paying lip service to sustainable development and integration. The failure to distinguish 
more carefully between these values facilitates the instrumentalisation of sustainable 
development for economic ends. Fuel Retailers is a case in point.50 
Tladi thus argues that a disregard for the nuanced distinctions between social and 
economic development needs can lead to the advancement of purely economic 
interests under the guise of sustainable development. This then allows social needs 
to be ignored in the name of development. Murombo voices a similar objection to the 
judgment in Fuel Retailers: 
[The decision] may unwittingly send the wrong message to industrialists who perceive 
the concept [of sustainable development] as being aimed at making ‘development’ 
sustainable and not to achieve integrated sustainability in the radical sense of 
scrutinizing activities that are not sustainable socially, economically and 
environmentally.51 
It would seem that in order to guard against this conflation of social and economic 
interests, it is necessary to identify the respective social and economic aspects of 
development more explicitly. Tladi’s proposed approach to sustainable development, 
discussed in 5 7 4 below, addresses this danger as it encourages transparency and 
the explicit recognition of those aspects of sustainable development which have 
informed a decision. 
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In his minority judgment in Fuel Retailers Sachs J adopted the view that the 
applicants’ case was based mainly on economic concerns.52 The applicants 
challenged the decision to authorise the construction of the filling station by arguing 
that the socio-economic impact of the proposed station should have been, and was 
not, considered. Sachs J’s implicit suggestion is that the applicants were not 
concerned about the well-being of the environment, but rather the threat of 
commercial competition. He maintains that because there was no “measurable threat 
to the environment”, sustainable development should not have been considered at 
all.53 The argument is that “social and economic considerations are only ‘triggered’ 
once the environment is implicated”.54 Sachs J explains further: 
[I]f some damage to the environment were to be established, the economic 
sustainability of a proposed economic enterprise could be highly relevant as a 
countervailing factor in favour of a finding that on balance the development is 
sustainable. 
However, in this case no such damage was found. Here sustainable development 
was used as a vehicle to promote economic interests and ward off commercial 
competitors. Du Plessis and Feris point out that “[i]n this instance the applicant 
focused not just on one pillar [of sustainable development], but on only one aspect of 
one pillar – namely competition”.55 While the approach of Sachs J in this case is 
instructive for the interpretation of section 24, it is important to note that these 
comments are specifically related to sustainable development as defined and 
prescribed by NEMA.56 
Sustainable development and the meaning of section 24 are also addressed in the 
case of BP Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Agriculture, Conservation, 
Environment and Land Affairs (BP).57 In this case BP contested the refusal of an 
application to develop a filling station, arguing that the Gauteng Provincial 
Department of Agriculture, Conservation, Environment and Land Affairs should not 
have considered socio-economic considerations in making its decision. The court 
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ultimately refused BP’s application for review and setting aside of the decision. 
During the course of the judgment the court confirmed the importance of sustainable 
development.  
Claassen J notes in BP that the balancing of rights necessary for sustainable 
development must be done “without any a priori grading of the rights”.58 The 
environmental right is on par with the other rights in the Bill of Rights and this should 
inform the way sustainable development is balanced. As Kotzé and Du Plessis note, 
the judgment indicates: 
[T]here is an undeniable link between the environmental right and sustainable 
development in that a rights-based approach to environmental governance elevates 
the status of environmental governance to a constitutional level, which should enable 
the achievement of sustainability.59 
BP also acknowledges the role of intergenerational equity in the interpretation of 
sustainable development as indicated by the structure of s 24(b):60 
The balancing of environmental interests with justifiable economic and social 
development is to be conceptualised well beyond the interests of the present living 
generation. This must be correct since s 24(b) requires the environment to be 
protected for the benefit of ‘present and future generations’.61 
The case affirms the need to consider the environmental, social and economic 
interests of future generations in the implementation of sustainable development. 
Along with the principle of intergenerational equity, the principles of sustainable use 
and equitable use as well as the principle of integration are recognised as elements 
of sustainable development.62 The court confirms that sustainable development 
“constitutes an integral part of modern international law” and indicates that 
sustainable development forms the basis for South African environmental law.63 
Claassen J explains that sustainable development means that economic interests 
will no longer dictate development related decisions: 
Pure economic principles will no longer determine, in an unbridled fashion, whether a 
development is acceptable. Development, which may be regarded as economically 
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and financially sound, will, in future, be balanced by its environmental impact, taking 
coherent cognisance of the principle of intergenerational equity and sustainable use of 
resources in order to arrive at an integrated management of the environment, 
sustainable development and socio-economic concerns.64 
The court does not suggest that economic concerns are irrelevant, but rather argues 
that sustainable development requires an integrated consideration of all factors. 
Economic factors should therefore not automatically trump social or environmental 
interests. BP explains that sustainable development demands an integration of 
different interests, a balancing of potentially conflicting rights and a recognition that 
environmental concerns deserve as much attention as social and economic ones.65 
The tension between environmental and social interests is seen in Minister of 
Public Works and Others v Kyalami Ridge Environmental Association and Others 
(Mukhwevho Intervening).66 Here section 26 was relied on to support the relocation 
of flood victims to temporary housing on a certain piece of land. At the time, the flood 
victims were living in appalling conditions, and the urgency of their need played an 
important role in the court’s decision. The relocation was opposed by residents of the 
area who relied on section 24, but they ultimately could not prove the risk of 
environmental harm.67 The urgency and desperation of the flood victims’ 
circumstances was an important factor in this case. If the residents had been able to 
show a legitimate risk of severe and irreparable damage to the environment the court 
may have reached a different conclusion. This case illustrates some of the possible 
conflicts between the three pillars of sustainable development. 
The Land Claims Court case of In re Kraanspoort Community (Kraanspoort)68 
demonstrates one of the ways in which sustainable development can be observed in 
practice. This case concerned the restitution of farm land from which a community 
was evicted in terms of the Group Areas Act 41 of 1950. The court recognised that 
along with restitution of the land came the “risk of unsustainable depletion of 
renewable resources on the farm”.69 The court held that it may impose conditions to 
prevent this unsustainable depletion of resources, and that such an approach would 
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promote the spirit, purports and objects of the environmental right.70 Conditions were 
attached to the restitution in order to ensure sustainable use of the farm’s resources, 
and the court linked this to intergenerational equity by explaining that unsustainable 
use of the land would ultimately “prevent the younger members of the community 
from having equitable access to the restored asset in future”.71 While not specifically 
addressing the interpretation of sustainable development, Kraanspoort affirms (and 
illustrates) intergenerational equity and the sustainable use of resources. In light of 
this decision, Kotzé argues that section 24 could restrict use of resources so as to 
ensure intergenerational equity: 
Section 24 and other environmental provisions thus may serve as restrictive conditions 
on resource use in the sense that they may reduce or eliminate the risk of depletion of 
resources, ensure sustainability and thus ensure adequate availability of these 
resources for future generations.72 
The recent case of Sole NO v Minister of the Department of Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fisheries73 illustrates how the court could approach conflicting interests in 
sustainable development decisions. In this case the applicant, on behalf of the 
public, sought an interdict suspending the commercial fishing of the South African 
West Coast Rock Lobster (WCRL).74 Sole argued that the WCRL had been over-
exploited and faced possible extinction. The respondents (representatives of the 
government and commercial fisheries) argued that there were “no factual, legal or 
scientific grounds” on which to grant the interdict.75 The court noted that the Minister 
is given the power and responsibility to achieve sustainable development of marine 
living resources and to ensure that these resources are used to contribute to 
economic growth and employment.76 The court examined the steps taken to 
preserve the WCRL, including the establishment of a scientific working group to 
study the WCRL and advise the Minister and the Department.77 It was held that the 
Minister was aware of the danger to the WCRL and that “the department has, after 
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considerable scientific and management intervention, determined that the continued 
utilisation of the WCRL resource is possible on a sustainable basis”.78 The measures 
put in place by the Department were “scientifically justified and [...] received wide 
acclamation from experts in this field”.79 Sole, on the other hand, had not produced 
any scientific evidence to support her contention that the WCRL were in as much 
danger as she had suggested.80  
The court refused to grant the interdict, and although the central reason for this 
was the lack of scientific evidence and proof, it also emphasised the potential 
consequences of granting such an interdict. The respondents pointed out that 
granting this order would have severe consequences for them: 
[I]t would cause irreparable financial prejudice and hardship to the rights holders, 
which is not justified, especially having regard to the scientific and efficient manner in 
which the WCRL fishery is managed.81 
After concluding that the applicant had not met the requirements for granting the 
interdict, the court emphasised that the economic and social consequences of the 
interdict would have counted against a decision to grant it: 
[T]he court should also bear in mind the huge financial implications and social 
upheaval that would be caused by the granting of the interdict. [...] it would be totally 
irresponsible for the court to consider the granting of an interdict in these 
circumstances, particularly in the absence of any convincing evidence, thereby 
causing financial prejudice and social upheaval on such a grand scale.82 
While the case does not address sustainable development in any detail, it is clear 
that social and economic factors would play an important role in cases such as this. 
Although a precautionary course of action would have been possible in this case, the 
court indicated that the extent of the impact on economic growth in the industry and 
on the livelihoods of those with commercial fishing rights required an approach which 
did not elevate the environmental concern, but balanced it with social and economic 
considerations. The court’s consideration of the applicant’s case does, however, 
indicate that the right in section 24(b)(iii) could allow for an individual to act, on 
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behalf of the public, for the protection of the environment.83 This means that the 
extinction or endangerment of a species due to over-exploitation could constitute an 
infringement of section 24(b)(iii). Such cases will, however, always involve an 
integrated consideration of the environmental, social and economic factors 
concerned. 
The cases discussed indicate an acknowledgment of the importance of including 
environmental concerns and the interests of future generations into developmental 
decisions, affirming the emphasis on environmental protection and intergenerational 
equity in section 24. The tension between economic and environmental 
considerations is also clear. These cases confirm that social, economic and 
environmental interests must be balanced and promoted simultaneously in order to 
achieve sustainable development, but it is not clear how this balancing act should be 
realised. In order to gain further insight into the meaning of sustainable development, 
the following section examines the concept in the international law context where it 
originated. 
5 6 Sustainable development in international law 
The notion of sustainable development has its origins in the international arena, 
which has given rise to a range of international conferences and instruments dealing 
with the meaning and application of sustainable development. The scope of this 
chapter does not allow for a detailed discussion of all the available international 
sources. The focus will therefore be on those sources which provide an indication of 
the meaning, content and principles of sustainable development as opposed to those 
which focus on practical implementation in the international sphere. 
As a concept in international environmental law, sustainable development is often 
regarded as having been coined by the Report of the World Commission on 
Environment and Development: Our Common Future (Brundtland Report) in 1987.84 
Tladi notes, however, that references to sustainable development were present in 
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the World Conservation Strategy of the International Union for Conservation of 
Nature and Natural Resources (ICUN) in 1980.85 
Prior to the explicit recognition of sustainable development, the 1972 Declaration 
of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm 
Declaration) was adopted.86 The Stockholm Declaration recognises the relationship 
between the environment and development, acknowledging the “[e]nvironmental 
deficiencies generated by the conditions of under-development and natural 
disasters”,87 the necessity for economic and social development,88 the need to 
reconcile “conflict between the needs of development and the need to protect and 
improve the environment”89 and the tension between the needs of “present and 
future generations”.90 Although it is not identified as such, the Stockholm Declaration 
includes a description of what would today be termed sustainable development: 
To defend and improve the human environment for present and future generations has 
become an imperative goal for mankind – a goal to be pursued together with, and in 
harmony with, the established and fundamental goals of peace and of worldwide 
economic and social development.91 
This goal includes elements recognised as central to sustainable development today, 
namely integration (in this case of the environment, peace, and development) and 
intergenerational and intragenerational equity.92 As Beyerlin and Marauhn explain, 
the Stockholm Declaration was the first international document to emphasise “that 
environmental protection and economic development must be understood as 
compatible and mutually reinforcing goals”.93 
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A decade after the Stockholm Declaration came the Brundtland Report which 
brought the concept to the forefront of the international consciousness.94 The 
Brundtland Report offered a concise definition of sustainable development which 
remains widely recognised:95 
Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. It contains 
within it two key concepts: the concept of 'needs', in particular the essential needs of 
the world's poor, to which overriding priority should be given; and the idea of limitations 
imposed by the state of technology and social organization on the environment's ability 
to meet present and future needs.96 
This definition emphasises the notion of intergenerational equity which demands 
consideration of the needs of future generations. The needs of the poor form part of 
the needs of the present generation and are given high priority in this conception of 
sustainable development. The Brundtland Report continues to emphasise the needs 
of the poor throughout and recognises the important relationship between poverty, 
inequity and environmental degradation:97 
The satisfaction of human needs and aspirations is the major objective of 
development. The essential needs of vast numbers of people in developing countries 
for food, clothing, shelter, jobs - are not being met, and beyond their basic needs these 
people have legitimate aspirations for an improved quality of life. A world in which 
poverty and inequity are endemic will always be prone to ecological and other crises. 
Sustainable development requires meeting the basic needs of all and extending to all 
the opportunity to satisfy their aspirations for a better life.98 
The recognition of the role of poverty alleviation in achieving sustainable 
development serves as a reminder that the social and economic development 
included in the notion of sustainable development should be understood as existing 
primarily for the poor. The Brundtland Report warns against living standards which 
encourage “living beyond the world’s ecological means”.99 The report also reiterates 
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the relationship between the environment and development and stresses that these 
are interlocking crises.100 
The next important milestone in the evolution of sustainable development is the 
1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) which 
produced the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (Rio Declaration).101 
As with the Stockholm Declaration and the Brundtland Report, the link between the 
environment and development is emphasised throughout the Rio Declaration.102 The 
Rio Declaration begins with an unmistakable anthropocentric perspective when it 
states that “[h]uman beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable 
development”.103 In accord with the Brundtland Report, the Rio Declaration 
recognises the eradication of poverty “as an indispensable requirement for 
sustainable development”.104 Human need is a central concern and the environment 
seems to be understood as a means of meeting human needs. Principle 8 refers to 
the elimination of “unsustainable patterns of production and consumption”, for the 
goal of “sustainable development and a higher quality of life for all people”.105 The 
Rio Declaration includes fewer references to environmental duties or responsibilities, 
and Tladi suggests that it may suggest “an inclination towards economic concerns”, 
whereas the Stockholm Declaration placed a greater emphasis on environmental 
interests and human rights.106  
In 2002 South Africa hosted the World Summit on Sustainable Development 
(WSSD) in Johannesburg which produced the Johannesburg Declaration on 
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Sustainable Development (Johannesburg Declaration).107 An important contribution 
of the Johannesburg Declaration is the identification of the three components which 
have become central to the principle of integration:108 
[W]e assume a collective responsibility to advance and strengthen the interdependent 
and mutually reinforcing pillars of sustainable development - economic development, 
social development and environmental protection.109 
In addition to this relationship between the three pillars, the Johannesburg 
Declaration also emphasises the need for poverty eradication,110 the problematic gap 
between rich and poor,111 and the importance of human development. 112 It is also 
significant to note the reference to access to “clean water, sanitation, adequate 
shelter, energy, health care, food security and the protection of biodiversity”,113 which 
suggests that socio-economic rights have a key role to play in advancing sustainable 
development. The Johannesburg Declaration emphasises human rights and the 
needs of the poor rather than the protection of the natural environment, suggesting 
that its conception of sustainable development involves a greater anthropocentric 
slant than the earlier instruments.114 
While the Johannesburg Declaration was the major product of the WSSD, the 
International Law Association also presented the New Delhi Declaration on the 
Principles of International Law Relating to Sustainable Development (New Delhi 
Declaration) at the Summit.115 The New Delhi Declaration contends that the following 
principles, among others, are essential for achieving sustainable development: the 
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principle of sustainable use of natural resources;116 the principle of equity and 
poverty alleviation;117 the precautionary principle;118 and “the principle of integration 
and interrelationship, in particular in relation to human rights and social, economic 
and environmental objectives”.119 The New Delhi Declaration is more explicit in its 
reference to environmental protection that the Johannesburg Declaration is, and 
Tladi notes that “the central concerns are poverty eradication and environmental 
protection”.120 The interrelationship between poverty and the environment is again 
highlighted as a fundamental issue in the achievement of sustainable development. 
In 2012 the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development was held in 
Rio de Janiero. In the outcome document “The Future We Want”, later adopted by 
the United Nations General Assembly, poverty eradication was recognised as “an 
indispensable requirement for sustainable development”.121 The document also 
confirms the need to achieve sustainable development through reducing inequality, 
improving basic living standards and encouraging equitable social and economic 
growth.122 Considering all the international sources above, it is undeniable that the 
international community views poverty eradication as an absolute necessity for the 
promotion of sustainable development. 
While there is little international jurisprudence dealing explicitly with sustainable 
development, the 1997 case of Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v 
Slovakia)123 does refer to the concept. This case dealt with a dispute over the 
construction of a power plant on the Danube river with the aim of producing 
hydroelectricity.124 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) described the underlying 
rationale  of the concept of sustainable development as follows: 
Throughout the ages, mankind has, for economic and other reasons, constantly 
interfered with nature. In the past, this was often done without consideration of the 
effects upon the environment. Owing to new scientific insights and to a growing 
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awareness of the risks for mankind – for present and future generations – of pursuit of 
such interventions at an unconsidered and unabated pace, new norms and standards 
have been developed, set forth in a great number of instruments during the last two 
decades. Such new norms have to be taken into consideration, and such new 
standards given proper weight, not only when States contemplate new activities, but 
also when continuing with activities begun in the past. This need to reconcile economic 
development with protection of the environment is aptly expressed in the concept of 
sustainable development.125 
The ICJ noted the development of international environmental law and the notion of 
sustainable development. The principles of intergenerational equity and the 
integration of economic development and environmental protection are recognised 
by the ICJ. What is important about this case, and indeed the paragraph quoted 
here, is that it is referred to with approval by the South African Constitutional Court in 
Fuel Retailers.126 This suggests that the ICJ’s description of sustainable 
development should be instructive in the interpretation of sustainable development in 
the South African context, and particularly in the context of section 24. The more 
recent 2010 case of Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay) also 
deals with sustainable development concerns, and the ICJ reiterates that the 
“essence” of sustainable development is “the balance between economic 
development and environmental protection”.127 This definition is limited to economic 
development which is in contrast to the emphasis on social development, poverty 
and human rights concerns found in many of the international instruments discussed 
above. 
The case of Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) v Nigeria,128 
although it involves very little discussion of the meaning or application of sustainable 
development, is an excellent illustration of the concerns and conflicts at issue in 
sustainable development scenarios. The case concerned the exploitation certain oil 
reserves in the Ogoniland region of Nigeria which involved the Nigerian government 
(in the form a state-owned oil company – the Nigerian National Petroleum Company) 
as well as the Shell Petroleum Development Corporation. It was alleged that the oil 
reserves had been exploited “with no regard for the health or environment of the 
local communities, disposing toxic wastes into the environment and local 
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waterways”.129 The oil companies’ failure to maintain facilities also resulted in oil 
spills “resulting in contamination of water, soil and air” in close proximity to certain 
villages.130 SERAC is an indication of the potential consequences of economic 
development which is allowed to persist unhindered by social and environmental 
concerns. The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the African 
Commission) held that the Nigerian government was guilty of a number of violations 
of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights,131 including the environmental 
right in article 24. Although article 24 of the African Charter does not mention 
sustainable development, the African Commission held that it should be included in 
the interpretation of the right: 
[Article 24 of the African Charter] requires the State to take reasonable and other 
measures to prevent pollution and ecological degradation, to promote conservation, 
and to secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources.132 
The African Commission acknowledges that the right to a general satisfactory 
environment favourable to development in article 24 necessarily includes the notion 
of sustainable development. On the tension between environmental protection and 
economic development in this case Van der Linde and Louw note: 
 [T]he African Commission gave clarity on the fact that although it can be balanced 
against development, the right to a satisfactory environment will not necessarily take a 
back seat if it impacts negatively on economic development.133 
The African Charter asserts that the environment should be favourable to 
development, but this does not mean that development always enjoys preference 
over the environment. Indeed in SERAC the environmental needs of the people 
(integrally connected to their livelihoods) were considered more important in the 
circumstances than the economic interests of the oil companies. 
The case of Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights 
Group International on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v Kenya134 highlights the 
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important role of the right to development in article 22 of the African Charter.135 This 
case concerned the development of a game reserve on a piece of land and the 
consequent eviction of indigenous communities for whom the land had cultural and 
spiritual significance. The Commission emphasised certain criteria for fulfilling the 
right to development in its decision: 
[Development] must be equitable, non-discriminatory, participatory, accountable, and 
transparent, with equity and choice as important over-arching themes in the right to 
development.136 
Where sustainable development is implemented it could be argued that these criteria 
should be fulfilled. Development must be carried out with due regard for the dignity, 
equality and freedom of those affected. The criteria serve as a guide for 
development in “a democratic and open society”137 which values “accountability, 
responsiveness and openness”138 and should therefore be taken incorporated into 
the notion of sustainable development. In Endorois the African Commission noted 
that the Kenyan government had not provided necessary compensation or benefits 
and failed to provide alternative places for grazing and religious ceremonies central 
to the community’s way of life. As the Kenyan government had not provided for the 
needs of the Endorois community in the development process, the African 
Commission ultimately held that it was in violation of the right to development (this 
was amongst numerous other violations of the African Charter).139 
The status of the notion of sustainable development in international law is not 
entirely clear or agreed upon.140 Some have argued that it should be considered a 
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part of international customary law,141 others consider it part of international soft law 
or a “political ideal” with no normative value.142 Beyerlin and Marauhn argue: 
[T]here is much in favour of the assumption that sustainable development remains 
below the threshold of normative quality that is an indispensable prerequisite for 
ascribing the quality of a (legal) principle to it.143 
Although the ICJ dealt with sustainable development in Gabčikovo-Nagymaros, it did 
not make any clear statement concerning the status of the concept. However, 
Weeramantry J, in a separate opinion of the case, maintained that sustainable 
development has indeed become part of international customary law:  
The principle of sustainable development is thus a part of modern international law by 
reason not only of its inescapable logical necessity, but also by reason of its wide and 
general acceptance by the global community.144 
Although the status of sustainable development in international law is uncertain, 
sustainable development has benefitted from constitutional recognition in South 
Africa.145 The international cases and instruments discussed should still influence the 
interpretation of section 24, which explicitly recognises sustainable development.146 
Feris and Tladi note that while the notion of sustainable development was largely 
formed in the international arena, it is important that it is “interpreted, applied and 
achieved primarily at a national level”.147 International sources remain indispensable, 
particularly when it comes to sustainable development given that the concept is 
acknowledged in a range of international instruments and decisions of international 
adjudicative bodies. However, the environmental right must be interpreted within its 
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specific context, and sustainable development will have certain applications and 
implications in South Africa which would not arise in other contexts. 
5 7 Academic opinion 
5 7 1 Introduction 
There is a broad range of approaches to sustainable development among academics 
of various disciplines. Many have defined sustainable development by identifying the 
elements or principles central to its meaning – some of these overlap with each other 
while others remain distinct. What seems to be agreed upon, however, is the need 
for sustainable development and the importance of its role in a world where the 
environment is increasingly threatened, which in turn threatens our way of life. The 
need for sustainable development is rooted in an awareness of the reciprocal or 
interdependent relationship between the environment and development.148 Field 
describes sustainable development as “a state of consciousness or knowledge about 
the earth’s systems which includes knowledge of the linkages between human social 
and economic systems and environmental systems”.149 
There is a clear consensus on the need for change and an acknowledgment that 
unfettered development will have devastating consequences. Bray notes that “our 
current way of dealing with the environment clearly threatens the survival of 
humankind under conditions worthy of human beings”.150 It is important to note that 
those who bear the disproportionate impact of environmental degradation are the 
poor. As Tladi points out, sustainable development is rooted in a recognition that “the 
current global pattern of development is detrimental for the environment and the 
social needs of the poor”.151 He suggests that it is necessary to “shift from the ruling 
economic growth paradigm to a paradigm where social and environmental 
considerations are prioritised”.152 Sustainable development is a means of 
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acknowledging that the environmental impacts of development must be curtailed 
while recognising that development remains necessary.  
5 7 2 Elements of sustainable development 
There is no universal understanding of sustainable development. While many 
authors have identified certain essential elements of the term, few agree on what 
these elements are. There is, however, a significant amount of overlap and 
agreement on aspects of sustainable development. I will now review some of the 
prevalent interpretations to determine what aspects of sustainable development are 
agreed upon. Those aspects which enjoy widespread recognition should be 
incorporated into our understanding of sustainable development within section 24. 
Sands divides sustainable development into four core elements: intergenerational 
equity, sustainable use of natural resources, equitable use of natural resources (or 
intragenerational equity) and the integration of environmental concerns with 
development.153 Intergenerational equity requires the current generation to preserve 
the environment for the sake of future generations, and sustainable use insists on 
reasonable exploitation of resources so as not to deplete them. Intragenerational 
equity requires the use and distribution of natural resources to be equitable within 
the current generation, and the principle of integration demands the consideration 
and incorporation of environmental interests into social and economic development. 
A similar set of core substantive elements of sustainable development is identified 
by Birnie and Boyle. They argue that sustainable development includes the 
integration of environmental protection and economic development; the right to 
development; the sustainable use and conservation of natural resources; 
intergenerational and intragenerational equity; and the polluter pays principle.154 The 
importance and necessity of development is underscored by the inclusion of the right 
to development as an essential element of sustainable development, while the 
polluter pays principle emphasises the need for those responsible for environmental 
damage to bear the necessary costs. 
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Marong also identifies certain principles which give content to sustainable 
development. As Sands and Birnie and Boyle have done, he refers to 
intergenerational and intragenerational equity and integration. In addition to these he 
adds the duty not to cause environmental harm, the principle of sovereignty over 
natural resources and the principle of common but differentiated responsibility.155 
These additional principles are particularly relevant in the international context with 
reference to the sovereignty of each state over its own resources, and the common 
responsibility of all states with regard to environmental protection coupled with the 
recognition that the responsibility for environmental degradation rests more heavily 
on developed states.156 
Field divides sustainable development into two categories: seeing rightly and 
equity. Seeing rightly refers to those aspects of sustainable development linked to 
“an awareness of our profound lack of scientific certainty” with regard to the 
relationship between social, economic and environmental systems.157 She argues 
that that the principle of integration, the precautionary principle and the preventive 
principle are all justified by the overarching notion of seeing rightly. Field explains 
that it is knowledge, that the environmental impact of economic activities may 
prevent such activity in the future, which necessitates a consideration of economic 
and environmental interests simultaneously (the principle of integration); lack of 
sufficient knowledge of the consequences of certain activities for the environment 
demands that we exercise caution (the precautionary principle); and an awareness 
of our inability to reverse certain environmental harm requires that we prohibit 
activities which would cause such harm (the preventive principle).158  
The second category of principles identified by Field is that of equity. She places 
much emphasis on the idea of equity and argues that “equity, not environmental 
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protection, is the absolute core of sustainable development”.159 Linking equity to the 
environment, she explains: 
[E]quity requires, more than ever before, an enhanced understanding, consideration 
and respect for our precarious and finite natural environment, and the desire to 
transform our human systems so as to be in harmony with that environment.160 
The principles of sustainable development which are incorporated into the idea of 
equity are intergenerational and intragenerational equity (also described by Field as 
temporal and geographical equity).161 Field notes that unlike seeing rightly, the 
principles of equity involve moral choices and moral duties which relate to the need 
“to leave enough natural resources for future generations”, the need to meet the 
needs of the present generation and the need “to ensure that everyone bears the 
cost of past unsustainable practices equally”.162 She suggests that the achievement 
of equity should involve poverty alleviation, transformation and redress, and 
environmental justice.163 Field’s conception of equity is clearly aligned to the goals 
and values of the Constitution as expressed in the preamble and the Bill of Rights.164 
Sustainable development, and more specifically the principle of integration, 
involves the balancing of the three pillars of social, economic and environmental 
interests. While sustainable development was initially understood as involving the 
relationship between the environment and development, this conceptualisation has 
been recognised as insufficient and it is increasingly “being defined as the integration 
of social, economic and environmental concerns”.165 Tladi warns against treating 
social and economic concerns as mere elements of development and not as 
independent interests as this could contribute to “the instrumentalisation of 
sustainable development for economic ends”.166 Some authors still choose to refer to 
the two elements of economic development and environmental protection. Murombo, 
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for example, refers to the principle of integration as involving “concepts of 
development, or economic growth, and environmental protection or conservation”.167 
While the majority of commentators refer to the three pillars as social, economic 
and environmental,168 some choose to use different language to describe these 
components of sustainable development. Glazewski offers an additional description 
of each pillar when he refers to “environmental protection, economic development 
and social upliftment”.169 This expression of the three pillars clarifies the underlying 
goal of each aspect of sustainable development – to protect the environment, 
develop the economy and improve people’s lives. Van der Linde and Basson offer a 
more moderate, and perhaps watered-down, description of sustainable development 
being “environmentally appropriate, socially beneficial and economically viable”.170 
This suggests an integration that renders each pillar tolerable rather than actively 
promoting environmental, social and economic concerns. Field indicates support for 
Ruhl’s approach which includes the environment and economy, but replaces social 
concerns with equity as the third component of sustainable development and 
integration.171 As will be seen in the discussion of equity below, this substitution of 
social concerns with equity implicates transformation, poverty alleviation and 
equitable distribution of resources, which could all be understood as elements of the 
social pillar. There is a great deal of overlap between equity and social interests as 
pillars of sustainable development. As it is the more widely used formulation, I will be 
referring to sustainable development as comprising of the three pillars of social, 
economic and environmental concerns. 
While there are many different conceptions of sustainable development, certain 
principles are consistently presented as central to the term. The two which have 
been consistently recognised and received the most attention in the literature are the 
principles of equity and integration. Equity includes both intergenerational and 
intragenerational equity, while integration refers to the relationship between 
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environmental, social and economic interests. These two essential elements of 
sustainable development will now be addressed in more detail. 
5 7 3 Equity 
5 7 3 1 Introduction 
As noted above, equity is widely recognised as an essential component of 
sustainable development.172 The role of equity in the interpretation of sustainable 
development in the environmental right cannot be overlooked. The right to equality, 
the constitutional value of equality and the explicit reference to “the benefit of present 
and future generations” in section 24 all underscore the crucial role of equity in the 
interpretation of sustainable development. Equity in sustainable development terms 
can be divided into two categories: intergenerational equity and intragenerational 
equity. Intergenerational equity operates temporally and is concerned with the needs 
of future generations, while intragenerational equity operates geographically and is 
concerned with equitable distribution of resources and meeting needs within the 
present generation. 
5 7 3 2 Intergenerational Equity 
As discussed above,173 much of sustainable development discourse is rooted in the 
awareness that current economic development, consumption and use of natural 
resources could threaten the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.174 
This gives rise to a moral obligation on the present generation to preserve the 
environment for the sake of future generations. Feris and Tladi explain: 
Each generation receives a natural and cultural legacy in trust from previous 
generations and [...] there is an obligation on each generation to conserve the natural 
and cultural resource base for future generations.175 
This approach demands that the present generation makes decisions with an 
appreciation of the potential consequences for future generations. As Tladi notes, 
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“intergenerational equity infuses a forward-looking approach into sustainable 
development discourse”.176 The precise needs of future generations are not clear, 
and arguably unknowable, but Du Plessis explains that sustainable development 
should aim to give “existing and future generations [...] access to economic, social, 
cultural and environmental entitlements”.177 This suggests that it is not merely the 
survival of future generations with which we are concerned, but also their ability to 
live full and dignified lives. 
In order to achieve intergenerational equity it is necessary to establish approaches 
to development which take environmental consequences seriously and aim to 
minimise environmental degradation. The principle of integration is a means of 
achieving this.178 Du Plessis explains that “cross-generational environmental justice 
requires of each existing generation to stay on a sustainable development track”.179 
Sustainable development is a long term project which must be employed by each 
generation in order to provide for the next. 
The principle of intergenerational equity is, however, not without criticism. Tladi 
points out that “[f]rom an ecocentric perspective, intergenerational equity as an 
anthropocentric approach is ethically flawed and insufficient to ensure meaningful 
protection of the environment”.180 Ecocentric environmentalists would argue that 
intergenerational equity is insufficient as it is solely concerned with human need and 
not, for example, biodiversity or the preservation of endangered species. In the 
context of section 24, however, conservation and ecological degradation receive 
explicit recognition, so there is less risk that environmental protection will be 
overshadowed by social and economic concerns. Considering the interpretation 
proposed for well-being in chapter 4 above it is also evident that conservation and 
environmental protection are important for the well-being of present and future 
generations. There is a clear constitutional imperative for measures to be taken to 
preserve these aspects of the environment for the benefit of present and future 
                                            
176
 Tladi Sustainable Development 43. Tladi goes on to note that “the principle of intergenerational 
equity is closely related to the precautionary principle which is also forward-looking”. 
177
 Du Plessis A “South Africa’s constitutional environmental right (generously) interpreted: What is in 
it for poverty?” (2011) 27 SAJHR 279 291. 
178
 Integration is discussed at 5 7 4. 
179
 Du Plessis (2011) SAJHR 290. 
180
 Tladi Sustainable Development 45. 




generations. Tladi argues, quite convincingly, that the principle of intergenerational 
equity need not be seen as a threat to the environment: 
Inherent in this principle of intergenerational equity [...] is a recognition of the 
autonomy of future generations to determine for themselves what their needs may be. 
[...] The principle of intergenerational equity thus requires the present generation to 
leave the environment in as good a condition as it was found. [...] Thus, a proper 
understanding of the principle of intergenerational equity would require the protection, 
and not destruction, of all natural species and not only those that benefit us at 
present.181 
The obligation to preserve the environment so as to leave it in “as good a condition 
as it was found” is reinforced by the recognition that we cannot, as the current 
generation, predict how the world will change in the future. Medical, technological 
and industrial needs could, for example, transform dramatically in the next century 
leading to unimagined demands for specific resources that seem worthless to the 
present generation. Tladi explains that the perceived threat to environmental 
protection posed by intergenerational equity is unfounded, as “[i]ntergenerational 
equity is concerned with our duty to protect the environment; not our right to destroy 
it”.182 
5 7 3 3 Intragenerational Equity 
The principle of intragenerational equity is concerned with equity within the current 
generation.183 This involves the equitable distribution of environmental resources and 
the recognition that development can contribute to the prevention of environmental 
harm. Tladi suggests that “[i]ntragenerational equity is concerned with the distribution 
of the benefits of development activities and the distribution of costs for 
environmental protection”.184 In other words, the benefits of development and natural 
resources should be shared equitably among all those belonging to the current 
generation, and the costs of preserving the environment for the next generation 
should also be distributed equally. The equitable distribution of environmental assets 
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and costs intersects with idea of environmental justice.185 As noted above, 
environmental justice, (as with equity) highlights the connection between the 
environment and equality, both as constitutional right and constitutional value.186 
Intragenerational equity also emphasises the relationship between development 
and the environment. People’s capacity for development is linked to their capacity for 
preventing environmental harm. Feris and Tladi have argued: 
In the context of environmental rights, intragenerational equity recognises the inherent 
right of peoples to development. This means therefore that any recognition of 
environmental rights must be balanced with the right to development.187 
This conception of intragenerational equity overlaps with the principle of integration 
which balances social and economic interests with the environment. 
Social justice and socio-economic rights are also implicated in the principle of 
intragenerational equity as it recognises the needs of the current generation as well 
as the environmental damage that this generation could do. The perpetrators of this 
damage are predominantly the poor who have no option other than to employ 
unsustainable practices in order to survive.188 Feris describes intragenerational 
equity as follows: 
The principle of intragenerational equity (equity within generations) is essentially an 
approach that takes cognisance of the distributional demands of social justice. This is 
premised on the belief that distributional inequalities are causally responsible for a 
great deal of environmental degradation. Reducing inequalities can therefore be held 
to be a necessary means of achieving sustainability. This is of particular importance in 
the South African context, given the enduring nature of socio-economic inequalities in 
the country.189 
It is clear that a conception of sustainable development which incorporates 
intragenerational equity (as defined by Feris) must include the goal of socio-
economic transformation and poverty alleviation. Du Plessis describes the 
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relationship between poverty alleviation and sustainable development as a mutually 
beneficial one: 
Environmental sustainability is necessary to achieving poverty reduction, and 
environmental or natural capital is necessary to ensuring wealth.190 
This suggests that successful sustainable development necessitates the alleviation 
of poverty.191 Feris argues that in order to achieve sustainability it is essential to 
reduce economic inequalities and address social welfare concerns.192 Kidd notes 
that this principle is evident in the environmental right. He argues that the health and 
well-being which is advanced through the environmental right in section 24(a) 
“consequently advances the objectives of s 24(b)’s concern with sustainable 
development”.193 
Poverty alleviation is, of course, not only necessary due to the environmental 
interests at stake. The relationship between poverty and environmental destruction 
also “has a direct impact on the enjoyment, realisation and improvement of other 
human rights and fundamental freedoms”.194 The interdependent nature of the rights 
in the Bill of Rights becomes important here. The sustainable development required 
by section 24 exists alongside socio-economic rights which address poverty-related 
needs. These socio-economic rights must be incorporated into our understanding of 
section 24 to contribute to the poverty alleviation which ultimately aids sustainable 
development. Feris and Tladi explain: 
For a truly integrated approach to sustainable development under the South African 
Constitution, the socio-economic rights protected, such as the housing rights, will have 
to be used to give content to the concept of sustainable development as found in 
section 24.195 
It is not only sustainable development which should incorporate socio-economic 
rights. Du Plessis argues that the converse is also true: 
[S]ustainable development should be understood to require of the programmes and 
measures of the state that are aimed at poverty alleviation to be focused not only on 
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immediate social upliftment and/or economic relief, but to take account of the more 
inclusive need for environmental sustainability.196 
Sustainable development should be taken into account when interpreting other rights 
so as to achieve environmental sustainability in all spheres. This would contribute to 
the integration of environmental and developmental interests. The right of access to 
housing, for example, should be understood interdependently with section 24 and 
sustainable development so that housing policies and programmes consider the role 
of each of the three pillars of sustainable development. 
Intragenerational equity, as an element of sustainable development, serves as a 
confirmation of the necessity of environmental justice and poverty alleviation in the 
achievement of environmental sustainability. It draws our attention away from purely 
environmental concerns to the human needs which must be addressed if we are to 
achieve sustainable development. 
5 7 3 4 Conclusion 
Equity demands an awareness of the needs of others and of the environmental 
consequences of our actions. Sustainable development, through the principle of 
equity, requires limits to be placed on consumption and depletion of environmental 
resources in order to allow others, both geographically and temporally, access to the 
resources they may need. Field explains that prioritising equity can minimise the 
exploitation of resources: 
If equity – defined in terms of meeting basic needs both now and in the future – is kept 
in sight as the goal toward which we are moving, there is a good likelihood that we will 
eschew economic activities that overexploit the finite resource base on which we all 
depend.197 
It is important to note that the relationship between intergenerational equity and 
intragenerational equity places limits on the current generations’ enjoyment of the 
environment and natural resources. Intragenerational equity should not overshadow 
the need for intergenerational equity. Willemien and Anél Du Plessis argue that “[t]he 
environmental right of the present generation can be protected and realised only to 
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the extent that it would not result in a negation of the availability of the same right for 
future generations”.198 There is therefore a continual interplay between benefit to the 
present generation and benefit to future generations. Equity requires a balance 
between these two. In addition to equity, the principle of integration is an essential 
element of sustainable development which be discussed below. 
5 7 4 Integration 
Turning to a more practical component of sustainable development, the principle of 
integration is a means of approaching environmental and developmental decision-
making. Integration demands that environmental, social and economic concerns are 
considered simultaneously in order to, as far as possible, meet the needs of all 
three.199 The need for integration is grounded in the realisation that environmental 
degradation cannot be prevented or minimised without paying attention to social and 
economic concerns. Willemien and Anél Du Plessis comment on this 
interrelationship between environmental, social and economic interests: 
It is impossible to mitigate the known and unknown impacts of climate change in the 
absence of a concerted effort to level socio-economic interests with the protection of 
the natural resource base. Similarly, it is not possible to combat human and ecological 
vulnerability without having access to infrastructure, financial resources and food 
security mostly dependent on economic and agricultural activity, all of which have an 
environmental footprint.200 
Integration recognises the interdependence of these factors. None of them can 
successfully be pursued in isolation, as they rely on each other. Integration requires 
“a holistic approach” to social, economic and environmental concerns.201 Kidd 
explains that “[t]hese three pillars are equally important and must be pursued 
simultaneously and with equal effort”.202 
Achieving the integration of these three distinct elements is rarely a simple task. 
Conflicts of interests are inevitable, but this should not be a deterrent. Tladi points 
out that conflict between environmental, social and economic interests is precisely 
                                            
198
 Du Plessis & Du Plessis “Striking the sustainability balance in South Africa” in Environmental Law 
in Africa 433-434. 
199
 As noted at 5 7 2 different language can be used to describe these three pillars of sustainable 
development, but the majority of authors refer to environmental, social and economic interests. 
200
 Du Plessis & Du Plessis “Striking the sustainability balance in South Africa” in Environmental Law 
in Africa 445. 
201
 Tladi Sustainable Development 58.  
202
 Kidd Environmental Law 17-18. 




why there is a need for integration.203 Integration requires us to find solutions which 
advance each sphere of interests rather than pitting them against one another. The 
principle of integration values compromise and incorporation of different interests 
over win-lose competition between conflicting interests. 
Feris illustrates the unavoidable conflict between environmental, social and 
economic interests with reference to land restitution claims.204 She points out that 
many land claims concern land that is currently protected as with, for example, land 
in the Kruger National Park. A decision which takes cognisance of sustainable 
development would consider the environmental, social and economic consequences 
of such a claim concurrently. Feris demonstrates the tension between economic, 
social and environmental goals in such instances: 
In making a decision on whether to award such claims decision-makers would have to 
take into account the possibility that claimants may not utilise the land for conservation 
purposes, but rather engage in other commercial ventures such as farming. This would 
clearly promote an economic and social goal as opposed to an environmental goal. 
However, whilst the environmental aim of preserving our natural heritage may weigh 
very heavy, equally so would the idea of restoring land to people who were unjustly 
deprived thereof in the past.205 
Sustainable development does not prescribe the conclusion that such a decision-
maker should come to, but it does demand that each of the three factors is 
considered. The decision-maker does not choose which of the three needs to fulfil, 
but rather attempts to satisfy all three simultaneously.206 
Sustainable development, and more specifically integration, can be described as a 
problem-solving technique or algorithm.207 Ruhl argues that sustainable development 
“defines all social problems in terms of three parameters – environment, economy 
and equity – and projects them in the dimensions of geographic scale and time”.208 
This approach expects the decision-maker to find the maximum benefit to each 
parameter within each dimension. In other words, it requires the decision-maker to 
“optimize all three parameters in both dimensions rather than maximize for any 
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single parameter or dimension”.209 While this is a useful method for approaching 
sustainable development problems, it is clear that the integration of social, economic 
and environmental concerns is not a simple one. As Field notes, sustainable 
development involves “recognizing and working with a system that is complex, 
dynamic, adaptive and evolving”.210  
Murombo is critical of the principle of integration and its application in practice. He 
argues that the tension between these conflicting interests renders sustainable 
development ineffective: 
[I]t is legitimate to argue that the continued meaninglessness of the concept of 
sustainable development is largely attributable to its attempt to reconcile the inherently 
irreconcilable and intricate concepts of development, or economic growth, and 
environmental protection or conservation.211 
While these concepts may not be entirely “irreconcilable” as Murombo suggests, the 
cases where all three are satisfied equally are very rare. Tladi points out that 
decision-makers will almost always reveal a preference for one of the three pillars of 
sustainable development.212 He suggests that “[s]ustainable development can be 
used by environmentalists and those pursuing the ends of economic development 
respectively in support of opposite claims”.213 Due to the variety of interests which 
could be protected under the areas of social, economic and environmental concerns, 
it is possible to disguise the advancement of a range of goals in the name of 
sustainable development. Tladi warns that, “[l]ike many other flexible legal and 
political concepts, integration and sustainable development can be misunderstood, 
misused or even abused to further particular positions”.214 The biggest concern for 
those who champion environmental protection is that the principle of integration 
could allow economic interests to be dressed up as sustainable development, and 
therefore environmentally friendly interests, when in reality they only promote 
economic gain. 
Field discusses the tension between environmentalism and sustainable 
development and argues that environmentalists would have a tendency to “maximize 
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the environmental parameter” rather than integrating social and economic interests 
alongside the environment.215 Environmentalism is described as a linear way of 
thinking as opposed to the three-dimensional approach of sustainable development’s 
principle of integration.216 According to Field, this insulation of environmental 
concerns “would breed linearity as ‘environmental measures’ were taken to address 
‘environmental problems’ in order to produce ‘environmental solutions’”.217 This 
environmentalist thinking is rooted in a concern for the protection of the environment 
and the fear that sustainable development thinking allows social and economic 
development to overshadow environmental issues.218 Murombo voices this concern: 
There is no evidence that the anthropocentric urge to develop and consume natural 
resources is about to change. On the contrary, there is increasing evidence that the 
radical environmental movement of the twentieth century is slowly being captured by 
economic interests.219 
Despite these criticisms of the principle of integration, Field argues that sustainable 
development thinking is necessary to advance environmental concerns.220 She 
suggests that the approach of the environmentalists is likely to be ineffective as they 
are at risk of becoming irrelevant. In South Africa environmental concerns must be 
managed within the context of the country’s history: 
[P]olitically-engineered underdevelopment, the tragic association of environmental 
conservation with racial conflict, and the resultant perception that environmental issues 
only reflect the concerns of the white middle and upper classes.221 
It is because of this context that, despite the dangers of misuse, sustainable 
development thinking which integrates social, economic and environmental 
concerns, is a far better tool with which to tackle environmental problems than the 
linear approach of narrowly-focused environmentalists. 
As already noted, the principle of integration does create opportunity for misuse 
and disguised bias. It is for this reason that Tladi advocates for a more transparent 
approach to sustainable development – one that recognises the preferred values that 
underlie a decision. He proposes 
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a more nuanced conceptualisation of sustainable development which not only 
accurately and expressly takes account of the values that sustainable development is 
supposed to integrate, but also, more consciously, identifies a hierarchy.222 
The point of departure for Tladi is that the preference for one of the three elements of 
integration is unavoidable. He argues that this preference should be identified and 
recognised openly rather than ignored. Such transparency would allow us to 
investigate whether there is a basis for the preferred value or not.223  Feris explains: 
Whilst the integration process is a value-driven process, the preferred value cannot be 
without a legitimate basis. In other words, a decision maker’s decision should be 
grounded in law and there should be some justifiable base in law for the preferred 
value.224 
Tladi suggests recognising these preferred values by identifying the use of one of 
three variations of sustainable development, each prioritising either social, economic 
or environmental concerns. The three variations which Tladi proposes are the 
economic growth-centred variation, the environment-centred variation and the 
human needs-centred variation.225 Each variation indicates “the values that take pole 
position in cases of conflict”.226 The goal is still integration of all three pillars of 
sustainable development, but Tladi’s approach recognises that there will be conflicts 
and that these conflicts will expose the decision-maker’s bias and preferences. As 
one would expect, in the economic growth-centred variation, economic growth 
trumps the other values in cases of conflict; in the environment-centred variation, the 
environment is prioritised; and in the human needs-centred variation social needs 
and the well-being of humanity enjoys prominence.227 
Although economic and social interests are often thought of as a unit, Tladi 
emphasises the need to distinguish between the two variations which prioritise these 
two related concerns. Both economic and social concerns are anthropocentric and 
seem to stand in opposition to environmental interests, but Tladi illustrates how 
different the two approaches are: 
 [T]hese two variations of sustainable development tend to pull in fundamentally 
opposite directions. While the human needs variation has, as its focus, basic human 
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needs required for a life of dignity, under the economic growth variation the focus is on 
those activities that can lead to the growth of national economies. Thus, in social 
needs-centred variations the emphasis tends to be on issues such [as] poverty 
eradication, improved access to health facilities, education and meeting all other needs 
necessary for a life of dignity.228 
Given the relationship between poverty and environmental degradation discussed 
above,229 it is important to note that the human needs-centred variation minimises 
the environmental harm caused by poverty and a lack of development. The 
economic centred-variation, as Tladi argues, is concerned with economic gain (which 
contributes to the national economy), but seems to hold no direct benefit for the 
environment or for the poor. He points out that the human needs-centred variation 
has social well-being as its objective and recognises that money and economic 
growth may be essential to advance social well-being.230 Under the human needs-
centred variation economic growth would, however, be instrumental rather than an 
end in itself. Tladi ultimately concludes that both the environment-centred variation 
and the human needs-centred variation can be categorised as ‘strong’ approaches to 
sustainable development, whereas the economic growth-centred variation is clearly 
‘weak’.231 
In conclusion, the principle of integration demands that decision-makers attempt 
the optimal solution which will simultaneously meet social, economic and 
environmental needs. As it will rarely be possible to satisfy all three factors equally, it 
is important to encourage transparency where a choice must be made to favour one 
of the factors. Tladi’s approach of the three variations of sustainable development 
offers a mechanism to recognise the preferred value in cases of conflict while 
demanding a legitimate legal basis for that preferred value. This approach to the 
principle of integration, and to sustainable development as a whole, is a useful one 
which will be discussed further below. 
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5 8 Proposed interpretation 
It is evident that sustainable development is a complicated, multi-faceted notion 
which is difficult to define and perhaps even more difficult to apply. It is necessary, 
however, to attempt to formulate an interpretation of sustainable development 
specific to South Africa, and specific to the environmental right in section 24.232 
Reasonableness has an important role to play in sustainable development 
decisions. Section 24(b) requires that “reasonable legislative and other measures” 
are used to achieve sustainable development. Reasonableness provides a standard 
against which the State’s policies and programmes can be tested:  
[Reasonableness review] subjects government’s choices to the requirements of 
reasonableness, inclusiveness, and particularly, the threshold requirement that all 
programmes must provide short-term measures of relief for those whose 
circumstances are urgent and intolerable.233 
The principles of reasonableness review developed in socio-economic rights 
jurisprudence are important for evaluating reasonableness in sustainable 
development matters.234 The measures adopted by the State in fulfilment of section 
24(b)(iii) with regard to sustainable development must meet these reasonableness 
requirements. This has important implications for how the three pillars of sustainable 
development are balanced. The requirement of short-term measures for urgent 
cases of immediate need implies that an emphasis should be placed on the pillar 
which can meet the urgent need of those living in intolerable conditions. This may 
require attention to be given to short term measures which fall under the social or 
economic pillar of sustainable development, while the long term needs of 
environmental protection are simultaneously advanced. Reasonableness review 
requires the prioritisation of short term needs of the poor while progressive 
realisation of the right is simultaneously promoted through long term policies and 
programmes. Section 24 does not include a progressive realisation qualification, but 
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the balancing of short-term and long-term needs is still relevant. The long-term 
projects of ecological sustainability and environmental protection require constant 
and consistent action for future benefits. These long-term projects must be balanced 
with current short-term social and economic needs. Reasonableness review 
emphasises the need to pursue these short-term and long-term goals 
simultaneously.  
Quinot and Liebenberg explain that reasonableness review requires an 
assessment of the measures taken by the State to determine whether they “are 
sufficiently effective and expeditious in achieving the goal of the full realisation of the 
relevant socio-economic rights”.235 This assessment necessitates a clear 
understanding of the goals and purposes of the right in question. The constitutional 
goals and values as well as the interdependence of rights are important here as they 
can shed light on the purposes of the environmental right which need to be realised 
through these reasonable measures. 
The plight of the poor is an important consideration in assessing the 
reasonableness of measures taken in the realisation of socio-economic rights, and 
therefore sustainable development. As Liebenberg points out, “the Court has 
acknowledged the poor as a vulnerable group in society, whose needs require 
special attention”.236 Consideration of the position of the poor is important in 
sustainable development matters, as the poor experience the impacts of 
unsustainable development and environmental degradation more than any other 
sector of society. The poor are also in more need of the social and economic 
development which is required to be advanced by the environmental right. The 
promotion of sustainable development must therefore involve a regard for the needs 
of the poor if it is to be deemed reasonable. 
Any reasonable measures taken to achieve sustainable development should be 
effective in realising the goals and purposes of section 24. The way the three pillars 
of sustainable development are balanced should be in accordance with the specific 
circumstances of the case taking into account the short and long term needs 
involved as well as the urgent needs of the most desperate. It is important to 
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remember the poor and consider the impact that environmental degradation or a lack 
of social and economic development could have on them. All of these factors will 
influence the reasonableness of a decision, policy or programme which aims to 
advance sustainable development. 
As noted above, sustainable development involves the constant integration and 
balancing of different interests. In the constitutional context this is similar to the task 
of balancing of conflicting rights: 
All of these rights [to housing, water, property and freedom of trade] require a constant 
balancing of diverging interests – often interests forming part of the pillars of 
sustainable development and the factors underpinning sustainability.237 
Sustainable development under the Constitution will often involve competing rights 
which need to be weighed against one another. There is no hierarchy of rights 
present in the Constitution, which means that there is a need “for the continuous 
balancing inter alia of economic, environmental, social and cultural interests”.238 Of 
course interests that enjoy constitutional protection should be given preference over 
those that do not. 
The interests linked to each of the three pillars of sustainable development should 
be balanced in proportion to the need for each respective pillar. Where there is 
urgent and serious need for environmental protection of an endangered species, the 
emphasis on environmental interests should be in proportion to this need. In this 
case a reasonable and proportional balancing of environmental, social and economic 
interests would favour the environmental interests. Similarly, where an urgent or life 
threatening social need comes into conflict with environmental interests which do not 
demand immediate action, the social pillar of sustainable development should enjoy 
preference in proportion to the extent of the need. The consideration of any less 
restrictive means should be required in sustainable development decisions to ensure 
that the final balance of the three pillars is the least limiting and offers the broadest 
protection to all three pillars as is possible in the circumstances. Where other 
constitutionally protected rights are implicated this will of course impact the emphasis 
placed on the three pillars. 
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Turning to the environmental right itself, it has been established that section 24 
has a distinctly anthropocentric character.239 As noted above, section 24(b) has the 
protection of the environment as its focus, but this environmental concern is for the 
sake of present and future generations, and not for the sake of the environment 
itself. Sustainable development is concerned both with environmental protection and 
social and economic development, but in section 24(b)(iii) the emphasis lies on the 
environment. The subsection refers to ecologically sustainable development and use 
of natural resources which should be carried out while promoting development at the 
same time. The structure of the right indicates that social and economic development 
is secondary to ecologically sustainable development.240 Section 24(b)(iii) protects 
human interests primarily through environmental protection and ecologically 
sustainable development which serves present and future generations. However, 
there may be instances where social or economic development serves the purpose 
of environmental protection. The relationship between poverty and the environment, 
for example, indicates that the eradication of poverty could potentially be advanced 
for the purpose of environmental protection as a reduction in poverty would result in 
a reduction in environmentally damaging or unsustainable practices employed by the 
poor. 
The principles of equity, integration and sustainable use undoubtedly form a part 
of sustainable development in the environmental right as they enjoy explicit 
recognition.241 The inclusion of certain principles in the interpretation of the term 
does not, however, shed light on how this concept should be applied in the South 
African context. Using Tladi’s variations model, I would like to suggest an approach 
to sustainable development which is in harmony with the environmental rights and 
the Bill of Rights as a whole. 
Tladi identifies three variations on sustainable development and suggests that a 
predetermined hierarchy exists in the decision-maker’s mind when sustainable 
development is applied. In any given situation social, economic or environmental 
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concerns could be given precedence over the other two. As already noted, this 
allows for decisions promoting economic gain to be dressed up as relating to 
environmental protection when they are in fact not concerned with sustainable 
development. In order to combat this it is essential to identify the values and opinions 
that inform different approaches to sustainable development. Tladi proposes “a more 
nuanced conceptualisation of sustainable development” which recognises the values 
which underlie the notion and expressly identifies a hierarchy.242 Feris agrees: 
We therefore need a more principled, value-based approach to sustainable 
development that identifies the value that is being prioritised in particular 
circumstances. The variation approach to integration takes into account that certain 
norms and values will most often be paramount in sustainable development decision-
making.243 
A more nuanced and principled conceptualisation of sustainable development in the 
South African context would be one which corresponds with the rights and values in 
the Bill of Rights as well as the purposes of the Constitution as a whole. The rights, 
values and purposes of the Constitution should shape the notion of sustainable 
development within our specific national and constitutional context. This value-based 
approach to sustainable development is in line with the value-based approach 
promoted by the Constitution itself.244 When sustainable development is applied to a 
certain set of facts the approach taken should be supported by a “legitimate basis” in 
the form of constitutional rights, values and purposes.245  
I will now examine how these variations of sustainable development are supported 
by the Constitution. Writing about Tladi’s three variations of sustainable 
development, Feris argues that the constitutional environmental right requires an 
environment-centred variation: 
Section 24(b)(iii) of the Constitution refers to the need to ‘secure ecologically 
sustainable development’. [her emphasis] It can be argued that ‘ecologically’ qualifies 
the type of sustainable development that is envisioned by the Constitution. It therefore 
clearly places an emphasis on environmental considerations and as such it places the 
environmental value centre-stage. Section 24 of the Constitution therefore mandates 
the environment-centred variation of sustainable development.246 
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Considering the wording, structure and focus of the right I agree with Feris that the 
version of sustainable development demanded by the environmental right is an 
environment-centred one. This does not mean that social and economic interests are 
ignored, but it does mean that in the context of sustainable development in section 
24 where there is a conflict with another interest, the environmental interest should 
prevail. Section 24(b) emphasises environmental protection and ecologically 
sustainable development, which indicates that these are primary goals of the right. 
The promotion environmental interests should be done while still maximising social 
and economic interests as much as possible. This emphasis on the environmental 
pillar of sustainable development is applicable where section 24 is the only human 
right at issue. Where there is no clear conflict of rights, and a case deals primarily 
with the environmental right, then the goals and purposes of the right indicate that 
environmental protection should enjoy preference.  
The environment-centred variation of sustainable development should serve as a 
point of departure in the South African context, but this is not absolute. The 
Constitution protects a variety of interests, many of which are social or economic, 
and these could also serve as justifications or legitimate grounds for human needs-
centred or economic growth-centred variations of sustainable development 
particularly where a set of facts implicates section 24 alongside other socio-
economic rights. The presence of socio-economic rights to housing, health, food and 
water could, for example, form the basis for a human needs-centred variation. 
Whatever variation of sustainable development is applied in a certain case, it should 
always be endorsed by supporting constitutional rights and values. 
Consider the example of choosing between the environmental protection of a 
certain piece of land or the use of that land for housing for the poor. The 
environmental right and the right to housing are in tension with one another in such a 
scenario, and the constitutional values could be used as further support for a certain 
variation of sustainable development in this case. In line with the principle of 
integration the ideal scenario is one where social, economic and environmental 
concerns are met simultaneously, but this is not always possible. In the example 
given, the value of human dignity could be cited as support for the use of the land for 
housing as the dignity of the homeless individuals is implicated. The value of equality 
could also be offered in support of the housing if the distribution of land is considered 




an aspect of intragenerational equity. On the other hand, the value of equality could 
be relied on to emphasise intergenerational equity and the need to preserve this land 
for future generations due to the presence of endangered fauna and flora. Tladi’s 
suggestion that preservation of the environment is important for the autonomy of 
future generations also suggests that the value of freedom could be argued for as a 
basis for environmental protection.247 The purposes of the Constitution are also 
instructive in such cases. The goals of social justice and improving citizens’ quality of 
life could, for example, be cited as support for a human needs-centred variation of 
sustainable development which focuses on the needs of the poor.248  
Sustainable development does not prescribe precisely which decision should be 
made in such situations. However, in the constitutional context there should be an 
obligation to legitimise the decision, not only by referring to the three pillars of 
sustainable development, but also by appealing to the rights, purposes and values of 
the Constitution. The urgency of the needs in the specific case could also be 
indicative of where the emphasis should lie in balancing the three pillars. It may be 
necessary to postpone the realisation of one interest in order to meet another 
immediate need which could have far-reaching consequences if not addressed. 
Such a postponement of significant interests must, however, be supported by the 
Constitution. 
The human needs-centred variation of sustainable development should enjoy 
support not only because of the direct social justice impacts, but also the indirect 
impact on environmental protection. As I have argued, poverty alleviation is widely 
considered to be linked to the advancement of environmental protection.249 The 
eradication of poverty, and therefore the promotion of socio-economic rights in the 
Constitution, is essential for the well-being of the environment and the promotion of 
sustainable development as a whole. It is possible, then, to promote the human 
needs-centred variation of sustainable development with the ultimate purpose of 
environmental protection. The context of section 24 as a whole is also important to 
consider here. The existence of section 24(a) implies that the promotion of 
sustainable development should not be in conflict with a right to an environment 
which is not harmful to health or well-being. In order to remain consistent with the 
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rest of the right, the realisation of sustainable development should address 
environmental harm to health or well-being wherever necessary. This may require an 
emphasis on the social pillar or, in other words, a human needs-centred variation of 
sustainable development. The Bill of Rights, and indeed section 24 itself, could 
therefore be relied on to legitimate the human needs-centred variation. 
While the Constitution could be understood to support environmental or social 
needs through the vehicle of sustainable development, the economic growth-centred 
variation of sustainable development enjoys considerably less constitutional support. 
There may be cases where the value of freedom could be understood as supporting, 
for example, freedom of trade. Labour rights could also be in tension with 
environmental rights in some situations, for example in the mining industry where 
environmental harm could be in tension with the livelihoods of miners. However, 
constitutional rights, values and purposes express a clear bias towards social justice 
and a human needs-centred variation of sustainable development.250 The 
Constitution offers little support for a variation of sustainable development where 
economic needs trump both social development and environmental protection.  
Despite the fact that there is less validation of the economic growth-centred 
variation of sustainable development, it is vital to remember that this does not mean 
that economic interests do not matter. To use Ruhl’s paradigm, the three pillars of 
sustainable development must all be optimised, even where a conflict forces the 
emphasis to rest of one of them. As Willemien and Anél Du Plessis explain: 
In light of section 24(b) it is evident that all environmental policies, plans, programmes 
and other regulatory tools must keep the sustainability equation in mind and may not 
only be construed to protect and promote strictly environmental, social or economic 
interests.251 
Integration demands that social, economic and environmental needs are all 
promoted concurrently. However, it would be unlikely that constitutional support 
could be found for the prioritising of economic interests above social and 
environmental interests where there is a clash between them.  As Sachs J held in his 
minority judgment in Fuel Retailers, economic sustainability “is an element that takes 
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on significance to the extent that it implicates the environment”.252 Economic 
concerns should be promoted as part of sustainable development for the purpose of 
the contribution to environmental protection and social development, not as an end 
in itself. 
Sole NO v Minister of the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries253 
illustrates the complexities of the integration of economic, social and environmental 
factors in practice. This case involved the tension between the applicant’s concern 
for the protection of the West Coast Rock Lobster (WCRL) and the need for the 
resource for the purposes of commercial fishing. The court had to decide whether or 
not to grant an interdict to prevent commercial fishing for the survival of the WCRL. 
The facts of the case serve as an example of the various considerations in 
sustainable development decision-making. In such a case the need to preserve the 
species (for the sake of environmental protection and for the sake of future 
generations who may need to use the resource in future) must be balanced with the 
economic need to continue using the resource. The social pillar is also implicated 
here as the livelihoods of many people are also at stake in such a case. Their 
livelihoods are paradoxically dependent on the continued ability to fish the WCRL as 
well as being dependent on the environmental protection and continued existence of 
the WCRL. It is necessary to examine the range of options and choose one which 
promotes all three pillars of sustainable development. The complete suspension of 
all WCRL fishery is not the only option available. Sustainable development requires 
the balancing of three pillars, which means that all three must be maximised and 
promoted simultaneously. This suggests that if there is a means to address the 
threat to the WCRL without such severe social and economic consequences, then 
this alternative should be considered before taking action which places all the 
emphasis on a single pillar of the sustainable development equation. The extent and 
urgency of the potential consequences should also be factored into such a decision. 
If the complete suspension of WCRL fishery is proven to be the only way to preserve 
the species, then it could be seen as a necessary means to protect the economic 
and social interests involved. However, if it is possible the preserve the WCRL 
without the drastic economic and social consequences of a complete suspension, 
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then sustainable development demands reasonable measures which are in 
proportion to the extent of the urgency and need in the specific circumstance. As 
noted in 5 5 above, the court ultimately found that there was not sufficient evidence 
to suggest that granting the interdict was necessary for the protection of the WCRL 
and the court also noted the extent of the negative impact it would have on social 
and economic interests.254 
In conclusion, sustainable development in the context of section 24 should include 
intergenerational and intragenerational equity and the integration of environmental 
protection with social and economic development. The central role of equality in the 
Constitution demands that the principle of equity informs all sustainable 
development. While the integration of social, economic and environmental concerns 
is required in the achievement of sustainable development, it is not realistic to expect 
an equal balance of these interests to be realised in all situations. As the concept of 
sustainable development is inherently flexible, it is not possible to prescribe a 
decisive solution to any set of facts.  
Reasonableness has an important role to play in sustainable development 
decision-making. The requirement of reasonableness guides the prioritisation of the 
three pillars of sustainable development, and demands that both short and long term 
measures are taken in the fulfilment of the right. Tladi’s approach of recognising 
which of the three factors has enjoyed preference is an appropriate one in our 
constitutional context. This approach encourages transparent and accountable 
decision-making and requires a legitimate constitutional basis for the sustainable 
development solution proposed. The legitimate basis should be rooted in 
constitutional rights, values and purposes. In light of this it is conceivable that the 
environment-centred and human needs-centred variations of sustainable 
development could find constitutional support, but less likely that substantiation could 
be found for a purely economic growth-centred variation within the Constitution. 
Ultimately the facts of the specific case and the particular intersection of rights 
involved would be indicative of the variation that should be used. The variation of 
sustainable development used should correspond with the principles of equity and 
integration which form the basis of sustainable development in section 24. 
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5 9 Conclusion 
Due to the impacts of environmental degradation and climate change, the notion of 
sustainable development has become central to national and international 
environmental and developmental concerns. This is evidenced by the explicit 
inclusion of sustainable development in the environmental right in section 24 of the 
Constitution. The right demands the promotion of sustainable development for the 
protection of the environment and for the benefit of present and future generations. 
As is apparent in legislation, case law, international law, academic opinion and 
section 24 itself, the principle of integration is central to sustainable development. 
Underlying this principle is the recognition of the interdependent relationship 
between the environment and development. Linked to this relationship is an 
awareness of the role of poverty alleviation in the promotion of environmental 
protection. In order to preserve the natural environment it is essential to promote 
social and economic development and, in particular, the eradication of poverty. 
The principle of equity is also a fundamental feature of the notion of sustainable 
development recognised in the structure of section 24 as well as South African 
jurisprudence, international law and academic opinion. The environmental right itself 
refers to intergenerational and intragenerational equity, while the Constitution also 
promotes equity through the inclusion of equality as a constitutional right and value. 
This emphasis on equity also underscores the need for environmental justice and a 
consideration of the needs of the poor. 
As sustainable development is an intrinsically flexible concept, it is important to 
approach sustainable development decision-making with transparency. The 
integration of social, economic and environmental concerns will often involve conflict 
between one or more of the three concerns. A decision to prefer certain factors over 
others should be legitimated with reference to constitutional rights, values and 
purposes. Tladi’s approach of the three variations of sustainable development is a 
useful mechanism for recognising the underlying bias and demanding valid grounds 
for a decision. 
It is evident from the rights and values of the Constitution, as well as the 
environmental right itself, that decision-makers will more readily find constitutional 




support for the environment-centred and human needs-centred variations of 
sustainable development. There may be circumstances where the economic growth-
centred variation would be required, but I would argue that such instances would be 
rare. 
Despite the recognition of certain preferences, sustainable development ideally 
aims to advance all three pillars of sustainable development simultaneously. If this 
can be done effectively, with the benefit of present and future generations in mind, 
the goals of poverty alleviation and environmental protection could be advanced 
together through the implementation of ecologically sustainable development. 





The environmental right in section 24 entitles everyone to “an environment that is not 
harmful to their health or well-being” while also providing a right to the environmental 
protection necessary to sustain the environment.1 The right itself is indicative of the 
need to balance human well-being with the protection of the environment and this is 
important for understanding our relationship with the environment. Rights are 
meaningless without a context and an environment within which to enjoy them. The 
continued existence of humankind depends on our ability to sustain the environment 
which sustains us. Protection of the environment is therefore essential for enjoyment 
of all rights. 
This thesis has not sought to give a comprehensive analysis of every important 
facet of the environmental right. There are many aspects of section 24 not 
addressed here which may have important implications for the application of the 
right. I endeavoured to contribute to the interpretation of a few key concepts in the 
right. The concepts dealt with are those which I regard as most ambiguous and in 
need of delineation. However, it must be noted that these concepts represent only 
part of the environmental right and, ultimately, the right must be understood and 
interpreted in its entirety.  
I have argued that the need to protect the environment must be understood in the 
social and historical context of inequality, discrimination and poverty in South Africa. 
The anthropocentric environmental right must be promoted in accord with the values 
of human dignity, equality and freedom. The pervasive poverty in our country 
threatens the rights of the poor while also threatening the environment. 
Environmental degradation and the depletion of natural resources are exacerbated 
by poverty and the eradication of poverty is therefore essential for successful 
protection of the environment. Our society is dependent on the well-being of the poor 
and of the environment. 
Through its dual promotion of environmental protection and human well-being, the 
environmental right has the potential to advance the achievement of the 
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constitutional goals of social justice, transformation and improving the lives of all 
citizens. Section 24 should be interpreted with due regard for the constitutional 
values of equality, human dignity and freedom as well as the interdependence of 
rights.  
In this thesis I have argued for a teleological interpretation of the key concepts in 
the environmental right which pays attention to the interrelationship of rights in the 
Bill of Rights and advances social justice. This approach was developed in chapter 2 
where various interpretive tools were considered. The interdependence of rights and 
the values and goals of the Constitution have been emphasised as important 
interpretive guides. The instruction in section 39(1)(a) is critical here. The subsection 
states that the interpretation of the Bill of Rights “must promote the values that 
underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom”.2 I suggested that any interpretation of section 24 must be compatible with 
the full range of rights in the Bill of Rights, the values of human dignity, equality and 
freedom, and the constitutional goal of advancing social justice and improving the 
lives of every citizen. A teleological interpretation seeks to give effect to the purposes 
and values underpinning the right. In addition to the environmental right itself, these 
purposes and values can be found in the preamble, the Bill of Rights as a whole and 
the interdependence between section 24 and various other rights.  
I demonstrated that an examination of a selection of specific rights and their 
relationship to section 24 reveals the potential of the environmental right to promote 
and reinforce (and be promoted and reinforced by) other rights in the Bill of Rights. 
By paying attention to the intersection of rights important areas of need, particularly 
those impacting the on poor, were highlighted. The right to equality draws attention 
to the need for environmental justice which emphasises the equitable distribution of 
environmental resources and negative environmental impacts. In the environmental 
sphere, the promotion of substantive equality is important for the health and well-
being of the poor. The right to human dignity emphasises the need to address 
intolerable conditions within which many people live. The interpretation of harm to 
health or well-being must include a consideration of the role of human dignity. An 
interdependent interpretation of the right to life and the environmental right suggests 
that the environment should not pose a threat to life while also promoting a life of 
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dignity. The right to life also highlights the need for environmental protection which is 
essential for the enjoyment of the right to life for all of humanity. The right to freedom 
and security of the person alerts us to the potential for environmental invasions of 
bodily integrity which are more subtle than physical assault, but could be just as 
dangerous. An interdependent interpretation of the right to housing and the 
environmental right highlights the quality of housing and its impact on the health or 
well-being of its inhabitants. A poorly chosen location for housing can have a 
significant impact on the health or well-being of the inhabitants even where the 
building itself is adequate. The lack of a progressive realisation qualification 
suggests that the environmental right could be used to reinforce and enhance the 
right to housing in such circumstances. The right to health care services implies that 
the right to health in section 24 should be understood as broader than health care 
services already provided for in section 27. Finally, the right to water has an 
important relationship with the environmental right as water pollution poses a severe 
risk to the ability to access safe water. In order for an environment not to be harmful 
to health or well-being, safe and sufficient water should be accessible. The 
environmental right should promote the quality of natural and man-made sources of 
water. These rights emphasise the potential of section 24 and its wide scope of 
application. The context and purposes of section 24 examined in chapter 2 illustrate 
the capacity of the environmental right to promote equality, human dignity and 
freedom in a way that advances the constitutional goal of social justice and improves 
the lives of South African citizens, particularly those living in poverty. 
Three key concepts in section 24 were examined in the subsequent chapters: 
“environment”, “health or well-being”, and “sustainable development”. The first of 
these, “environment”, was addressed in chapter 3. The meaning of the concept is 
pivotal to section 24 and has extensive implications for the interpretation and 
application of the right. The anthropocentric nature of the environmental right 
indicates that the term “environment” cannot be limited to the natural environment 
and must include aspects of the man-made or anthropogenic environment. I argued 
that the environment must be understood as broader than the natural environment if 
the right is to be effective in promoting dignity and equality and advancing social 
justice for the poor. An interpretation of the term “environment” must pay attention to 




the social, economic and cultural dimensions of the environment as well as the 
relationship between the environment and development. 
I proposed that the term “environment” in section 24 should be interpreted to 
include people’s physical surroundings and the relationship between people and 
these surroundings. This interpretation of environment allows for the inclusion of 
natural and anthropogenic environments as well as the social, spiritual and cultural 
aspects of people’s relationships to these environments. Important facets of the 
physical environment encompassed by such a definition include work environments, 
access to water and sanitation, and features of the urban environment such as 
libraries, schools, roads and railways. As I suggested, an understanding of the 
environment which embraces these features could be very valuable for the poor as 
they regularly encounter environmental risks in many of these settings. 
Chapter 4 discussed the meaning of the terms “health” and “well-being”. As the 
two concepts appear as a unit and there is a degree of overlap between the two, I 
focused primarily on the broader concept of “well-being”. In the context of section 24, 
health should be understood to include both physical and mental health, and their 
relationship with the environment. I argued that the term “well-being” is extensive 
enough to include a vast range of experiences, but a negative impact on well-being 
(or health) must constitute harm before it infringes the environmental right. 
I illustrated in chapter 4 how the inclusion of well-being in section 24 serves to 
highlight the various ways in which the human experience is affected by the 
environment. I suggested that the conservation and protection of the natural 
environment are important components of well-being and that human well-being is 
intimately connected to the well-being of the environment. The aesthetics of physical 
surroundings are also an important feature of well-being in section 24 and can 
impact on, for example, emotional health and recovery from illness. Well-being also 
includes cultural and spiritual facets which are particularly important for indigenous 
communities whose cultural and spiritual well-being is often fused with elements of 
the natural environment. 
I emphasised the relationship between the environment and poverty and the role 
of this relationship in the interpretation of the right. The notion of well-being in the 
environmental right is significant for those living in poverty as it has strong links with 




poverty. Poverty affects well-being in numerous ways and prevents the poor from 
gaining access to that which could improve their well-being. While poverty does not 
detract from all aspects of well-being, and wealth does not guarantee well-being in 
all spheres of life, I suggested that urgent material needs related to well-being should 
enjoy preference over those which are more immaterial and abstract. Such an 
approach would allow for a hierarchy of needs requiring the more urgent and dire 
violations of human well-being to be addressed before resources are spent on minor 
harm to well-being. 
The notion of well-being must be interpreted in the context of the Bill of Rights 
within which it is situated. I proposed that the normative content and goals of the 
rights in the Bill of Rights should inform our understanding of well-being. The goals of 
improving citizens’ quality of life and freeing the potential of each person in the 
preamble of the Constitution can be understood as a commitment to well-being. The 
Bill of Rights is indicative of what the Constitution deems necessary for a life of 
equality, dignity and freedom, and it is consequently indicative of the entitlements 
which underpin human well-being. I therefore suggested that where the condition of 
the physical environment impacts negatively on a right in the Bill of Rights, or on an 
individual’s ability to access such a right, this could lead to a violation of section 24. 
This interpretation of well-being is particularly important for the poor who 
experience intersecting forms of disadvantage which lead to impacts on well-being 
not specifically addressed by other rights. There may be situations where the right to 
an environment not harmful to well-being has a unique role to play in improving the 
lives of citizens and promoting social justice. An example of such a situation is that of 
damaged roads leading to a lack of physical access to certain sites necessary for the 
realisation of rights such as a municipality or home affairs office. I sought to show 
that an interpretation of well-being which considers the fulfilment of the full range of 
rights in the Bill of Rights, and their interdependence, is important for the 
marginalised and underprivileged who experience multiple forms of deprivation and 
disadvantage. 
I proposed that the Bill of Rights be understood as a compilation of components of 
well-being as it identifies those facets of human life which are worthy of constitutional 
protection. Where an aspect of the human experience, as envisaged and protected 
within the Bill of Rights, is diminished or infringed by an aspect of the physical 




environment, there is harm to the individual’s or community’s well-being and 
therefore a violation of section 24. 
Finally, the notion of sustainable development was examined in chapter 5. Section 
24 has a clear anthropocentric focus which is emphasised in the formulation of 
section 24(b). The right to have the environment protected through “ecologically 
sustainable development” is included in the environmental right for “the benefit of 
present and future generations”.3 Sustainable development is rooted in a recognition 
of the risks and consequences of the use (and abuse) of the environment and 
natural resources. The environment must therefore be protected so as to enable 
continued development and availability of natural resources for future generations. 
The relationship between the environment and development is recognised 
frequently in international environmental law. It is central to the notion of sustainable 
development. Sustainable development seeks to balance environmental protection, 
economic development and social development. Development cannot be sustained 
over the long term without the protection of the environment. I argued that it is 
important to distinguish between the economic and social facets of development as 
they serve different purposes and are promoted in different ways. Where these 
facets of development are conflated, there is a risk of advancing purely economic 
interests at the expense of environmental protection and social needs. 
Poverty was once more emphasised as an important factor which must be 
considered when interpreting sustainable development. Extensive poverty, 
unemployment and social need require social and economic development, while 
conditions of poverty also contribute significantly to environmental degradation. The 
poor often employ unsustainable practices and deplete natural resources in order to 
survive. Environmental protection thus requires development in order to alleviate the 
environmental effects of poverty. I suggested that the socio-economic rights in the 
Bill of Rights have an important reinforcing role to play in this regard. As the socio-
economic rights further the goals of poverty alleviation and development, 
environmental protection and sustainable development are indirectly promoted. 
Sustainable development demands the simultaneous promotion of social 
development and environmental protection. 
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The concept of sustainable development has received much attention in 
international law and among environmental law academics. From the range of 
elements of sustainable development suggested in the literature, I identified and 
analysed those which are recognised in the formulation of section 24 and enjoy 
broad consensus. These are the principle of equity, which encompasses 
intergenerational and intragenerational equity, and the principle of integration which 
concerns the integration of environmental, social and economic interests in 
sustainable development decision-making. 
Intergenerational equity is underscored by the constitutional value of equality and 
involves an obligation towards future generations. As is evident from its structure, I 
argued that section 24 requires us to consider the economic, social and 
environmental needs of both present and future generations. I noted that 
environmental protection and conservation play an important role in intergenerational 
equity. An appreciation of the freedom and autonomy of future generations suggests 
that the environment should be protected and preserved so that future generations 
can make their own decisions regarding environmental resources. As the present 
generation we should aim to preserve all natural resources as much as possible. The 
resources that are of no use today may prove invaluable to future generations. The 
notion of intergenerational equity also emphasises that sustainable development is a 
long term project which must be passed on to each new generation. 
I argued, furthermore, that intragenerational equity draws attention to the 
necessity for sustainable development to address the needs of the current 
generation on an equitable basis. Equality and environmental justice have an 
important role to play here. I proposed that sustainable development should promote 
the equitable distribution of natural resources and the benefits of development. 
Alleviating poverty in the present generation is also an essential feature of 
sustainable development and intragenerational equity. The poor often bear the brunt 
of environmental risk without enjoying any benefit from environmental assets. In this 
regard I argued that socio-economic rights have an important role to play in 
addressing the needs of the poor, thereby advancing sustainable development, 
poverty alleviation and intergenerational equity. 
The principle of integration involves the harmonisation of the three pillars of 
sustainable development: environmental protection, social development and 




economic development. Sustainable development values compromise and 
consolidation of the three pillars in order to promote all three simultaneously rather 
than win-lose competition between the three conflicting goals. The balance of all 
three aspects of sustainable development is important, as a narrow environmentalist 
perspective which ignores human need risks becoming irrelevant and ineffective, 
particularly in the South African context. 
I proposed that reasonableness should be considered in balancing the three 
pillars of sustainable development. The principles of reasonableness review 
developed in socio-economic rights jurisprudence provide an indication of those 
interests which should be prioritised in sustainable development matters. In this 
regard a consideration of both short-term and long-term needs is important. A 
consideration of the position of the poor and vulnerable who may be affected by a 
decision is also an important requirement for the reasonableness. I argued that the 
reasonableness requirement demands that sustainable development decisions 
contribute to the realisation of the goals and purposes of the environmental right. 
As a perfect balance between the three pillars is rarely possible, I noted that 
decision-makers will regularly indicate a preference for one of the three pillars of 
sustainable development. In light of this, I proposed that the transparent approach 
developed by Tladi should be adopted.4 This approach involves the explicit 
recognition of the preferred pillar in sustainable development decisions. Tladi refers 
to the environment-centred variation, economic growth-centred variation and the 
human needs-centred variation of sustainable development. Each variation 
acknowledges which pillar of sustainable development has been given priority. I 
proposed that Tladi’s approach of openly recognising the preferred value and its 
legitimising basis is appropriate in the context of section 24 and the Bill of Rights. 
This would require decision-makers to rely on a legitimate constitutional basis for 
their decisions. I further contended that more constitutional support can be found in 
the Bill of Rights for environment-centred and human needs-centred variations of 
sustainable development than for the economic growth-centred variation. This 
approach would guard against the abuse of sustainable development for the 
promotion of pure economic gain. 
                                            
4
 See Tladi D Sustainable Development in International Law: An Analysis of Key Enviro-Economic 
Instruments (2007). 




Sustainable development often implicates competing rights in the Bill of Rights. As 
there is no inherent hierarchy of rights in the Constitution, it is not always clear which 
decision should be made in sustainable development problems. While a range of 
options may be open to a decision-maker, I propose that sustainable development 
should be understood as requiring reliance on the rights, values and purposes of the 
Constitution to legitimise such decisions. This approach will encourage sustainable 
development to promote the constitutional goals of social justice and improving the 
lives of the poor, due to the support found for these goals throughout the Bill of 
Rights.  
As I pointed out, it must also be remembered that the environmental right aims to 
achieve ecologically sustainable development. I observed that the sustainable 
development remains anthropocentric as the protection of the environment is 
ultimately for the benefit of present and future generations. In light of the 
environmental emphasis in the right, I propose that where no other rights are 
involved, sustainable development should favour the environmental pillar. Where 
rights, particularly socio-economic rights, are implicated in a case the pillars must be 
balanced according to the extent and urgency of the need. How this balancing is 
done will depend on the urgency of the need, the other rights affected, and the 
impact of the various alternative balancing outcomes on the purposes and goals of 
the Constitution. I suggested, however, that little constitutional support exists for the 
promotion of purely economic interests or, in fact, for the promotion of economic 
interests above environmental or social interests. 
This transparent and contextual interpretation of sustainable development 
requires a reliance on the Bill of Rights and the Constitution as a whole, emphasising 
the interdependence of rights and the importance of the unity of the Constitution. The 
proposed approach should therefore bring attention to the needs of the poor as it 
requires a constitutional basis and forces decision-makers to consider the full range 
of rights, values and purposes of the Constitution (all of which hold important 
benefits for the poor). 
The importance of the environmental right is emphasised by the Constitutional 
Court in Fuel Retailers v Director-General: Environmental Management where it was 
held that the protection of the environment “is vital to the enjoyment of the other 




rights contained in the Bill of Rights; indeed it is vital to life itself”.5 I have attempted 
to show the potential of this pivotal right to advance not only environmental 
protection but also social justice and poverty alleviation, and I must agree with Feris 
that the environmental right is indeed an “underutilised resource”.6  
A holistic, teleological interpretation of the right which takes cognisance of the 
interdependence of rights could make an important contribution to the protection of 
the environment for the sake of humankind while promoting social justice and the 
needs of the poor. 
In summary, I have suggested that a teleological interpretation which considers 
interdependence of rights and constitutional goals and values is the optimum 
methodology for giving content to section 24. I argued that the right should not be 
interpreted without taking South Africa’s circumstances of poverty, unemployment 
and inequality into account. The constitutional context provides indications of how 
best to interpret section 24 in accordance with the rights, values and goals of the 
Constitution. I proposed that the constitutional context indicates that “environment” 
must be understood to include the anthropogenic environment in order for the rights 
and purposes of the Constitution to be effectively advanced. I argued that the 
constitutional context of rights, values and goals indicates which aspects of life enjoy 
constitutional protection and are therefore considered essential for giving content to 
the term “well-being”. Finally, I suggested that constitutional rights, values and goals 
offer a means to guide and legitimise the complex balancing of interests necessary 
for sustainable development. 
This thesis has endeavoured to shed light on how a teleological and 
interdependent approach to the interpretation of section 24 can address the needs of 
the poor and promote social justice. There are, however, many aspects of section 24 
beyond the scope of this research which still require investigation. The notion of 
harm has important implications for the scope of “health or well-being” in section 24. 
I briefly addressed the meaning of harm in chapter 4, but a more extensive study of 
the term is needed in order to understand what would constitute an infringement of 
section 24(a). As illustrated by Kidd, the meaning of well-being could be informed by 
the interpretations and approaches to the term found in other academic disciplines. 
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This calls for a thorough investigation of the various sources available and their 
interaction with well-being in the environmental right. The potential of section 24 as a 
socio-economic right is also in need of further study. Although the environmental 
right is a socio-economic right, it is also distinguished from other socio-economic 
rights in the Bill of Rights by the exclusion of a progressive realisation or available 
resources qualification. The absence of these internal qualifications has a range of 
potential implications for how section 24 is understood and implemented. This would 
also have an impact on how reasonableness is understood and applied in the 
context of section 24. Precisely what this could mean remains to be investigated. 
There is also a great need for more examination of the interrelationship between 
section 24 and other socio-economic rights. As I have argued in chapter 2, the 
presence of the environmental right in the Bill of Rights has consequences for the 
interpretation and scope of other rights. These possible consequences deserve 
further attention. Finally, it is clear that in order to clarify the meaning of the 
environmental right in section 24, the courts need to elaborate on the content and 
meaning of the right. As Du Plessis has argued: 
[I]n order to avoid the perils of an impoverished and meagre development of 
constitutional environmental jurisprudence and in order to remain committed to the 
transformative purpose of the Constitution, the courts will have to concretise, albeit 
cautiously, the meaning of s 24 as soon as the opportunity reveals itself.7 
The exciting potential of section 24 to advance social justice and promote a higher 
standard of living for the poor will not be fully realised without the judicial affirmation 
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